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In this project, I examined rhetorical activities of the 1969–1970 Chicago Eight 
Trial, focusing on discourse from the trial itself (e.g., from the eight defendants, the 
judge, the lawyers, and the court reports) and discourse occurring outside the trial (e.g., 
newspaper reports) from 1968 to the present. Because the Chicago Eight Trial played an 
important role in the discussion of the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement, I sought 
to interrogate the rhetorical dimensions of the discourse within the trial, in the media 
coverage of the trial, and among the participants during the trial. This case was situated 
within the context of antiwar protests in the United States as well as the transformative 
context of the 1960s, specifically contestations about the Cold War, civil rights, political 
assassinations, and the military draft. Overall, this project was intended to deepen 
understanding of how public moral argument, Baktinian carnival, and guerrilla theater 
functioned in discourses of the Chicago Eight Trial, whose defendants aimed to challenge 
the dominant sociopolitical culture over the U.S. war in Vietnam. In addition, the 
Chicago Eight Trial was a prime example of the ways that public moral arguments can be 
used to disseminate messages about the political, ethical, and social conditions in the 
United States. Finally, in this project, I sought to understand how the rhetoric involving 
the Chicago Eight Trial was framed by the defendants and by the media. The project 
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The United States of America was founded on principles of dissent. Religious 
liberties, fair taxes, voting rights—these are just some of the topics that have motivated 
Americans to question the power structure under which they live. As a central element of 
American political culture, protest has provided a means to advocate for freedoms—of 
the press, of speech, of religious expression, of political beliefs and more.1 One of the 
most contentious issues in U.S. history has been war. Although war is almost always 
controversial, protesting against war can be fraught with difficulties. Antiwar protesters  
often face accusations of being unpatriotic, un-American, or even traitorous, which at 
times have limited their abilities to dissent.2 However, with each war the United States 
has entered, activists have learned new, innovative ways to convey their antiwar 
messages.  
Beginning in the 1950s and lasting until the early 1970s, the U.S. political climate 
underwent radical changes. Within the context of the Cold War, the New Left movement 
emerged, the civil rights movement gained momentum, women’s liberation took shape, 
and the Vietnam War escalated. Despite the public notions of prosperity that perpetuated 
American life,3 poverty, sexism, and racism proliferated.4 Many among the younger 
generation of Americans began to dissent, tired of what they viewed as the older 
generation’s out-of-date politics and norms. This ideology of dissent soon cultivated in 
them the desire to act. “A striking feature of the 1960s,” M. J. Heale contended, “was a 
pervasive belief in the power of action.”5 Some protesters used resistance strategies 
learned from previous generations, and others sought to create new forms of protest.6 




the increasingly protracted Vietnam War became the main cause for protest by the end of 
the 1960s,7 particularly for American college students.8  
Antiwar activists can be found for every war throughout U.S. history; however, 
the new technologies of the 1960s, combined with a “belief in the power of action,” 
created the largest and most visible antiwar movement in the nation’s history.9 Young 
Americans, and college students in particular, became the driving force behind many of 
the emerging protest groups; they protested against the draft, the imperialist nature of 
U.S. foreign policy, and the morality of the war in Indochina. Pictures of young 
Americans protesting in the streets appeared on television, in newspapers, and in films; 
many of the leaders of antiwar groups consequently gained celebrity status.10 These 
protests, examined through the lens of the Vietnam War, offer a valuable opportunity to 
delve deeply into the activism of this era and to explore the responses and memories the 
protests prompted.11 
In this project, I examined rhetorical activities of the 1969–1970 Chicago Eight 
Trial, focusing on discourse from the trial itself (particularly discourse produced by the 
eight defendants, the judge, the lawyers, and the court reports)12 as well as discourse 
surrounding and following the trial (through major newspapers) between 1968 and 1972. 
Although previous research has focused on historical reconstructions of the DNC protest 
and the trial,13 legal issues within the trial,14 and biographies of the defendants and 
lawyers,15 few rhetorical studies of the trial exist.16 In this dissertation, I sought to extend 
existing research in three ways. First, I recognized a broad range of discourses as relevant 
to understanding the Chicago Eight Trial. Second, I interrogated rhetorical dimensions of 




U.S. antiwar protests, Cold War battles, civil rights movements, political assassinations, 
and changing sexual standards. Third, I introduced theories of public moral argument, 
carnival, the morality play, and media framing to the process of interpreting Chicago 
Eight Trial discourses. 
Public Moral Argument, Carnival, the Morality Play, and Media Framing 
In this dissertation, I sought to answer two research questions regarding the 
rhetoric of the Chicago Eight Trial and its news coverage:  
1. How did the defendants’ use of public moral arguments function as a means 
of social protest, particularly in a legal setting dependent on rules and 
decorum, and extend and transform traditional forms of American antiwar 
protest rhetoric in the process?  
2. How did such public moral arguments transcend the trial and continue to 
circulate through media coverage, potentially influencing national discussions 
over the legitimacy of the war and the restrictions on free speech rights during 
wartime?   
Public moral arguments serve as a key critical lens for this study. Celeste 
Michelle Condit noted that morality is constituted through public discourse.17 Such 
arguments, Walter R. Fisher claimed, are “publicized” and thus “made available for 
consumption and persuasion of the public at large.”18 This type of argument is commonly 
directed toward those who would not be considered “experts” on the subject.19 Defining 
what is or is not moral consequently lies at the heart of the public moral argument. Fisher 
wrote that such arguments are “founded on ultimate questions—of life and death, of how 




moral argument addresses problems of social and/or political consequence that encourage 
identification and engagement with the community.21   
Linking public moral argument with narrative theory, Fisher differentiated public 
moral arguments from reasoned discourse. Referring to nonexperts, Fisher noted the need 
to address ethical issues with “good reasons,” arguing that the definition of “expert” in 
the public moral argument is determined by the public. The public judges competing 
narratives based on their “fidelity”—in other words, “whether the stories they experience 
ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives” and the stories’ 
“probability,” or “what constitutes a coherent story.”22 Elaborating further on Fisher’s 
narrative theory, Lisa M. Gring-Pemble noted that the public moral argument enacted 
through narrative is persuasive because it allows the audience to identify with one side of 
the argument over the other.23 Because public moral arguments rely on narratives as a 
key component of persuasion,24 different voices create competing narratives, requiring 
the members of the public to make complex decisions about moral issues in the midst of 
contested political disputes.  
Court trials can easily become the sites of public moral arguments because of the 
dramatic nature of the genre,25 the media attention often given these cases, and the 
inherent moral issues that often surround legal deliberations. Within the narrative 
paradigm, a public moral argument may well rise to the level of a “public controversy.”26 
Reggie Twigg, for example, explained the moral nature of the court system: “The Court 
and its translators, such as the media, use narratives to inculcate ‘new’ interpretations of 
ideology into the public. In doing so, the Court’s relationship to the public in shaping 




can manipulate narratives in order to make grander arguments about the law and 
morality. For instance, in his analysis of the 1857 Supreme Court Case Scott v. Sandford, 
Todd F. McDorman argued that the court discerned the status of citizenship by defining 
who met the criteria of personhood, providing its own moral answer to a very 
controversial public question in the process.28  
When the public moral argument couples with media framing, it has the potential 
to transform the trial into a political spectacle. As Stephen Underhill writes, “spectacles 
can function as political tools designed to manipulate a public through constructing 
problems and offering policies that leaders work to pass for ulterior political purposes.”29 
Spectacles are constructed through language, as Murray Edelman writes. “It is language 
about political events, not the events in any other sense, that people experience; even 
developments that are close by take their meaning from the language that depicts them. 
So political language is political reality.”30 Thus the public moral argument’s expression 
through language merges with media frames to shape the stories from and about the trial. 
In certain circumstances, this spectacle is portrayed through the carnivalesque, a 
bawdy form of social satire. Public moral argument may be displayed through the 
carnival to express opposition to the dominant culture and its institutions, functioning as a 
form of social protest.31 Mikhail Bakhtin divided the carnivalesque into three categories: 
“ritual spectacles,” “comic verbal compositions,” and “various genres of billingsgate.”32 
Accordingly, the carnival is a public creation, Bakhtin argued, because the community 
takes part in its festivities. “Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, 
and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people.”33 In Rabelais 




behavior that might be considered vulgar by those in the upper classes. Consequently, the 
carnivalesque offers a new way of viewing the world, Bakhtin maintained, one based on 
the discourse and actions of a group that is ordinarily dismissed. Building upon Bakhtin’s 
original conception of the carnival, John Fiske argued that the carnivalesque represents “a 
testament to the power of the ‘low’ to insist upon its rights to a place in the culture.”34 
Proponents of carnival deny that rules must control; carnival “builds a world upside 
down.”35  
The carnival thus roots itself in the activities of those whose voices may be 
ordinarily ignored or dismissed by the larger public and by those in power. As James A. 
Janack noted, “Carnival’s historical role” has been a means of “protest against the 
dominant sociopolitical system and its manifestation as a response to alienation from the 
political elite.”36 Similarly, M. Lane Bruner acknowledged the power structures that are 
involved in carnival protest: “Those on the losing ends of the political and economic 
spectrums have periodically counteracted repressive forms of government with 
carnivalesque forms of protest.”37 The carnival thus offers credibility to the often 
misinterpreted or rejected forms of protest.38 
In this study, I applied the critical lens of public moral argument to analyze the 
discourse surrounding the Chicago Eight Trial. More specifically, I argue how the 
carnival (in the case of Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin) and the morality play (in the 
case of Bobby Seale) created public moral arguments that used previous antiwar 
strategies and extended those tactics in new ways. To accomplish these research goals, I 
examined the transcripts from the trial, including the arguments and the descriptions of 




My intention was to demonstrate the ways that the defendants’ protest activities reflected 
and differed from more traditional modes of protest seen during the Vietnam War. I 
situate the discourse and actions of the defendants within the larger context of U.S. 
antiwar protests to determine the ways these actions complemented, extended, and 
amended previous forms of protest.  
In addition, I explored the circulation of such public moral arguments within the 
news coverage from the time of the Democratic National Convention in August 1968 to 
shortly after the seven defendants’ sentences were overturned in November 1972. Of 
particular salience were issues of war protests and free speech rights. News framing 
theories guided the examination of the corresponding news coverage. Dietram A. 
Scheufele and David Tewksbury explained, framing “is based on the assumption that 
how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is 
understood by audiences.”39 Robert Entman argued that media frames function as 
narratives, serving four major functions: they “define problems,” “diagnose causes,” 
“make moral judgments,” and “suggest remedies.”40 In addition, media framing often 
relies on visual images to strengthen its narrative.41 Therefore, in this study, I also 
examined verbal and visual media portrayals of the Chicago Eight Trial discourse in 
order to understand the circulation of the defendants’ public moral arguments.42 
Ultimately, in this project, I sought to understand how the Chicago defendants 
targeted their public moral arguments to a larger public in order to transcend the 
immediate courtroom context, resulting in the media’s circulation of such arguments 
throughout U.S. political culture. I argue such arguments transcended questions of the 




strategies, the draft, and civil liberties, both while the trial was occurring and in the years 
and decades that followed. 
Précis of Chapters 
As suggested in the foregoing I contend that public moral arguments and carnival 
rhetoric used by the Chicago Eight helped punctuate the discourse about the country’s 
war in Vietnam. In creating courtroom displays that attempted to get the attention and 
coverage of the U.S. news media, the defendants helped ensure a widespread circulation 
of their antiwar and antigovernment strategies, transforming the courtroom into another 
protest site. My examination of rhetorical discourse at this site interrogated the trial 
transcripts, news stories surrounding the trial, and visual portrayals of the defendants 
through popular newspapers. To contextualize my examination, I provided a brief 
account of antiwar discourse before and during the Vietnam War. Accordingly, the 
dissertation is divided into the following chapters.  
Chapter 1 provides a history of antiwar discourse in American culture from the 
Revolutionary War to the Korean War, and outlines ways that civil liberties have been 
limited during times of war. The right to protest has been a significant and controversial 
issue within the United States since the time of the Puritans and continues to be a divisive 
issue even today, particularly during times of war. Antiwar protests represent arguments 
against the authority of the government, making this dissent even more contested. In 
addition, antiwar activism encourages citizens to question their religious beliefs, and 
often, to alter or strengthen their religious commitments.43 Further, this sort of protest can 
promote an increased examination of societal structures and the need for social revision. 




arguments that may prompt questions about the underlying structures and practices of a 
nation, particularly in terms of civil liberties during times of war. Moreover, American 
antiwar protesters have built upon the strategies of previous activists, using successful 
strategies and repeating some mistakes. An understanding of previous antiwar efforts 
provides the foundation for understanding the similarities and differences of the Vietnam 
War protesters.   
Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the antiwar movement against the 
Vietnam War, focusing on the movement’s similarities to previous protests and noting 
the numerous differences of this dissent. The Chicago Eight Trial cannot be understood 
apart from the larger context of the Vietnam War; this was a political trial in which the 
defendants attempted to make arguments about the morality of the war itself through their 
actions and testimony within the trial. In this chapter, I explain the context in which the 
defendants protested, the various groups to which each defendant belonged, and the 
actions at the Democratic National Convention that led to their arrests.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the verbal discourse and nonverbal actions of the judge, 
defendants, and lawyers during the trial. I apply Bakhtin’s construction of the carnival, 
using the three categories of “ritual spectacle,” “comic verbal compositions,” and “genres 
of billingsgate” as a framework for understanding how the carnival creates public moral 
arguments. The defendants used this strategy to challenge not only the charges against 
them, but the entire judicial system, a corrupt capitalist economy, and most important, the 
war in Vietnam. Finally, I analyze how the behaviors and discourses of the eight 
defendants, the lawyers, and the judge can be understood as a public moral argument 




Chapter 4 provides a case study of one defendant in particular: Bobby Seale, 
cofounder of the Black Panther Party. Seale’s role in the trial provides an interesting 
point of analysis for several reasons. Though vocally opposed to the Vietnam War, Seale 
was more concerned with racial justice domestically. He had no involvement in planning 
the demonstrations at the DNC; in fact, he was in Chicago for a short period of time to 
deliver a speech at the request of protest organizers. Further, Seale demanded to act as his 
own attorney in the trial. In addition, as the only African American defendant, Seale 
offered a unique perspective. In this chapter, I explore Seale’s use of guerrilla theater as 
an act of public moral argument, through which he challenged the racism of the court 
system. Situating Seale’s discourse within the context of the Cold War generally and the 
anti-Vietnam war movement in particular, I examine the unique positions of African 
American protesters and Bobby Seale, arguing that Judge Hoffman and the U.S. 
government used a different iteration of the same containment strategy it had begun 
against the Civil Rights movement in the Cold War period. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss news framing and its role in creating meaning about the 
trial. Again, public moral argument serves as the critical template for this chapter, along 
with theories of news framing. I discuss how the trial was portrayed by national 
newspapers (Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago 
Tribune). My intention was to examine how the defendants attempted to circulate their 
public moral arguments through the news media. Finally, in this chapter I argue that the 
media’s use of the marginalizing frame, in which the media favors the institution over the 




public moral argument of the movement by motivating supporters and justifying the 
protest. Therefore, the defendants’ public moral argument was often overshadowed. 
Overall, this project was aimed at deepening understanding of how public moral 
argument functioned to challenge the dominant sociopolitical culture regarding the U.S. 
war in Vietnam. The Chicago Eight Trial exemplifies ways that public moral argument 
can be used to convey broad arguments about the political, ethical, and social conditions 
within the United States. The trial also shows how news framing can work to construct 
meaning for the larger audience that exists outside the immediate venue of protest 
discourse.   
The trial involving the Chicago Eight has been called a “transforming event in 
American political and legal history,”44 because its implications did not just involve the 
innocence or guilt of the defendants. The defendants in the case clearly sought media 
attention and desired to transform the trial into a forum for larger political ends. Abbie 
Hoffman explained the defendants’ mission in his autobiography: 
We wanted to reach young people. We wanted to “show” we were different from 
those prosecuting us. We wanted to present a synopsis of the issues dividing the 
nation, thereby elevating our cause to equal footing with the government. We 
could never hope to accomplish this power struggle with arms; we could only 
begin to manage it with imagery.45  
The ostensible goal of the defendants was of course to be acquitted, but more than 
that, they sought to change the political landscape of the country. In the following 
discussion, I argue that the Chicago Eight used a rhetoric that reflected the features of 




the courtroom. Throughout the trial, the defense called witnesses who spoke more about 
the immorality and illegality of the Vietnam War than about the innocence of the 
defendants. In fact, the defendants themselves took advantage by subverting the platform 
of traditional courtroom conduct to argue against the war whenever possible. As historian 
Jon Weiner wrote, “At the end of the sixties, it seems that all the conflicts in America 
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Antiwar Protest in United States History 
The right to protest state-sponsored action has been a significant and controversial 
issue in American history since the time of the Puritans and continues to be a divisive 
issue, particularly during times of war. Robert L. Ivie suggested war has come to be 
considered an inevitability, needed to protect ideals and save lives. Protest against war, 
Ivie argued, is much more controversial than war: “Curiously, placing one’s self or loved 
ones in harm’s way seems less difficult and more reassuring than questioning the 
necessity, legitimacy, or sanity of war in any given case.”1 Protests against war represent 
arguments against the authority of the government, making this dissent even more 
contested.2 In addition, antiwar protest can also encourage citizens to question their 
religious beliefs and alter or strengthen their religious commitments,3 and can promote 
increased questioning of societal structures and the need for social revision. Acts of 
protest, specifically against war, thus represent a controversial, multilayered debate about 
the underlying structures of a country. These debates are the focus of this chapter.   
Protesters are often accused of being disloyal. Thus, antiwar arguments and 
demonstrations are often linked to issues of patriotism. Just as American dissent has its 
roots in Puritan times, so does the ideology of American patriotism. According to George 
McKenna, patriotism—the idea that Americans have a special place in the world—has its 
roots in the Puritan belief that Americans are a “chosen people.”4 Alfred Jordan 
considered patriotism a type of bias in which a collectivity enhances the credibility of the 
belief.5 Jordan further noted that patriotism encourages a sort of ethnocentrism that 




sentiments.6 Patriotism is inherently connected to issues of war. John Somerville wrote, 
“To speak of patriotism was to think of war; to hear the words ‘a great patriot’ was to 
visualize a man with arms in hand risking his life on the field of battle.”7 Protest against a 
war, therefore, becomes an issue of patriotism, and those who choose to question the 
ethics, legality, politics, or motives of war often face questions about their loyalty to the 
nation and possible allegations of treason. 
Despite the political risks of antiwar protest, however, Americans have 
participated in antiwar demonstrations and activities throughout American history. In this 
chapter, I examine the nature of antiwar protest beginning with the Revolutionary War 
and ending with a discussion of the Korean War, tracing developments in protest 
throughout the last three centuries. I treat the Vietnam War in a separate chapter, because 
the dissent against this war is the focus of this dissertation. Because “patriotism” is 
intrinsically linked to issues of war, in this chapter I will also discuss how protesters 
bridged (or failed to bridge) the gap between patriotism and antiwar sentiments. Finally, I 
examine how antiwar protesters emerged within the dominant discourse of the time. 
Thus, the purpose of this examination is to gain a larger understanding of how protest and 
the political actors who participated in such protest have been perceived throughout the 
country’s history. Previous scholarly efforts at exploring antiwar discourse in the United 
States have treated only one conflict at a time; thus, I combine these discussions with an 
emphasis on significant figures within each antiwar movement in an effort to trace some 
of the consistencies and differences involving antiwar protest in the United States. 
I organize this chapter into six sections based on the national or ideological 




two wars that the United States fought against the British Empire: the Revolutionary War 
and the War of 1812. The second section deals with the Mexican-American War, which 
occurred from 1846 to 1848. The third section is devoted to the Civil War and the 
protests by citizens in both the North and in the South. In the fourth section, I discuss 
wars with Spain and its colonies, particularly the Spanish-American War and the 
Philippine-American War. The fifth section is dedicated to World War I and World War 
II. Finally, I have labeled the last section “The Cold War,” and included the Korean War 
within this section, because this war cannot be understood apart from the atmosphere 
created by the fear of communism.8  
The Revolutionary War 
Prior to the American Revolution, social movements began emerging in places 
like New England and the South in response to British regulations. For instance, the 
Continental Association of 1774, created by the First Continental Congress, encouraged 
its members not to import goods, but rather to rely on domestic products instead. In 
addition, the Association asked its members to spread the nonimportation, 
nonconsumption message to their friends and neighbors and to police those who were 
importing products that could be bought domestically.9  Behind these measures was the 
hope that Great Britain would give in to the demands of the colonies in response to the 
boycott.  
The Association emphasized patriotism among its members and used the term to 
argue for the rightness of its cause. According to Barbara Clark Smith, “a patriot 
[according to the Association] was one who did not import, consume, or raise prices on 




the main tool used by the Association members to enforce “patriotism” among the 
colonists, but the group also encouraged community members to sign petitions saying 
that they agreed to support the rules of the Association.11 Those colonists who did not 
abide by the rules of the Association were subject to public hearings, and Association 
members boycotted their products or stores. This movement against Great Britain ended 
with the beginning of the Revolution, but clearly showed the willingness of the colonists 
to protest against treatment they deemed unjust.  
Because the United States began as a British colony, it is not surprising that the 
country’s first war was one for independence from the British Empire. Not all American 
colonists desired to break from their mother country; in fact, many were hesitant to give 
up the protection offered by the crown and the loyalty they had cultivated toward the 
monarchy. Traces of the war opponents’ arguments may be found, for example, in 
Thomas Paine’s 1776 pamphlet Common Sense: “Why is it that we hesitate? From 
Britain we can expect nothing but ruin. If she is once admitted to the government of 
America again, the Continent will not be worth living in.”12 Paine further sought to refute 
arguments of those who wished to stay under Britain’s power, contending that 
independence was inevitable because of the distance between Europe and the Americas, 
and because God was the true ruler of America, not a King.13 Despite the popularity of 
Paine’s arguments, some colonists remained unmoved by the pamphlet, continuing to 
pledge their allegiance to the crown. Joyce Appleby noted, “While there were radical 
leaders prepared to push for independence—for instance Samuel and John Adams—too 
many men and women were apprehensive, not just about the dangers of a struggle for 




war as a rebellion, not a revolution, and were hesitant to take part in radical acts of 
rebellion against their government.15 These issues complicated the notion of “patriotism,” 
requiring colonists to choose between ties to their homes or to their British leaders.  
Although today the Loyalist party is seen as a group of traitors, during the 
American Revolution, this party had considerable support from colonists and leaders. In 
fact, Robert Calhoon estimated that between 15% and 20% of colonial Americans would 
have been considered Loyalists.16 One famous loyalist who refused to support the 
American Revolution was Joseph Galloway. Galloway attempted to bridge the gap 
between Loyalists and Revolutionaries by creating a more beneficial union among the 
colonists and Great Britain. Galloway did not believe that Americans had suffered from 
oppression under the crown; in fact, he concluded that the Revolution was illegal and 
unwarranted. In addition, Galloway argued that a rebellion would not be beneficial for 
either the Americans or the British.17 In his rhetorical analysis of Galloway’s arguments, 
James Edward Sayer described the American dilemma as a choice of “foreign conquest 
and internal strife if her [America’s] rebellion were successful, or the loss of political and 
human rights at the hands of the British if the rebellion failed.”18 After his attempts to 
create a union between the colonists and the British failed and his service to the British 
crown ended, Galloway began publishing pamphlets outlining the reasons that the 
Revolution should be stopped. His protests went unheeded in America, so Galloway 
moved to England to profess his arguments to the British people. He encouraged the 
British to employ the support of American Loyalists more effectively and warned them 




attempts at persuasion in England met with the same response as did his efforts in 
America, receiving little attention from the population or its leaders. 
Another group of Loyalists, the Tories, enacted a different type of protest against 
the American Revolution: The Tories performed plays that emphasized the greatness of 
King George and the magnificence of the British Empire.20 According to Ralph Borden 
Culp, the Tories used dialogues in which they berated the Whigs and glorified the 
Loyalist cause. Culp wrote, “Glittering generalities associated these three subjects [King 
George, the English Whigs, and Great Britain] with the heroic past, with peace and 
liberty, with material progress, and with the middle class attitudes of the viewers.”21 The 
Tories’ efforts proved unsuccessful; the American Revolution began in 1775 when the 
colonists formed the Continental Army and prepared for battle with the British. 
Many African American slaves chose to remain loyal to the British crown. The 
British offered male slaves the promise of freedom in return for their loyalty. The 
presence of slavery in America provided a confusing contradiction noted by many 
African Americans. Mary Beth Norton noted the  
primary intellectual paradoxes of the Revolution: the ironic fact that slave-holding 
Americans, who accepted without question doctrines of racial inferiority, wrote 
ringingly of the “equal rights of man” and inveighed resoundingly against the 
possibility that the colonists would be “enslaved” by Britain.22  
Because of this paradox, many African American slaves defected from their plantations 
to join the side of the British. Available means of protest for slaves were limited; their 
strongest means of conveying antiwar sentiments was to flee the country or to join the 




the words “Liberty to Slaves” onto their shirts in an effort to protest the paradox of 
freedom that the colonists represented.23 
In addition, women protested against the war, in part because many became 
destitute or widowed as a result of the Revolution. Although some suffered in silence, 
others sought change. They protested to their local authorities about the pay (or lack of 
pay) that their husbands received during their service. They protested the lack of pension 
money for those women who lost their husbands in the war.24 Though no specific 
women’s organization emerged during this time to protest the war, individual women and 
small groups of women protested as issues arose.25 Because women were most often 
confined to the private sphere, their complaints were frequently met with jeers and 
contempt from the government and the male public. Women’s rights were further 
restricted during the war as well: They were forced to take jobs that paid meager wages in 
order to support their families and were often forced to flee their homes for fear of British 
reprisal.26  
Despite fears, many women spoke out against their treatment during and after the 
war. For example, some women argued that they experienced the same conditions faced 
by slaves. Abigail Adams was perhaps the most famous woman to make the case for 
women’s rights during the Revolutionary War, discussing the position of women with her 
husband John Adams. In her study of women during the Revolution, Betsy Erkkila noted 
Abigail Adams became “one of the first to note and draw out the revolutionary 
implications of the analogy between the political position of America and the position of 




foundation for their arguments, but their status in society ultimately limited their efforts 
to ultimately create change. 
During the war, those who spoke out against the Revolution were quickly silenced 
or sanctioned. For example, in Charleston, South Carolina, those who opposed the 
Revolution were, according to Walter Edgar, “silenced by physical threats or banishment 
to the countryside.”28 Loyalists were ridiculed and criticized in newspapers, speeches, 
and pamphlets and had their reputations mocked and their political ideas chastised.29 
Robert S. Lambert noted the confiscation of Loyalist property even after the war, 
explaining that prominent Tories’ property had been seized and sold at auction.30 Special 
prisons were created for Tories, including the Simsbury Mine in Connecticut, which was 
particularly brutal to its inmates.31 
With the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, protest became even 
more difficult for those seeking social and political change. Following the XYZ Affair of 
1798–1799,32 President John Adams waged an undeclared war with France, often 
referred to by historians as the Quasi War. Rebellions occurred across the country, 
including Fries’s Rebellion in Pennsylvania. Participants in Fries’s Rebellion opposed the 
taxes being collected to fund the war with France, because the citizens in Fries’ city did 
not believe the benefits of the war justified the costs.33 Though their arguments centered 
on issues of taxation, the citizens who took part in this rebellion argued against the 
constitutionality of the war as well. In one case, the Hembolt family and their neighbors 
created a “liberty pole” on which they attached a sign that read, “The Constitution 
Sacred, No Gagg [sic] Laws, Liberty or Death” to protest American participation in the 




In response to the increased public opposition to the war,35 many courts had 
begun enforcing libel laws to punish protesters who spoke out against the government. 
Thomas F. Carroll noted, however, that the enforcement of these punishments was often 
excessive and sporadic:  
The severity with which this law was administered and the doubts as to the exact 
provisions of it in regard to libels led to the demand for legislative enactments on 
the subject, and the Federalist majority in Congress hastily passed the Sedition 
Act to meet the situation.36  
The Alien and Sedition Acts were actually made up of four acts: (1) The Naturalization 
Act, which focused on the length of time aliens were required to reside in the United 
States before becoming eligible for citizenship; (2) The Alien Friends Act, which enabled 
Adams to deport aliens who were considered dangerous to American security; (3) The 
Alien Enemies Act, which allowed the President to deport citizens of countries currently 
at war with the United States; and (4) The Sedition Act, which read: 
And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or 
shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall 
knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of 
the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the 
President of the United States, with intent to  defame the said government, or 
either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either 
of them, in contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of 




combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, 
. . . then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United 
States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two 
thousand dollars, and  by imprisonment not exceeding two years.37 
Thus, with the passage of the Sedition Act, speaking or writing any discourse that the 
government could possibly consider false, slanderous, or malicious became punishable by 
law. 38  
The War of 1812 
The War of 1812 is commonly thought of as a war to assert America’s new power 
in the world.39 However, Norman K. Risjord has argued that the War of 1812 was also 
inspired by economic factors and the desire of Republicans to pursue a more militant 
foreign policy.40 Further, Risjord has asserted that James Madison, after taking over the 
office of the President in 1809, left the door open for war hawks to assert dominance over 
presidential decision making.41 In addition, Louis Morton Hacker has observed that the 
War of 1812 had expansionist underpinnings, because many agricultural workers in the 
United States desired the acquisition of Canada.42 Evidently, all these factors combined to 
ignite a war between the United States and Great Britain that left the U.S. Capitol 
Building and the White House burned and the principle of expansion unrealized for a 
time.  
As a new nation, the United States was not yet seen as a world power by the 
European elite. Despite the victory in the Revolutionary War, U.S. leaders often felt 
bullied by Great Britain and other European powers—a point repeatedly emphasized by 




was “the naïve longing to be liked” by the international community. Combined with the 
American reputation abroad as being “brash, boastful, crude, [and] money-mad,” this 
longing led many Republican leaders to condemn the British as a volatile enemy.43 
Robert L. Ivie noted that “Republican charges of British barbarity were persistent, 
thematic, and pervasive to the point of portending the ruination of American 
independence.”44 By depicting the British as “evil,” “plotting,” and “diabolical,” 
Republican leaders could construct an enemy that required destruction and a justification 
for asserting American military and moral power. 
Economic factors also provided a rationale for a U.S. declaration of war against 
Great Britain in 1812. Donald R. Hickey noted that the embargos imposed by Great 
Britain on the United States led to a “deep depression, perhaps the worst experienced [by 
the U.S.] since the beginning of colonial times.”45 In particular, leaders in the Southern 
and Mid-Atlantic states felt that a war with England was the answer to an agricultural 
downturn related to previous naval embargos. Prices for many of the agricultural 
products produced by these states, such as cotton and tobacco, had been steadily 
declining, and many in the South blamed British trade restrictions, despite evidence that 
the decline in prices was actually a long-term trend.46 According to Risjord, the “South 
and the West . . . went to war primarily to defend the right to export their products 
without interference from Britain.”47 The perception of Great Britain as an enemy led 
many Americans to blame the British for economic hardship, even though most of the 
evidence shows Britain provided a large market for American goods.48 
In addition, many Republicans believed war would strengthen their hold on the 




being Thomas Jefferson’s hand-picked successor. Madison relied heavily on Jefferson’s 
opinions, and his presidency continued to strengthen the Republican hold in American 
government.49 Although Jefferson sought a peaceful resolution to the conflicts with Great 
Britain, he also worried publicly that war would be the only possible solution.50 Madison 
apparently shared his concerns, but pressure from his political party seems to have forced 
his hand.51 War offered several advantages for Republican leaders. In addition to the 
prestige of once again defeating the British, many Republicans believed war could, 
according to Hickey, offer “the prospect of significant political dividends” and “the best 
means of unifying the Republican Party.”52 With the election of 1812 approaching, many 
Republicans believed that a war with Great Britain would secure the vote for Madison.  
Finally, war with Great Britain offered the temptation of acquiring land north of 
the U.S. border. This motive had four distinct advantages: (1) attaining Canadian lands 
would mean an expansion of the republican form of government, (2) the United States 
would gain economically, (3) Canada would provide a strategic battleground for war, and 
(4) the United States could end the sale of arms by Great Britain to Native American 
tribes who sought to use them against the United States. Although Madison denied the 
expansionist explanation for his declaration of war, the benefits of gaining Canadian land 
seemed undeniable.53  
Opposition to the war began even before its declaration. The most vocal 
opponents of the War of 1812 were the Federalists, who believed war would be 
disastrous for the United States. Initial arguments focused on the problems that war 
would create for the American economy. As historian Lawrence Delbert Cress wrote, 




along the frontier. . . . The heavy burden of wartime taxation . . . would rest with equally 
destructive force on every region of the country.”54 In an article in the Columbian 
Centinel, for example, one anonymous citizen wrote,  
I do not believe in the justice, and still less in the expediency of a British 
war. . . . Nor can I see any reason, why it is prima facie proof to greater 
patriotism, to be in favor of going to War, than to be in favor of remaining at 
Peace, especially if we think that war will bring nothing but disgrace and poverty, 
and that peace may be preserved with honor and advantage.55  
In addition, many Federalists feared that another downturn in America’s economy could 
lead to increased lawlessness and anarchy. “War meant unemployment . . . and with it 
discontent bred of idleness and want,” according to Cress.56 Many merchants in Vermont 
and New York resisted the war effort by continuing to sell food and oil to the British 
even during the war, despite a strict embargo. As Harvey Strum wrote,  
War did not stop New Yorkers or their Vermont neighbours from smuggling . . . . 
One reported caravan of smugglers was nearly a mile long. . . . Without American 
provisions the British could not have fed their troops and civilian population in 
Upper Canada (Ontario) in 1814.57  
Smuggling thus became a reaction to and protest against an economically unpopular war 
in New England. 
Federalists warned this war was another example of how the United States had 
strayed from its original purpose. Cress summarizes the Federalist argument that the war 




[The nation] had turned its back on the God who had made it free and 
independent. It had allowed individual ambition to replace a commitment to the 
common good as the driving force in society. For two decades . . . the lusts and 
passions of individuals in the pursuit of worldly goods had pushed the nation 
toward disaster. . . . Unjust laws, sometimes enforced in a cruel and arbitrary 
manner, had been passed and the public treasury squandered. Worst of all, a war 
had been declared that was neither necessary nor in self-defense.58 
Federalists claimed that God punished the citizens of the United States through the losses 
of this war, and the only way to be saved from God’s wrath was to repent. Repentance 
meant speaking out against the war, refusing to participate physically or monetarily in the 
war, and working to unseat government officials who had pushed for the war.59 In the 
Trenton Federalist, an anonymous “Hunterdonian” noted, “The moment we pronounce 
war against England, and as a necessary consequence, peace, union, and cooperation with 
France, our domestic endearments, our civil liberties, and our religious privileges, are in 
jeopardy.”60 William Gribbin noted, “[The message] was as simple as this: if the war was 
punishment for America’s sins, then those sins must be immediately expurgated.”61 Some 
citizens even engaged in fasts during the summer of 1812 in an effort to protest the war 
and to repent for their nation's sins.62 
The most extreme Federalist message came from New England Federalists, who 
called for the possible secession of New England from the Union. In the fall of 1814, the 
Massachusetts government met with representatives from Great Britain in an effort to 
secure a possible alliance with the crown at the Hartford Convention. According to J. S. 




separate peace with New England.”63 New England considered itself extraordinary in 
many ways, particularly in its commitment to republican ideals. According to James 
Banner, Jr., “It was this potent combination of republican and exclusivist attitudes which 
led many people during the trying days of 1814 to talk of concerted protest, a separate 
peace with Great Britain, or, in the last extremity, disunion.”64 Although secession was 
considered a last resort, one writer in the Boston Daily Advertiser noted its possibility:  
I do not mean to say that this bond [the union] may not be broken. On the 
contrary, I have no doubt that from a federation of sovereigns, any one or more of 
the sovereigns may secede, if it sees fit to do so. . . . All other means of relief 
should be first tried.65 
Despite the dominance of the Republican Party in New York’s government, New 
York Federalists also emerged as a significant antiwar voice. In response to the 
Republican endorsement of war, New Yorkers elected antiwar Federalists to its Assembly 
and urged its Congressmen and Senators to vote against a war.66 After war was declared, 
Federalists in the state urged the creation of a “Peace Party” to unite those who believed 
the war to be unjust.67 Harvey Strum noted many New Yorkers refused to serve in the 
state militia.68 Various antiwar and anticonscription rallies took place across the state.  
Many Federalist leaders began disseminating their antiwar message through 
newspaper stories. Editors and columnists of these newspapers faced angry mobs, 
violence, and death threats for expressing their antiwar views, but the papers persisted in 
supporting the Federalist cause.69 In Virginia, the Alexandria Daily Gazette, the Norfolk 
Gazette and Publick Ledger, and the Virginia Patriot emerged as Federalist bastions of 




were met with mobs, riots, destruction, and violence. The most violent attacks against 
Federalist-controlled newspapers occurred in Baltimore in the summer of 1812. As a 
Republican stronghold, Baltimore merely tolerated the existence of Federalist papers 
prior to the war. When war was declared, however, many Baltimore Republicans 
believed that the Federalist paper, the Federal Republican, was printing articles that 
amounted to treason. On June 22, two days after the Federal Republican published an 
official declaration against the war, a group of between thirty and forty men broke into 
the newspaper office and destroyed its contents, including the paper’s printing press.71 
Rioting continued throughout the city for weeks, targeting anyone or anything that the 
mobs believed to be un-American. Donald Hickey offered several examples of the 
violence: 
An Irishman . . . had to flee because he had reportedly ridden express for the 
Federal Republican. Mobs dismantled several ships in the harbor, convinced that 
they were loaded with provisions for Britain or her allies. The city’s black people 
came in for a share of the abuse as well. Two houses in the black section of town 
were pulled down because their owners were thought to be sympathetic to 
England.72 
Despite the violent and destructive nature of the mob, none of the rioters was punished. 
On this account, Hickey concludes that the conflict left “a legacy of fear among 
Federalists in the city.”73  
The Mexican-American War 
The empire-building nature of the War of 1812 remained in the American 




further into the nineteenth century as war with Mexico became a stronger possibility. The 
desire of the United States to annex Texas and other Mexican lands, combined with 
arguments blaming Mexicans for hostilities toward American citizens, resulted in a war 
between the two nations. The arguments of those who opposed war with Mexico were 
steeped in anti-imperialist sentiments.  
The idea of “manifest destiny,” described by Julius W. Pratt as the “philosophy of 
territorial expansion,”74 was evident in American minds during the early nineteenth 
century. John O’Sullivan, editor of the Morning News and the Democratic Review 
utilized the phrase: 
The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In 
its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined 
to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles; to establish on earth 
the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of the Most High—the Sacred 
and the True.75 
O’Sullivan later used the phrase “manifest destiny” directly when urging for the 
annexation of Texas, writing that other nations have placed themselves 
between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference 
against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our 
power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny 
to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our 
yearly multiplying millions.76 
It was fate, such logic indicated, that the United States would expand its territory in order 




The election of James K. Polk in 1844 cemented the expansionist visions for the 
United States. A strong believer in manifest destiny, President Polk sought ways to 
expand American territory. Mexico became an appealing target to Polk for several 
reasons. Peter M. Jonas wrote, “Mexico’s stormy history following independence, its 
close proximity to the United States, and the presence of a considerable number of 
American citizens and businessmen in Mexico all strained relations between the two 
nations.”77 Polk cited the death of American citizens in Mexican territory, the effort of his 
administration to foster peaceful negotiation, and the move by Mexico to declare war 
upon the United States first. In his “War Message” of May 11, 1846, he stated, 
But now, after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United 
States,  has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the American 
soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations 
are now at war. As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, 
exists by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of 
duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the 
interests of our country.78 
Despite his expansionist goals, Polk’s message omitted any discussion of manifest 
destiny, instead arguing that military action was a defensive measure. In doing so Polk 
officially declared war on Mexico and began the first American foreign war. 
The first group to oppose war with Mexico publicly was the Whigs, in contrast to 
the prowar Democrats who then held power. One of the most famous Whigs of the time, 
Daniel Webster, spoke publicly against the war in several speeches. Webster’s antiwar 




Webster’s antiwar messages, “He claimed he opposed adding the territory acquired in the 
war as much as he opposed adding Canada to the United States. . . . Webster added that 
expansion would damage the Constitution and throw the Senate into disarray.”80 In his 
address to the Senate on March 23, 1848, Webster argued that the acquisitions gained 
from the war (New Mexico and California) were unnecessary, useless, and not worth the 
efforts of war. Further, Webster warned of the dangerous precedent that the Mexican-
American War created for later imperialist leaders. He stated, “Sir, we take New Mexico 
and California; who is weak enough to suppose that there’s an end?. . . . Who thinks that 
the hunger for dominion will stop here of itself?”81 Webster made further arguments 
about the interests of slaveholders in the new territory, which abolitionists took up and 
extended.82 
Many abolitionists believed that the war was started by slaveholders to expand 
slave-holding territory, and they used moral arguments to speak out against the war. 
Various church groups created open letters or published articles in their papers that 
publicly opposed the war on the grounds that it was seen as an attempt to extend slavery. 
In particular, the Congressionalists, the Quakers, and the Unitarians created resolutions 
that united their antiwar and antislavery messages.83 In 1846, Theodore Parker noted the 
immoral nature of the war in “A Sermon of the Mexican War,”  
Slavery has already been the blight of this nation, the curse of the North and the 
curse of the South. It has hindered commerce, manufacturers, agriculture. It 
confounds your politics. It has silenced your ablest men. It has muzzled the pulpit, 
and stifled the better life out of the press. It has robbed three million men of what 




ask, O Americans, where is the harmony of the Union? It was broken by slavery. 
Where is the treasure we have wasted? It was squandered by slavery. Where are 
the men we sent to Mexico? They were murdered by slavery.84 
Thus, abolitionists created a direct link between the Mexican-American War and the 
extension of slavery and warned against the immoral path America was taking. 
The abolitionists’ most strident move came in the form of the Wilmot Proviso, a 
rider attached to an appropriations bill, which stated that none of the new territory 
acquired in the war would ever be open to slavery. The proviso was never passed—it was 
defeated every time by unanimous votes from the South. The proviso had a divisive 
effect on antiwar Whigs and Democrats alike. It stated,  
Provided that, as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any 
territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty 
which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the 
moneys herein appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever 
exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be 
duly convicted.85  
According to Frederick Merk, “The Wilmot proviso was the most ominous of the protests 
generated by the war. It was ominous because it so sharply divided the nation into 
quarreling sections.”86 In fact, historian Eric Foner identified this proviso as an early 
marker on the path to Civil War: The proviso was to serve as a guarantee that the war was 
not being fought to extend slavery.87 
As in the past, antiwar protesters faced charges of treason and censure both 




because it was America’s first foreign war of significance. However, the nature of the 
war made suppression of news stories particularly convenient. According to Tom Reilly, 
the martial law imposed by American forces in Mexico led to the censorship of the press. 
Reilly argued, “In the same manner it found martial law effective in controlling civilian 
populations in general, the army found these broad, vague powers a useful tool to silence 
newspaper critics.”88 Reilly cited at least ten cases in which the United States army 
suppressed newspaper coverage of the war by censoring content or shutting down the 
papers altogether.89  
The Civil War 
The abolitionist sentiment that had been building as a result of the Wilmot 
Proviso and other debates culminated in the early 1860s. Those who opposed slavery 
were willing to fight for the cause. On the other side, those who supported slavery as a 
necessity for the Southern economy were willing to defend their interests. Many 
Northerners were apathetic toward slavery and did not want to risk their lives and 
livelihoods in a war to abolish the practice. In addition, not all Southerners wanted to 
break from their Northern counterparts. The dissenters during this period often blamed 
slaves themselves and the institution of slavery as a whole for dividing the nation, 
expressing an antiwar sentiment that relied on economic, anticonscription, and racial 
arguments.  
The abolitionist cause, combined with the political, economic, and social climate 
of the times, hastened the coming of the Civil War. As more Northerners joined the 
antislavery campaign, Southern resentment grew. David Zarefsky has observed that the 




things by the same terms, such as liberty and constitutionalism.”90 Abraham Lincoln 
described this polarization in his “House Divided” speech, delivered on June 16, 1858:  
I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I 
do not expect the Union to be dissolved—do not expect the house to fall—but I 
do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. 
Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it 
where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate 
extinction; or its advocates will push forward, till it shall become alike lawful in 
all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South.91 
In addition, Lincoln, in the “Cooper Union Address” of 1860, answered the threats of 
Southerners to secede from the Union: “Your [the South’s] purpose, then, plainly stated, 
is that you will destroy the government unless you be allowed to construe and force the 
Constitution as you please, on all points in dispute between you and us. You will rule or 
ruin in all events.”92 The election of Lincoln in November 1860 marked a turning point 
for many Southerners who feared the policies of the new president toward slavery. 
Believing that they could secede without starting a war—or if war would come they 
could repel the opposing forces—Southern states began to leave the Union.93 Thus, the 
Civil War began as a war over not only slavery, but over the rights of states to remove 
themselves from the Union. The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861. 
Many Americans did not want war, however, and began speaking out against the 
cause in both the North and the South. One group that bridged regional divides was the 
Peace Democrats, also known as the Copperheads.94 Wyatt Kingseed explained the 




fight for black freedom, not when former slaves would compete for jobs. In rural areas, 
farmers could hardly afford to leave fields and livestock to take up arms.”95 Many 
Copperheads blamed abolitionists for the war and did not want to fight on behalf of 
slaves.96 Arnold M. Shankman cited an example in which Copperheads in Pennsylvania 
threatened an abolitionist clergyman: “A band of war critics interrupted the sermon of 
Reverent E. P. Eyer and demanded to know whether he was a Democrat or an 
abolitionist. They informed him that, if he was the former, he could continue to preach, 
but if he was the latter, they intended to hang him.”97 Further, Copperheads spread 
rumors about black strikebreakers who would take white jobs in the cities and fictional 
stories “involving miscegenation and prostitution, since these could be used to persuade 
Pennsylvanians that continuation of the war would promote racial amalgamation and 
moral decadence.”98 The Copperheads were resentful of the war and used various tactics 
to show their discontent like delivering public speeches, holding conventions, and in 
some cases even starting riots.99 
In combination with the economic and racial arguments against the war, many 
Americans protested based on anticonscription sentiments. On May 3, 1863, the U.S. 
government passed the first conscription act is its short history. That July, many New 
Yorkers took to the streets to protest the draft in what became one of the most violent 
riots of the nineteenth century.100 Iver Bernstein noted how the Conscription Act of 1863 
provoked the anger and resentment of many in New York by being “biased against the 
poor, magnifying white racial fears, and involving the federal government as never before 
in local affairs.”101 The rioters burned buildings, destroyed subway tracks and roads, and 




to Bernstein, the riots began as an anticonscription protest, became a looting affair, and 
finally ended with the clash of the military and the mob.102 “Speechmaking,” noted 
Winona L. Fletcher, “ran the gamut of rhetorical composition” during the riots,103 where 
Motives varied from a desire for political power to a genuine love of humanity. 
Although there is no glib explanation for social upheaval, demagogues could 
easily find disruptive causes to exploit: the inequities . . . of the draft; the 
frustrations of a prolonged war; disgust with war profiteering; hostility to the 
Republican administration and to Negroes; degrading urban poverty and 
ignorance.104  
All these issues involving the war culminated in the riots, during which time blacks were 
lynched, businesses were destroyed, and homes were burned to the ground.105 
Although the Civil War differed from previous wars in many of its origins, the 
underlying theme of imperialism still troubled the nation during the 1860s. The 
acquisition of new lands from Mexico and France brought the question of slavery to the 
forefront, increasing tensions between North and South and culminating in the attempted 
dissolution of the Union and ultimately the entrance into war. Unfortunately, the issue of 
America’s imperialistic ambitions did not end with the last gunshots of the Civil War in 
1865: The United States continued  attempts to acquire new lands and continue the 
country’s march toward its "manifest destiny." 
War with Spain and its (Former) Colonies 
In the late nineteenth century, the world’s major military and industrial powers 
vied to possess foreign lands and gain the wealth such lands could provide. The Spanish-




scrambling of powerful nations to gain new colonial powers and to build larger 
empires.106 Racial and classist stereotypes and a revised version of manifest destiny in 
1898 expressed in both the Spanish-American War and the U.S. War with the 
Philippines.107  
At the beginning of the Cuban independence movement, Cuba sought American 
support as it attempted to break its colonial ties with Spain. According to James C. 
Bradford, the act of protecting Cuba was unprecedented; the United States had never 
before gone to war in defense of another nation’s sovereignty.108 H. W. Brands noted,  
Their [Cuba’s] entreaties drew strong support from certain segments of the 
American population. Manifest Destinarians argued for American intervention on 
grounds of both the welfare of the Cubans, who would be released from Spanish 
bondage, and the interests of the United States, which might win control of Cuba 
in the bargain.109  
However, prior to the war, some Americans argued against the expansionist nature of a 
war with Spain. The desire for war was confirmed, it seemed, when the Maine was 
destroyed off the coast of Havana, Cuba, on February 15, 1898. Although the sinking was 
not the only reason for war, it certainly affected public opinion regarding war with Spain. 
According to Brands, “Even much of that portion of American opinion that wasn’t 
demanding war was no longer strongly opposing it” after the sinking of the Maine.110  
Known as the “splendid little war,” the Spanish-American War lasted only 100 
days and had relatively few casualties compared to previous wars.111 In addition, the 
United States “emerged as a colonial power, the possessors of the spoils of war.”112 




Rico, and the Philippines), opposition to the war was limited. Frank Freidel claimed the 
Spanish-American war “was too brief and too successful to become unpopular.”113 Piero 
Gleijeses noted, however, that antiwar newspapers, particularly the Boston Herald, 
Harper’s Weekly, the Richmond Dispatch, the Baltimore American, and the San 
Francisco Chronicle, and a few antiwar Senators maintained their oppositional stance 
during those 100 days. Their arguments expressed concerns about the strength of the 
Spanish navy versus a newly formed and underdeveloped U.S. navy, the number of U.S. 
casualties, the soaring cost of the war, and the lack of clear rewards for the country.114 
These arguments were often muted, however, in the face of the stronger prowar 
congressmen and journalists.115  
The conclusion of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of new colonies 
brought dissent from America’s new foreign lands, particularly the Philippines. Also, the 
treatment of Filipinos became a major point of dissent among Americans. For the United 
States, the Philippines represented a strategic military and economic base for further 
expansion. According to Stanley Karnow,  
The conquest of the Philippines was ancillary to their [the U.S. government’s] 
paramount goal of dislodging Spain from Cuba, but they realized that by 
propelling American power into the Pacific, businessmen could boost their 
lucrative trade with China and Japan and profit from tapping their thriving 
markets and rich sources of raw materials.116  
Having been exploited for years by the Spanish, Filipinos rejected America’s “colonial” 




In an effort to curb the growing hostility toward the war, which was lasting far 
longer than had the Spanish-American war and generating a significant number of 
American and Filipino casualties, proponents of the war suggested that it was being 
fought for the good of the Filipinos themselves. President Theodore Roosevelt, the most 
outspoken promoter of the colonial war with the Philippines, framed the war as a 
necessary step toward civilizing the Filipino population.117 In a speech delivered on 
September 7, 1900, Roosevelt argued that liberty  
is invoked to secure the abandonment of American honor and to throw the 
Philippines under the rule of a corrupt and tyrannous oligarchy. . . . [W]e cannot 
too clearly keep in mind that the success of the Aguinaldian rebels would mean 
not liberty for all Filipinos, but liberty for a certain bloodthirsty section to oppress 
a great majority of their fellow countrymen.  
Roosevelt explained that the purpose of the American involvement in the Philippines 
“means to give the islands peace, and it is the only chance they have of getting peace or 
of getting good government.”118 Extending Roosevelt’s arguments, Albert Beveridge, in 
his speech entitled “The March of the Flag,” characterized American colonialism as a 
“duty to the world.” He characterized the Filipinos as uncivilized and argued that the 
United States was saving them from a life of savagery: “Would not the people of the 
Philippines prefer the just, human, civilizing government of this Republic to the savage, 
bloody rule of pillage and extortion from which we have rescued them?” 119 By casting 
the Filipinos as savages in need of American intervention, advocates of war rationalized 




In reaction to the War with the Philippines, a group of dissenters, particularly 
anti-imperialists, emerged to oppose the war.120 In contrast to Theodore Roosevelt’s 
framing of the acquisition of the Philippines as “expansionism,”121 the opposition, 
according to Stephen Rendahl, emphasized the term “imperialism.”122 In an inaugural 
document published in the Los Angeles Times, the Anti-imperialist League decreed,  
To the President and the Congress of the United States: The undersigned, citizens 
of _____ in the states of _____ protest against any extension of the sovereignty of 
the United States over the Philippines in any event, or other foreign territory, 
without the free consent of the people thereof, believing such action would be 
dangerous to the republic, wasteful of its resources in violation of constitutional 
principles, and fraught with moral and physical evils to our people.123 
These arguments countered Roosevelt’s belief that the United States was bestowing 
republican virtues on the Philippines, occasionally arguing that the annexation of such a 
savage country would ultimately harm the United States. Paul Kramer wrote, “Many of 
these concerns were explicitly racial: annexation of the Philippines would lead to the 
‘corruption’ of the U.S. body politic itself through Filipino citizenship and the 
‘degrading’ of U.S. labor by additional waves of ‘Asiatic’ immigrants.”124  
Anti-imperialist leagues emerged across the country, boasting such members as 
Jane Addams, Mark Twain, William Jennings Bryan, and Andrew Carnegie.125 Mark 
Twain, in particular, wrote and spoke extensively against the imperialistic actions of the 
U.S. government. Emphasizing identification and morality, Twain attempted to reveal 
inconsistencies between the ideals of America and imperialist thinking.126 Some women’s 




nature. For example, Mary A. Livermore, member of the Anti-Imperialist League and 
one-time president of the American Woman Suffrage Association, aligned the causes of 
both groups in an effort to equate the struggles of both groups for liberation.127 William 
Jennings Bryan, one of the most vocal of the anti-imperialists, used this platform in his 
contest against William McKinley in the 1900 presidential election. In his speech 
entitled, “Imperialism,” delivered on August 8, 1900, Bryan warned against the menaces 
of unbridled expansion. He argued that there existed no just reason for colonizing the 
Philippines and supported the creation of a “stable form of government in the Philippine 
Islands.” He also called for the protection of “the Filipinos from outside interference 
while they work out their destiny, just as we have protected the republics of Central and 
South America and are, by the Monroe Doctrine, pledged to protect Cuba.” Replacing 
one colonizing force with another, contended Bryan, was not only immoral, but also 
illegal.128 
Anti-imperialist sentiment grew as the war waged on, but subsided as military 
action in the Philippines came to an end. Imperialism won out in the Philippines; Emilio 
Aguinaldo, leader of the Filipino resistance, was captured, and his followers could not 
carry on the war without him. Utilizing a “policy of attraction,” the United States 
implemented an American-run and backed government in the Philippines, which existed 
until the archipelago achieved its independence in 1946.129 The legacy of the wars with 
Spain and its former colony continued well into the twentieth century as the United States 
became even more involved in European and Asian affairs. These wars marked a 




were understood up to that point—in fact, the discourse of benevolence and duty 
encouraged military intervention abroad. 
World War I 
After the conclusion of the War with the Philippines, the United States continued 
its aggressive foreign policy. Cyrus Veeser has claimed that reasons for this foreign 
policy included  
the creation of world-class navy after 1890, the growing importance of New York 
as a world financial center, the desire to end social conflict at home through trade 
expansion abroad, and the emergence of the United States as a colonial empire 
after the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898.130  
The 1908 election of William Howard Taft, Theodore Roosevelt’s hand-picked 
successor, led to a policy of “dollar diplomacy” in the United States, continuing 
America’s involvement in foreign matters, particularly in Latin America. Emily S. 
Rosenberg defined dollar diplomacy as “a controversial U.S. policy that attempted to use 
private bank loans to leverage the acceptance of financial advisers by foreign 
governments that U.S. officials and investors considered unstable.”131 This policy 
substituted “dollars for bullets” according to Taft,132 and tightly linked the financial 
sectors of the United States to the government sphere. Further, this policy allowed the 
United States to become more involved in foreign affairs and led to the continuation of 
American intervention abroad.  
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist, effectively beginning what came to be 




Great War, the United States declared a policy of neutrality. The U.S. could not remain 
nonaligned for long, however, as the country continued to trade with Great Britain, 
infuriating Germany. The sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and further provocations by 
the German government encouraged Woodrow Wilson to declare war, but the President 
continued his refusal to commit American troops. The German actions, in addition to 
British encouragement, led to feelings of anger and sympathy for many Americans, while 
others continued their adamant support of the President’s neutrality.134  
Woodrow Wilson announced on April 2, 1917, that America would go to war, 
despite previous promises that he would keep the United States out of the European 
conflict. Citing naval violations by the Germans as the major reason for his decision, 
Wilson argued that entering the war would help make the world “safe for democracy.” 
Wilson said,  
Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have 
no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. . . . We are but one 
of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights 
have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make 
them.135  
Opposition to the war began even before American involvement, but became 
especially intense after Wilson’s “War Message.” Several diverse groups emerged and 
occasionally converged to contest the nature and conduct of the war, including, among 
others, the pacifists, union workers, anarchists, suffragists, religious leaders, and even 
government officials. The crux of their arguments lay in various interpretations of the war 




country relied on the efforts of industrial workers, women, and immigrants to fight the 
war. In addition, the United States reinstated the draft in order to meet the military needs 
of the war.136  
As the United States entered into another foreign war, the government passed 
measures to ensure that antiwar activists would not hinder the war effort. The Espionage 
Act, passed on June 15, 1917, served to penalize those who would interfere in any way 
with the draft or the war. Section 3 of the Act stated,  
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false 
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of 
the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its 
enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or 
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the 
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or 
of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.137 
Less than a year later, Wilson signed the Sedition Act in May 1918, which extended the 
penalties of the Espionage Act to those who, “when the United States is at war, shall 
willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive 
language about the form of government of the United States,” in addition to those who 
“intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States.”138 Combined, 
these two acts created measures that allowed the U.S. government to prosecute anyone 




restrictions on free speech stemmed in part from the president’s belief that the enemy was 
using surrogates such as liberals and labor leaders . . . to undermine the American war 
effort.”139 Resistance to these acts led to a number of American citizens being censured, 
jailed, or even deported.140 
One of the first antiwar advocates prosecuted under these acts was Emma 
Goldman. Goldman was arrested for speaking out against a war she defined as immoral, 
illegal, and unnecessary and for urging the citizens of the United States not to participate 
in the war effort. Goldman’s indictment came after a speech she gave to a large group of 
immigrants on June 14, 1917, in which she urged men to resist the draft on the grounds 
that the war was unjust and unwanted by the American people. In that speech, Goldman 
stated,  
If war is necessary, only the people must decide whether they want war or not, 
and as long as the people have not given their consent I deny that the President of 
the United States has any right to declare it; I deny that the President or those who 
back the President have any right to tell the people that they shall take their sons 
and husbands and brothers and lovers and shall conscript them in order to ship 
them across the seas for the conquest of militarism and the support of wealth and 
power in the United States. You say that is a law. I deny your law. I don’t believe 
in it.141 
Because she specifically recommended that citizens avoid conscription and questioned 
the reasoning behind the war, Goldman was arrested for having violated the Espionage 
Act. Her trial began on June 27, 1917, and despite the accusations waged against her, 




We simply insist, regardless of all protests to the contrary, that this war is not a 
war for democracy. If it were a war for the purpose of making democracy safe for 
the world, we would say that democracy must first be safe for America before it 
can be safe for the world. . . . Free speech is suppressed. Free assemblies are 
broken up by uniformed gangsters, one after another. . . . So we say, gentlemen of 
the jury, our crime, if crime there be, is not having in any way conspired to tell 
young men not to register or having committed overt acts. Our crime, if crime 
there be, consists in pointing out the real cause of the present war.142 
Goldman was found guilty of violating the Espionage Act and was subsequently 
imprisoned prior to her deportation to Russia. In addition, the men in attendance at her 
June 14 speech were required by authorities to present their draft cards, and anyone who 
could not produce their card for police was arrested as well.143  
Eugene V. Debs was another famous figure indicted under the new Espionage and 
Sedition Acts. As a Socialist and pacifist, Debs was a controversial figure in American 
politics. He had condemned the Spanish-American War and the subsequent War with the 
Philippines and continued his activist activities during World War I. Speaking throughout 
the country on socialist issues, Debs spread his antiwar message while authorities 
watched and waited. In Canton, Ohio, Debs argued against the war during a speech he 
delivered on June 16, 1918. He was arrested and indicted for  
attempting to cause insubordination, mutiny, disloyalty, and refusal of duty within 
the military forces of the United States, and the utterance of words intended to 
procure and incite resistance to the United States, and to promote the cause of the 




In his Canton speech, he reportedly made only six references to the war. According to 
Bernard J. Brommel, Debs argued that although it was the working man who would 
ultimately fight the war, it was the elite who decided to wage wars. In addition, according 
to Brommel, Debs wanted workers to “know that they exist for something better than 
slavery and ‘cannon fodder.’”145 Debs stated,  
Every solitary one of these aristocratic conspirators and would-be murderers 
claims to be an arch-patriot; every one of them insists that the war is being waged 
to make the world safe for democracy. What humbug! What rot! What false 
pretense! These autocrats, these tyrants, these red-handed robbers and murderers, 
the “patriots,” while the men who have the courage to stand face to face with 
them, speak the truth, and fight for their exploited victims—they are the 
disloyalists and traitors. If this be true, I want to take my place side by side with 
the traitors in this fight.146 
During the trial, Debs mostly served as his own attorney, repeatedly arguing that his June 
16 speech was protected by the First Amendment. Further, Debs continued to promote his 
socialist beliefs and reinforce his antiwar message. Despite his eloquence and logical 
arguments, Debs was convicted for his antiwar activities. In his final address to the court, 
he stated, 
Years ago I recognized my kinship with all living beings and I made up my mind 
that I was not one bit better than the meanest of the earth. . . . In that day [when 
Socialism takes over] we will have the universal commonwealth . . . [of] the 




day war will curse this earth no more. . . . If I had my way, there would be no 
soldier.147 
Debs was sentenced to ten years in prison where he continued to write and advocate 
against the war, even running for president from his jail cell. 
Despite the threat of severe sanctions for speaking out against the war, a few 
brave politicians chose to denounce both the war and the Espionage and Sedition Acts. 
One of these speeches was delivered by Republican Progressive Senator Robert 
LaFollette. Opposed to the war from the start, LaFollette voted against the Declaration of 
War and the War Revenue Act. Journalists began publishing stories that the Senator 
believed the United States had “no grievance” with Germany, although this was 
reportedly a misquote.148 In reaction to these stories, citizens signed petitions urging 
LaFollette’s dismissal from the Senate. On October 6, 1917, LaFollette was given the 
chance to speak to the Senate chamber regarding the petition and his previous remarks. 
Instead, LaFollette delivered his “Free Speech in Wartime” address, arguing against 
wartime sanctions on free speech. In the speech, he stated, “Mr. President, our 
government, above all others, is founded on the right of the people freely to discuss all 
matters pertaining to their government, in war not less than in peace, for in this 
government the people are the rulers in war no less than in peace.”149 Although 
LaFollette was not impeached from the Senate, his speech did little to convince the 
proponents of war. He was still maligned in the press and in the Senate for his antiwar 
views; news articles demanding LaFollette’s resignation (or worse) abounded.150  
Finally, women involved in the U.S. suffrage movement emerged as antiwar 




radical organizations of the woman’s suffrage movement, including the National 
Woman’s Party (NWP). As the President of the NWP, Alice Paul became a significant 
figure in the suffrage movement. Paul was not particularly antiwar, but believed that the 
United States should honor democracy at home before claiming to fight for democracy 
abroad. According to Sally Hunter Graham,  
Most woman suffrage associations, including NAWSA [National American 
Woman Suffrage Association], supported the war effort. . . . NWP members used 
Wilson’s war goals to point out his hypocritical attitude toward woman suffrage, 
but refused to lend their services in any way to the war effort.151  
The NWP continued to picket outside of the White House during the war years, despite 
vocal and violent protests. Many picketers were arrested and charged with “obstructing 
the sidewalk,” and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. When Paul was finally arrested, she 
waged a protest in which NWP prisoners refused to eat. According to Graham, these 
protests, combined with public outrage over the women’s treatment in prison, forced 
Wilson to attend to the suffrage matter. Graham wrote, “Wilson realized by late 1917 that 
in order to maintain the integrity of his demands for democracy abroad, he would have to 
acknowledge the right of women to democratic participation at home.”152 Wilson brought 
the Nineteenth Amendment to Congress shortly after Paul’s release. Wartime pressures, 
in addition to public outcry, were at least in part responsible for Wilson’s attentiveness to 
the issue. According to Philip N. Cohen, “Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment as 
an emergency war measure.”153 Although the suffragists did not explicitly argue against 




 In addition to suffrage, women argued for an end to the war based on their desire 
for peace. Creating organizations such as the Woman’s Peace Party and the Anti-
Enlistment League, many women argued against the war because of the death and 
destruction that this conflict would bring.154 In “What War is Destroying,” prominent 
social activist Jane Addams argued that women were in a unique position to protest the 
war. She believed that the “protection . . . nurture . . . fulfillment . . . conservation . . . 
[and] ascent of human life” required women to protest against the war.155 Referring to the 
war as a “holocaust,” Meta Lilienthal Stern encouraged women to act even before the war 
involved the United States. Asking “What can you, the individual woman, do?” Lilienthal 
Stern urged women to send postcards to the President and Secretary of State, write letters 
to the newspapers, join a peace organization, discuss their anti-war beliefs with their 
families and communities, and “fight false patriotism” by teaching their children the 
“truth about war and making them hate it.”156 
The end of the First World War brought new tensions to the country. Although it 
would seem logical that the infringements on antiwar speech and action would cease as 
the war ended, the enforcement of sanctions on anti-American or unpatriotic language 
continued. Patrick Renshaw explained, “Reds, radicals, foreigners, and dissenters of all 
kinds were harried, persecuted, prosecuted and deported in the years 1917-20.”157 The 
first Red Scare in the United States, precipitated by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, 
lasted three years and served as an important precedent for future indictments against 




World War II 
The period between the end of World War I and the start of the World War II was 
one of highs and lows for the American people. Following the war, U.S. citizens saw a 
brief boom in manufacturing and production. According to Charles Poor Kindleberger, 
the invention of the automobile, the refrigerator, and talking motion pictures significantly 
increased the country’s ability to recover after the war.158 In addition, the United States 
continued to make loans to European governments for recovery efforts, despite the 
billions of dollars already owed to the United States for the war effort and reparations. 
The economic boom increased efforts of workers’ unions to increase the rights of 
workers, including advocating for the eight-hour work day, promoting safer working 
conditions, and championing increased benefits from employers. The economic high was 
short-lived, however; in 1929, the stock market crashed, and the period of the Great 
Depression began. The Depression spanned more than a decade, and ended with the 
creation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal efforts and the start of World War II 
in Europe. 
World War II began in September 1939 when Germany under the leadership of 
Adolf Hitler advanced into Poland in an attempt to seize Polish lands and exterminate 
enemies of Hitler’s Germany. Almost immediately after Germany’s invasion, the United 
Kingdom and France declared war on Germany. Shortly after, Italy and Japan allied with 
the Germans, forming the Axis Powers. Although initially allied with Germany, the 
Soviet Union eventually joined with Great Britain and France to form the Allied Powers 
in 1940. France, however, was soon occupied by Germany, and its international efforts 




Initially, the United States sought a policy of neutrality in the new World War. 
Although loosely tied to Great Britain through FDR’s Lend-Lease program, many U.S. 
leaders and citizens did not wish to become involved militarily in the conflict—that is, 
until December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked the American Naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii. According to Stephen E. Ambrose, this attack gave the United States reason to 
enter the war. Hitler had no reason to push America into the war; however, FDR, 
promoting his “arsenal of democracy” appeal, believed that the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain could not win the war alone.159 In his “War Message,” delivered to Congress on 
December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war against Japan. He 
stated,  
I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert 
that we will not only defend ourselves to the utmost, but will make it very certain 
that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.160  
U.S. citizens, enraged at the seemingly unprovoked attacks on its own soil, largely 
clamored for the country’s entry into the war. Still, antiwar sentiment swelled in two 
significant groups: conscientious objectors and isolationists. 
The United States began planning for the war in 1940, reintroducing the Selective 
Service Act as a prewar preparation measure. Just as in previous wars, however, many 
Americans opposed the draft for religious, moral, and political reasons. Alex Sareyan 
estimated that roughly 15,000 men claimed Conscientious Objector (CO) status during 
World War II, and between 2,000 and 3,000 of these men were turned down or jailed for 
nonparticipation.161 Patricia McNeal noted that three types of COs emerged during the 




[T]here were the men who, on the basis of religious opposition to war, refused all 
combatant military service or training, but were willing to perform non-combatant 
military service under military direction within the armed forces. . . . Secondly, 
there were also men whose opposition to World War II involved the actual 
violation of the Selective Training and Service Act by either refusing to register 
or failing to report for induction or assuming some other posture of non-co-
operation. . . . The third group was opposed to war and to all military service, 
combatant or non-combatant.162 
COs were still obligated to serve their country in some capacity, but the new terms of the 
Selective Service Act allowed religious pacifists to serve in the domestic, private sector 
by performing social work. These provisions, however, did not deter those COs who 
chose to speak out against the evils of war.163  
Catholics represented a major religious group that objected to the war on moral 
grounds. Robert Lowell, a famous poet in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and a newly 
converted Catholic, refused to serve in any capacity to aid the war effort. As a Catholic, 
Lowell argued that he could not participate in the war on the grounds that it violated the 
just war theory. 164 He believed that the war was being fought for profit, and war 
profiteering could not be justified in religious or moral terms.165 Further, the Catholic 
Worker Movement, founded in 1933, maintained a pacifist stance during WWII. Their 
newsletter, The Catholic Worker, featured articles with antiwar messages and even urged 
men not to register for the draft.166 
In addition to religious groups that objected to the war based on religious views, 




Stewart-Winter noted, “For men living in increasingly militant black communities, 
Selective Service and other draft-related hearings represented yet another encounter with 
powerful white men who enacted the obligations without conferring the rights of 
citizenship.”167 Further, African Americans embraced a new type of discourse during the 
1940s that emphasized the broken promises of World War I.168 In an article published in 
the Arkansas State Press, an opinion writer stated,  
We fought one war to make the world safe for democracy. We are engaged in a 
greater struggle today in which our men are to fight our enemies whether they be 
the yellow men of the Empire of the Rising Sun, or the pale-faced Germans who 
would Nazisfy the world. How can you feed them on doctrines of liberty, self 
respect and tell them to get ready to fight and die and at the same time expect 
them to run like a timid fawn at the appearance of a white policeman?169  
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 
black press joined to protest African American involvement in the war. The press noted 
the reluctance of the military to accept black volunteers, the segregated nature of the 
armed forces, the violence against blacks in military and civilian quarters, and the 
compartmentalizing of blacks into the most dangerous military positions.170 The black 
press wanted to support the war effort, but could not deny the inequities the war 
compounded. The press thus created the slogan “Double V,” or “Double Victory,” which 
supported more equal participation in the foreign war and the need for more equality at 
home. The Double V strategy encouraged blacks to fight a war on two fronts, suggesting 




the leadership domestically. Despite the encouragement of the black press to support the 
war, many African Americans rejected this plan and continued to resist conscription.171 
Civilian reactions to conscientious objectors ranged from antipathy to outright 
hostility while government leaders continued to prosecute those whom they believed did 
not have a suitable reason for refusing service. The term “slackers” was used to describe 
those who would not register for the draft or chose not to serve the war effort in any 
capacity.172 Stewart-Winter noted,  
Several thousand men went to prison during the Second World War, either 
because they refused to register for the draft or submit to a physical . . . or because 
they could not persuade their draft boards that their convictions were sincere and 
religious.173  
COs protested even from prison, engaging in work strikes to protest their containment.174 
Isolationists became another important group that emerged to protest American 
entry into World War II. The most famous of the isolationist groups was called the 
America First Committee (AFC) and boasted such members as future President Gerald 
Ford and Charles Lindbergh. The Committee argued against the war on economic, moral, 
and political grounds. They did not believe that Germany posed a significant threat to the 
United States and feared that the economy would boom and then fall as it had after World 
War I. Further, the Committee worried that the repressive measures and propaganda 
techniques adopted during the World War I would strike again as America entered into 
the new battle.175 The main goal of the AFC was to ready the United States for any 
potential attack. The group stressed a strong defense at home and encouraged the country 




AFC wrote position papers, spoke to the media, and lobbied Congress against the war. In 
addition, the AFC believed that movies influenced Americans’ opinions about 
intervening in the war and consequently called for theater boycotts throughout the 
country.177  
The America First Committee’s efforts against intervention in Europe were met 
with hostility and suspicion by the U.S, government. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, 
working under the guidance of FDR, attempted to undermine the committee using 
various controversial techniques. For example, Roosevelt ordered Hoover to perform 
surveillance on various groups, including the AFC. In particular, wiretapping became the 
predominant form of AFC surveillance. According to Douglas M. Charles, “Bureau 
officials targeted prominent individuals who were not in the forefront but were associated 
with anti-interventionists and America First.” They ultimately presented their findings to 
the president.178 Information gained from wiretapping was used by FDR and Hoover to 
counter the messages of the isolationists in newspapers and public speeches in an effort to 
sway public opinion in their favor.179 The headline of one brochure boldly stated, “Is 
Lindbergh a Nazi?” The ensuing twenty-seven pages were intended to prove that the 
AFC and Lindbergh were partners of the Nazi regime.180 
The Korean War 
The end of World War II created a changed landscape, both literally and 
politically, for much of the world. When the Axis Powers surrendered, the Allied Powers 
were left to pick up the pieces of a destroyed Europe and Asia. Gary A. Donaldson wrote, 
“The end of the war simply brought on a new series of international problems, the most 




The 1917 revolution in Russia established communism in the nation and its territories and 
sent a wave of communist fear throughout the world, including the United States. The 
establishment of the communist People’s Republic of China in 1949 by Mao Zedong 
significantly increased this fear. Korea, which had been occupied by Japan since 1910, 
had become a battleground in WWII, and Russia wanted to gain Korean territory. As 
Russia began marching from China into Korea, U.S. political leaders feared the entire 
nation of Korea would fall to communism as well, and a compromise was proposed. 
Donaldson noted, the United States “proposed to the Soviets an arbitrary division of 
Korea. The dividing line was set at the 38th parallel. . . . To the surprise of Pentagon 
experts, the Soviets accepted the proposal and halted their advance.”182 The Soviet Union 
established a procommunist government in North Korea, and the United States sought to 
establish democracy in the South. Although attempts to unify the country were numerous, 
a consensus on how best to achieve unification failed.  
As the theory of containment became the primary foreign policy strategy 
popularized by the Truman Doctrine, U.S. government leaders feared any extension of 
communism in Asia. When North Korea launched an attack in an attempt to take over 
South Korea in June 1950, the Truman administration knew it had to intervene. Allan R. 
Millett wrote, “The American leaders saw the invasion as a direct challenge to the 
American policy of ‘containing’ Communism and Russian imperialism and the U.S. 
strategic corollary of forward, collective defense and nuclear deterrence.”183 The war 
expanded as China entered the conflict after the United States pushed back the North 
Koreans and continued U.S. efforts north of the 38th parallel. The United States had not 




new enemy.184 Although General Douglas MacArthur, commander of United Nations’ 
troops in Korea, advocated an extension of the war into China, President Truman rejected 
the notion of extending the war further.185 The Korean War ended in a stalemate, with the 
division between North and South returning to the 38th parallel and neither country 
claiming victory or defeat. 
Opposition to the war began almost immediately. Although the fighting was 
called a “police action” by President Truman, this linguistic difference did not matter 
much to many war-weary Americans, but did serve as a preemptive move designed to 
reduce the potential for resistance. Noting that the policy of containment advocated by 
the Truman administration had not worked in keeping China from turning to 
communism, some Americans wondered why the United States bothered to continue the 
policy in Korea. John W. Spanier expressed American sentiments during the Korean 
conflict: “The frustrations of containment were bad enough; but the failures made it 
intolerable.”186 The lack of progress in the war furthered Americans’ distaste.  
Despite the lack of popular support for the war, few groups emerged to protest the 
U.S. war in Korea. Isolationist Republicans emerged as the largest group opposed to the 
Korean War, but for political reasons, most Republicans remained reserved in their 
denunciations of the war for fear of being labeled unpatriotic or even communist. Senator 
Robert Taft of Ohio became one of the most vocal Republican opponents of the Korean 
War, questioning the legality of the war and President Truman’s usurpation of power by 
bypassing Congress to engage in the “police action.”187 Although Taft did not disagree 
with the war on a moral or political level, he did express fear that President Truman’s 




As the war dragged on, Republican senators put away their fears of communist 
accusations and once again found their antiwar voices. Often, their arguments centered on 
the characterization of the conflict as a “limited war.”189 In fact, Republican politicians, 
including Douglas MacArthur, took an all-or-nothing approach to Korea, calling for 
either full-scale war or complete isolation. According to MacArthur, “those who advocate 
appeasement and defeatism through the waging of a limited war] . . . do not grasp that it 
is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and 
dynamic leadership.”190 However, fears of direct Russian involvement, combined with 
the worry that a deeper involvement in Korea would tie up American forces that would 
be needed if the Soviets decided to spread their communist doctrine to other parts of the 
world, quickly quelled this type of antiwar argument.191 
The muted opposition to the Korean War can be ascribed to the intense fear of 
communism throughout the United States, along with highly-engineered influence 
attempts from the U.S. government. Average Americans would not have had sufficient 
understanding of what was going on to support anything but pacifist opposition. 
Arguably, a major development in the Korean War was a new set of anti-anti-war 
discourse strategies designed for mass consumption. In particular, many Americans 
feared any further extension of communism, believing that this would lead to what 
became known as the “domino effect” throughout the world.192 News that the Soviet 
Union had exploded its own atomic bomb in 1949 exacerbated these fears. In addition, 
McCarthyism (named after Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin), the 




second Red Scare all served to suppress motivation to protest any government actions to 
combat communism at home and abroad.193 
Conclusion 
Robert L. Ivie wrote, “War is easy. Peace is difficult.”194 In terms of antiwar 
dissent, this statement is particularly true. The antiwar activists whose goals were to keep 
the United States out of war and to create a more peaceful world were met with verbal 
harassment, imprisonment, deportation, privacy invasion, and violence. In this chapter, 
however, I have shown that despite all of the difficulties that came with maintaining an 
antiwar stance, many Americans chose to voice their beliefs anyway. Severe sanctions 
could be levied against those who spoke against American war policy.  The Espionage 
and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918 were heirs to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
and contained much of the same xenophobia and oppressive language as their 
predecessors. Protestors were initially met with surveillance, forced oaths, verbal, and 
physical attacks during the early years of American independence. Censorship, 
banishment, and containment soon followed.  New technologies, such as wiretapping and 
motion pictures, allowed the government to gain even more control over the antiwar 
messages presented in the media. Notwithstanding the numerous ways their messages 
were obstructed, contradicted, or silenced, antiwar protesters continued to speak out 
against what they believed was an unnecessary or unjust war. 
Despite the immense differences in rationale, enactment, enemies, and context, 
many of the antiwar strategies from the Revolutionary War remained the same until the 
Korean War. The utilization of the press, in particular, has been a key to antiwar protest 




newspapers of the 1810s, abolitionist newspapers of the 1830s to the 1860s, and the 
isolationist editorials of the World Wars, the press has been a major tool for protest. The 
use of the press to disseminate antiwar messages and to counter those messages 
maintained the importance of the press into the twentieth century. 
In addition to publications, public speeches and gatherings have been a major tool 
of protestors from the Revolutionary War to the Korean War. In the 1770s Tories created 
theatrical plays to display their discontent with the war. In response to another war with 
Great Britain, antiwar activists held rallies, even threatening session from the union at 
their assemblies. Others formed Leagues based on topics ranging from Anti-imperialism 
to Abolition to Peace Activism. The America First Committee wrote papers and lobbied 
Congress as an antiwar organization.   
Refusal of service was another major strategy of the antiwar activists. Women, 
immigrants, and African Americans noted the hypocrisy of fighting for freedom abroad 
while repressing freedom at home, and refused to take part in the war. Others believed 
that the war hurt the United States economically and refused to allow their own 
livelihood to be destroyed by their participation in war. Some refused to enlist based on 
religious or moral objections, while others protested the purpose or execution of the war 
specifically. Americans continued to question the consequences of an expanded military, 
the disregard for the Monroe Doctrine, the expansion of war in the Eastern Hemisphere, 
and the increasing demand for equality by immigrants, African Americans, and women. 
The Chicago Eight extended and transformed many of the techniques used by 
previous antiwar activists in their efforts against the Vietnam War, positioning 




brochures, sit-ins, and conscientious objection, Vietnam War protesters continued the 
traditions of previous activists. The scale of the Vietnam War, combined with the new 
forms of media coverage, the lack of a clear enemy, the numbers of men being drafted, 
and the seemingly unending length of the war required new strategies, including press 
conferences, large-scale protest marches, veteran testimony, guerilla theater, and even 
self-immolation. 
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The Vietnam Antiwar Movement, the Democratic National Convention, 
and the Chicago Eight Trial 
Antiwar protests aimed at the conflict in Vietnam began in the early 1960s, but 
many historians have argued that the years 1965 to 1968 marked the most volatile time in 
the movement against the war.1 Growing out of the array of social movements that began 
in the early 1960s, the antiwar activists engaged in various forms of protest, from sit-ins 
to marches to guerilla theater,2 attempting to convey their discontent with the U.S. 
government’s involvement in Vietnam. Some of these efforts culminated in the protests 
outside of the Chicago Democratic National Convention in 1968, where thousands of 
demonstrators converged to protest the war. Rallies, clashes with police, and rioting 
ensued. After the riots, eight highly visible members of the antiwar movement were 
charged with inciting riots at the convention. In order to understand the charges against 
the defendants and their resulting trial, details of the American antiwar movement, the 
activities leading up to the Democratic National Convention, and the events of the 
Convention must be examined. 
The Start of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam 
American involvement in Vietnam began well before most U.S. citizens were 
aware of the problems troubling the small Asian country. The presence of the French in 
the region, combined with the intervention of the Chinese and the increasing fear over the 
spread of Communism, compelled the United States to provide assistance to Vietnam.3 In 
1950, American neutrality in the region ended, and the United States committed to 





wrote, “By early 1950, American policymakers had firmly embraced what would become 
known as the ‘domino theory,’ a belief that the fall of Indochina would cause in rapid 
succession the collapse of the other nations of Southeast Asia.”5 Fearing the fall of 
Vietnam to the Communists, President Harry S. Truman committed sizeable funds, 
military equipment, and strategic input to the French, with the hope that American troop 
involvement would be unnecessary.6 
As President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office, the situation in Vietnam had not 
improved, despite the increased amounts of U.S. aid pouring into the country. 
Eisenhower found himself in a difficult predicament; he had condemned the Democratic 
leaders prior to his presidency for losing China to the Communists, and he did not want 
to allow Vietnam to suffer the same fate.7 Yet, he had learned many lessons from the 
Korean War; like Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower saw the half-hearted U.S. 
commitment in Korea as the reason for the stalemate. 8 Without committing American 
troops, Eisenhower sought to intervene in the region to “maintain and support a friendly 
and independent non-Communist government in Viet-Nam.”9 
The Geneva Conference began in 1954, and was an attempt at resolving many 
issues in Asia, including a discussion around the situation in Vietnam. In addition to 
decisions about the fate of North and South Korea, the conference participants also 
agreed that France would withdrawal its troops from Vietnam. The area in Indochina was 
then divided into the three countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, with Vietnam 
being further divided into “military regrouping zones” of North and South.10 The Geneva 
Agreements of 1954 also called for free elections in Vietnam. However, neither the 





the Conference. Leader of South Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem refused to hold elections as 
required by the Agreements, and the United States continued to back Diem’s illegal 
regime, despite doubts about his qualifications. Although the Geneva Agreements led to 
an end to the conflict between France and Vietnam, it set the stage for renewed conflict 
between North and South Vietnam.11   
When President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he continued Eisenhower’s 
commitment to send military advisers, dramatically increasing their numbers. Like 
Eisenhower, Kennedy viewed the Vietnam conflict in terms of the Cold War. Melvin 
Small noted, “When the time came to consider options for Vietnam, Kennedy feared that 
he had to set limits or face more provocations from the Communists.”12 Replacing 
Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation” foreign policy with a “flexible response” strategy, 
Kennedy built up the country’s ability to fight both conventional and nuclear wars.13 
However, Kennedy was unconvinced that American military intervention in Vietnam was 
the best course for the war.14 Eventually, though, soldiers originally represented as 
“advisers” became actively involved in military combat,15 even supporting the overthrow 
of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.16 Sanctioning the military coup was the 
last decision Kennedy made regarding Vietnam; three weeks after Diem’s fall, Kennedy 
was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. 
Inheriting a troubled and confused foreign policy toward Vietnam, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson created a new policy, which led to an escalation of American ground 
troops and the eventual full-scale involvement of the U.S. military. The turning point for 
Johnson’s increased military involvement in Vietnam occurred on August 1, 1964, when 





and competing stories about the prewar exigencies, Johnson took the “Tonkin Gulf 
Incident” as his opportunity to respond militarily.17 The resulting Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution gave President Johnson the authority to prevent and retaliate against any 
attacks targeting U.S. forces in Vietnam.18  
In two short years, American involvement in Vietnam escalated to unprecedented 
proportions. According to Herring, “By 1967, the United States had nearly a half million 
combat troops in Vietnam. It had dropped more bombs than in all theaters in World War 
II and was spending more than $2 billion per month on the war.”19 In addition, the 
military drafted more than 30,000 men per month, and the number of Americans killed 
already numbered 13,000.20  
The Tet Offensive in January 1968 represented another major setback to the 
Johnson administration’s war strategy. The offensive occurred when Viet Cong troops 
launched a large-scale military attack against numerous South Vietnamese cities and 
major U.S. strongholds. Donaldson noted the devastation of the Tet Offensive:  
The United States lost nearly 4,000 soldiers in eight weeks of fighting; ARVN 
[Army of the Republic of Vietnam] lost nearly 5,000 men; and some 14,000 
noncombatants were killed. At Hue, 500 U.S. and ARVN soldiers were killed in 
battle that was partly house-to-house urban fighting. That ancient city was 
virtually destroyed by U.S. bombing  attacks and artillery barrages that left 
100,000 civilian refugees in their wake. Some 2,800 Vietnamese civilians were 
reported executed by Communist troops during the occupation; another 2,800 





Although the Viet Cong experienced even more severe causalities, their surge inflicted 
heavy losses on the United States and allied forces. After Tet, Johnson attempted 
negotiations with the North Vietnamese, but these talks ultimately failed.22 
By the time President Richard M. Nixon took office in 1969, the situation in 
Vietnam seemed grim. Nixon, however, was determined not to have a U.S. military loss 
on his record. Seeking an end to the war that would allow the United States to achieve 
“peace with honor,”23 Nixon remained committed to the anti-Communist cause. In his 
book No More Vietnams, Nixon described the predicament he faced when taking office: 
I recognized that my first priority had to be to end the Vietnam War in a way that 
would achieve the goal for which we had fought for so long. The war was tearing 
American society apart. . . . And the way in which the United States met its 
responsibilities in Vietnam could also be crucial to the Soviet and Chinese 
assessments of American will, and thus to the success of any new relationships 
with those two powers.24 
However, as Herbert Y. Schandler noted, “The Nixon administration, like the Johnson 
administration before it, soon came to the realization that it did not control events and did 
not control the pace of the war.”25 In an effort to keep South Vietnam from falling to the 
Communist forces, Nixon engaged in various covert operations involving Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia.26 Publicly espousing the policy of Vietnamization,27 Nixon was secretly 
ordering the bombing of Viet Cong strongholds in Cambodia and Laos.28 In addition, 
Nixon ordered the withdrawal of American troops on a precipitous scale, causing many 





was ending the war, “an additional 20,553 Americans were killed in the last four years of 
the war.”29    
Continued peace talks with Hanoi produced little room for negotiation. By the 
time Viet Cong forces launched the Easter Offensive in March 1972, the number of U.S. 
troops in Vietnam was too minimal to protect the South.30 Each side experienced large 
numbers of casualties, and both the United States and the North Vietnamese seemed 
finally ready to settle the war. In total, the military costs of the war was $111 billion31 
and the loss of American troops totaled over 58,000.32 In late June 1973, Congress 
approved an amendment to end U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, and in November 
of the same year, passed the War Powers Act over Nixon’s veto, requiring the president 
to “terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report 
was submitted” within sixty days.33 After the complete withdrawal of American forces, 
the North Vietnamese quickly drove south and defeated the ARVN.34 The North 
Vietnamese troops renamed the former South Vietnamese capital of Saigon Ho Chi Minh 
City and united the North and South as one country governed by Communism.35  
The Beginning of a Movement 
Very few Americans spoke out against the war in the years prior to 1963, when 
journalists began covering the events in Vietnam more visibly.36 Lifelong pacifist David 
Dellinger was among the first major dissenters regarding U.S. policy in Vietnam. 
Dellinger, a Yale graduate and World War II draft resister, participated in the Easter 
Peace Walk in April 1963, where he argued for the right of marchers to carry signs that 
denounced the war in Vietnam.37 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan noted, however, 





ineffective.”38 The largest pacifist group at the time, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy (SANE), was not particularly prominent prior to 1964. In fact, Zaroulis and 
Sullivan called the years 1963 to 1964 “the years of lonely dissent—the years when a few 
isolated voices began to cry out against American involvement in Vietnam.”39  
As American involvement in Indochina grew, however, groups with diverse 
backgrounds and varied interests emerged to protest the Vietnam War, including religious 
groups, civil rights leaders, politicians, college students, and even Vietnam War veterans. 
The antiwar movement did not require membership in any one organization, and often 
groups worked across lines to advocate antiwar positions.40 Small noted the fluid 
boundaries of the various antiwar groups:  
If you said you were in the movement, you were accepted as a member in good 
standing. You became part of an ever-shifting coalition of pacifists, liberals, 
social democrats, socialists, Communists, and cultural radicals, many of whom 
were college students, working people, suburbanites, clerics, politicians, 
journalists, intellectuals, and even proverbial little old ladies in tennis shoes. By 
1969 there may have been as many as 17,000 national, regional, and local 
organizations that could be considered in the movement.41 
These groups often formed coalitions, working together to encourage the largest number 
of people to participate in their rallies.42 The 1968 Democratic National Convention 
offered a prime opportunity for antiwar advocates, particularly those from the New Left, 
to hold a large demonstration that would be sure to draw large crowds and receive 





The New Left  
As the class structure and familial patterns of American society underwent radical 
changes after World War II, the Baby Boomers gained access to higher education in 
larger numbers than ever before. In addition, a newfound focus on self-direction, 
combined with a growing distaste for the ongoing Cold War, encouraged this generation 
to question authority. In his sociological account of the rise of the New Left, George R. 
Vickers wrote,  
The contradiction between the values and relations within the family, and those 
within the university, led to discontent among the children from the most 
advanced layers of the bureaucratic, white-collar strata, which took the form of 
political and cultural opposition based on self-directed values.43  
The New Left did not have any one particular ideological underpinning, but rather relied 
on a variety of theories. As K. L. Julka described, the New Left “emerged at the 
confluence of various streams of thought: Maoism, existentialism, neo-anarchism, 
Surrealistic thought and neo-Marxism tinged with Freudian psychoanalysis.”44 However, 
much of the group’s theoretical foundation was based on the theories of Herbert Marcuse, 
a Frankfurt School political theorist. Marcuse contended that the intellectual must live 
outside of institutional fear in order to change the infrastructure of society. Thus, 
Marcuse advocated a move away from capitalism and Communism, because both 
structures reified the repression of particular groups.45 Many in the New Left found 






During the civil rights movement, many student organizations, both in the North 
and the South, joined the cause for racial equality.47 Groups began emerging on college 
campuses, seeking to extend the rights of African Americans in the United States, often 
to the dismay of university officials. After being denied their right to protest or after 
being sanctioned by their universities, many students added protests against these 
restrictions to their civil rights causes. In 1964, for example, students began the Free 
Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California at Berkeley to combat the 
limitations they experienced when trying to protest for civil rights.48 
One of the major New Left groups with roots in the civil rights movement was the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The SNCC became involved in 
various civil rights causes, including desegregation and voter registration drives. 
Following the Supreme Court ruling in 1961 that ended segregation in bus terminals, the 
SNCC began what they called “freedom rides” to test the desegregation ruling, riding 
buses throughout the South and encountering intense violence.49 In addition, the SNCC 
created the “freedom summer” of 1964, during which the group planned to engage in 
voter registration drives for African Americans in Mississippi, and according to Joe 
Street, to “highlight the brutality inherent in Mississippi’s culture.”50  
A second major group that emerged from the activism of the New Left was 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Originally conceived in 1962 by college 
students in Port Huron, Michigan, SDS had over 300 chapters on college campuses at its 
peak.51 SDS modeled much of its protest style after the SNCC and the civil rights 
movement, including tactics of nonviolent sit-ins, marches, and conventions. According 





march on Washington was infused with the imagery and spirit of the civil rights 
movement.”52  In addition to its “spirit,” SDS applied civil rights protest methods to their 
anti-war protest, combining these two issues while also appropriating protest 
methodologies from their previous repertoire. As the United States became deeply 
entrenched in the Vietnam war, SDS made antiwar protest its most important cause.  
SDS became involved in draft-resistance efforts in 1966 and encouraged many 
college students to do the same. Arguing against the 2-S student deferment that allowed 
college students to defer their service, many members of SDS, including one of its 
founders, Thomas Hayden, believed that the Vietnam War was being fought by a 
disproportionate number of working-class and African American soldiers.53 The group 
created teach-ins at universities around the country, instituted student strikes at Columbia 
University and other campuses, and encouraged young men to “resist” the draft.54 After 
touring North Vietnam during a bombing halt in early 1966, Hayden returned with a 
renewed commitment to end the war, and he encouraged members of SDS to help lead 
the country on a more peaceful path. SDS leader Rennie Davis also worked closely with 
Hayden to organize antiwar protests. After traveling to Vietnam to witness firsthand the 
devastation of the fighting, Davis became a central figure in SDS’s demonstrations 
against the war.55  
Another prominent group that surfaced to protest the Vietnam War was the 
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (Mobe), of which David 
Dellinger became a chair and prominent leader. Dellinger had a long history of antiwar 
protest and pacifism, having been jailed for refusing to register for the draft during World 





Dellinger insisted that Mobe dedicate itself to civil disobedience and strongly argued 
against the use of violence as a tool of protest. As a central organizing group for the 
antiwar movement, Mobe was responsible for mass rallies and marches, including a huge 
demonstration at the Lincoln Memorial in 1967.56  
The Yippies, or Youth International Party, was another counterculture group that 
emerged in the 1960s as a response to the war in Vietnam, the civil rights movement, and 
apolitical hippie groups. While Mobe professed nonviolent means of protest, the Yippies 
advocated the use of more radical tactics to bring an end to the war. In his book 
Revolution for the Hell of It, Abbie Hoffman, the Yippies’ leader, espoused the goals as 
conceived by the group: 
1. The blending of pot and politics into a political grass leaves movement—a 
cross-fertilization of the hippie and New Left philosophies; 
2. A connecting link that would tie together as much of the underground as was 
willing into some gigantic national get-together; 
3. The development of a model for an alternative society; [and] 
4. The need to make some statement, especially in revolutionary action-theater 
terms, about LBJ, the Democratic Party, electoral politics, and the state of the 
nation.57 
Both Hoffman and Yippie co-founder Jerry Rubin used the news media to disseminate 
their antiwar messages. Perhaps more than any other group in the antiwar movement, the 
Yippies served a polarizing function within the movement because of their bizarre antics 
and drug-induced messages.58 Molly Hite characterized their tactics as “subversive fun,” 





centerfold.59 The Yippies’ main tactic was guerilla theater. Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. 
compared the strategies of the Yippies to that of the ancient Greek Cynics, whose refusal 
to compromise with the dominant order and extreme behavior led to their use of what 
Windt termed “the diatribe.” The diatribe relied on shock, exaggeration, and laughter, but 
as Windt noted, this form left its users open to ad hominem attacks. The Yippies 
reinvented the Cynic’s diatribe in the 1960s, engaging in public sexual acts and nudity, 
wearing unconventional clothing, throwing cash onto the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange, and attempting to exorcise demons from the Pentagon.60 Other antiwar groups 
with similar messages, including religious groups, legal analysts, war veterans, and 
politicians, often found the Yippies’ tactics unappealing and chose to protest against the 
war through different means.  
Religious, Legal, and Political Dissenters  
Some of the first visible protests against the Vietnam War that surfaced in the 
U.S. press occurred among religious groups and individuals—for example, Buddhist 
monks lighting themselves on fire. In 1963, the South Vietnamese leader, Ngo Dinh 
Diem, was violently suppressing Buddhists throughout the Southern region. Buddhist 
monks resorted to self-immolation to protest Diem’s rule. Described by Small as 
“burning themselves in protest against his tyranny,” self-immolation became a horrifying 
form of protest that shocked many Americans into action.61 Following the June 11, 1963, 
self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc,62 American Catholics emerged to 
protest the treatment of Buddhists by South Vietnamese Catholics. They carried signs 





protests were broadcast on ABC news, but largely went unheeded as the civil rights 
movement captured Americans’ attention.  
Many religious groups argued over the morality of the mass bombings inflicted on 
Vietnam by the United States. As Small noted,  
The images of a modern air force raining down death on helpless peasants who 
were not engaged in comparable attacks on Americans took away the moral high 
ground from the United States in its battle to win . . . the hearts and minds of its 
own citizens.64  
In protest of the mass bombings in Vietnam, a few Americans emulated the actions of the 
Vietnamese Buddhists at home.65 Zaroulis and Sullivan described the 1965 self-
immolation of Norman R. Morrison, a thirty-two-year-old Quaker, who  
walked to the river entrance to the Pentagon across the Potomac from the nation’s 
capital, doused himself with kerosene from a can that he carried, and set himself 
on fire. He was about one hundred yards from Secretary of Defense Robert S. 
McNamara’s office and within full view of its windows.66  
Zaroulis and Sullivan also noted the stories of Alice Herz, an eighty-two-year-old 
Holocaust survivor who immolated herself in Detroit in 1965 and Roger A. LaPorte, a 
twenty-one-year-old member of the Catholic Worker movement, who set himself on fire 
in front of the United Nations in New York,67 both protesting “against a great country 
trying to wipe out a small country for no reason.”68 Protesting the war on moral grounds, 
these religious activists took an extreme action to demonstrate their objections toward the 





As the bombings continued, many Catholic groups became involved in various 
antiwar protests. The Catholic Worker movement and its leader, Dorothy Day, engaged 
in both moderate and radical protests. For example, in November 1965, a large-scale 
demonstration was held in New York’s Union Square to rally against the Selective 
Service Act of 1965. Many younger protesters intended to burn their draft cards in 
defiance of the act; however, Day offered a more moderate speech that explained the 
position of the Catholic Workers in religious and pacifist terms.69 The Catholic Worker 
movement continued its protest throughout the tenure of the war; however, the tension 
between radicals and moderates in the movement was never perfectly resolved.70 
On May 8, 1968, another group of Catholic protesters entered a Selective Service 
Office, stole a large number of draft cards from the files, and burned the cards in the 
parking lot. Later called the Catonsville Nine, this group consisted of two priests and 
seven parishioners, who prayed over the blazing draft cards.71 As part of what J. Justin 
Gustainis called the “Catholic Ultra-Resistance,” the Catonsville Nine mailed 
“manifestos” to various reporters in the Baltimore, Maryland area.72 The Nine were 
arrested for interfering with the draft and served their time in prison, but the story of their 
protest was disseminated throughout the country. 
Catholics were not the only religious denomination to protest the war. Many 
religious groups worked across their denominational divides to protest the war. Harold E. 
Quinley noted, “the clergy’s positions on the war . . . were found to be part of a highly 
structured political and theological belief system.”73 In November 1969, various religious 
groups participated in the Mobe-sponsored “March Against Death” protest in 





other religious parishioners, who marched from Arlington National Cemetery to the 
White House, where each person read the name of a fallen soldier.74 In addition, these 
religious leaders attempted to hold a mass in the Pentagon Mall called the “Mass of 
Peace,” but these demonstrators were dispersed or arrested.75  
The leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Martin 
Luther King, Jr., spoke out against the Vietnam War, combining his religious arguments 
with his quest for civil rights. On April 4, 1967, King delivered the well-known speech, 
“A Time to Break Silence,”76 in which he criticized the Vietnam War against the advice 
of friends, fellow ministers, and the Johnson administration.77 In the speech, King 
expressed regret for not speaking out against the war sooner and noted the kinship 
between the plight of the Vietnamese peasant and the African American. King expanded 
his moral arguments to include international affairs, arguing that African Americans were 
dying in disproportionate numbers in Vietnam and that the war was distracting 
Americans from their domestic problems.78 
Some Americans felt that U.S. involvement in the war violated the 1954 Geneva 
accords and various Articles of the United Nations Charter. In the Geneva Accords of 
1954, the United States had promised to keep out of the affairs of other countries.79 In 
addition, many international lawyers noted that the war violated Articles 2 and 53 of the 
U.N. Charter, which prohibited nations from interfering in the affairs of sovereign 
countries and required the approval of the U.N. Security Council to wage war.80 The most 
prominent promoter of the idea that the war was illegal was Ho Chi Minh, leader of the 





Ho Chi Minh had declared regularly, with only minor variations, that the 
American presence in South Vietnam was an egregious violation of the 1954 
Geneva accords and that, as fundamental preconditions to negotiations, the DRV 
[Democratic Republic of Vietnam] required that the United States cease bombing 
and withdraw its military forces and political agents from the South.81  
In addition, government figures spoke out against the illegality of the war in 
Vietnam. Senate Majority Leader Michael J. Mansfield noted the need for the U.N. 
Security Council to oversee American involvement in Vietnam and claimed that the 
United States required U.N. support if the nation wanted to win the war.82 J. William 
Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted the illegality of 
the war, citing the country’s violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords:  
Mr. President, in terms of flaunting by Government officials of the people’s right 
to know the facts, there has been no period in American history comparable to 
that of our involvement in Vietnam. From the shoddy disregard of the Geneva 
accords, through the misrepresentation surrounding passage of the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution, down to the present-day attempt to pass off the dictatorial Thieu 
regime as a government which shares our values, the executive branch of the 
Government has failed—and continues to fail—to come clean with the American 
public.83  
In addition, the Russell Tribunal, made up of various international political, religious, and 
social movement leaders, took up the argument against the Dow Chemical Company and 
the use of napalm against Vietnamese civilians, the treatment of Vietnamese POWs that 





Laws of War.84 According to Zaroulis and Sullivan, the Tribunal concluded that the 
United States had violated “numerous international treaties in its conduct of the war,”  
including the Hague Convention of 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 . . . and the UN Charter—in addition, of course, to 
repeating offenses for which Germans and Japanese were tried after World War II 
at Nuremberg and Tokyo.85 
The Vietnam Veterans against the War (VVAW), one of the most credible yet 
controversial antiwar groups, extended the arguments of the Russell Tribunal by 
testifying against the use of napalm and other weapons of war. In addition, the veterans 
spoke out against the war atrocities committed by both the United States and the 
Vietnamese. Speaking publicly about their own experiences during the war, the antiwar 
veterans argued that dissent was their patriotic duty. The clearest example of this dissent 
occurred in February 1971 when the VVAW held a three-day event called the Winter 
Soldier Investigations, in which over 100 veterans testified that they had witnessed or 
committed war crimes in Vietnam.86 As Richard Moser noted, “Beatings, rape, murder, 
and the destruction of crops and livestock—the veterans portrayed a war, not against an 
enemy, but against a people.”87 The testimony of the soldiers, disseminated through a 
documentary entitled Winter Soldier and a book entitled The New Soldier, was intended 
to expose the widespread nature of the soldiers’ abuses and to urge an ending to the war. 
Soldiers recalled their experiences watching other soldiers kill children, throw enemy 
bodies out of planes for fun, rape Vietnamese women, and disembowel dead bodies.88 
Many veterans began to desert the military, either by moving to Canada or staying in 





The diverse strategies of Vietnam War protesters in many ways extended the 
tactics and ideologies of the previous 200 years, but also offered a few departures. 
Similarities included the use of speeches, draft resistance, civil disobedience, marches, 
and rallies as discussed in Chapter 1. A major difference was not how dissenters were 
protesting, but who was protesting. Military veterans returning to testify against the war 
represented a significant departure from the usual critics of war. Another important 
difference came from the New Left, especially the Yippies. The use of guerrilla theater, 
and specifically the carnival, was a new tactic for opposing war in the United States. The 
Yippies threw money on the New York Stock Exchange, they attempted to exorcise evil 
spirits from the Pentagon, held a “Yip-In” at Grand Central Station, and produced a 
“Festival of Life” at the Democratic National Convention.90 As will emerge in later 
chapters, the use of the carnival and guerrilla theater seeped into the strategies used by 
the defendants in the courtroom, extending their antiwar tactics from the political arena to 
the judicial. 
The 1968 Democratic National Convention and its Aftermath  
Despite the different tactics and views of all of these diverse antiwar groups, 
many of them came together at the 1968 Democratic National Convention to protest 
American involvement in Vietnam. The convention was expected to attract not only 
politicians but extensive media coverage as well, and thus it afforded the demonstrators a 
large audience for their message. In addition, the convention drew diverse groups from 
various political affiliations. “Some represented factions of the New Left. Many were 
committed Marxists, wedded to revolutionary change. Others were apostles of the 





Olson and Randy Roberts. “The only conviction they shared was the notion that liberal 
politics were moribund. It was that firmly held belief that they brought to Chicago.”91 
The Yippies originally conceived the idea for a nonviolent demonstration to be 
held outside of the Democratic National Convention as a protest against the policies of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson. Thus, the original intention of the demonstration, 
according to its organizers, was to protest the Democratic Party, particularly the 
president. When Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection, “he did the one 
thing no one counted on,” according to Hoffman—leave office at the end of his first full 
term as president.92 When Robert F. Kennedy announced his candidacy for president, the 
Yippies thought of disbanding and discussed whether to cancel their plans to attend the 
convention. Abbie Hoffman explained,  
It took two full weeks of debate to arrive at a method of dropping-out which 
would not further demoralize the troops. The statement was all ready when up 
stepped Sirhan Sirhan [the man who assassinated Robert Kennedy], and in ten 
seconds he made it a whole new ball game. We postponed calling off Chicago and 
tried to make some sense out of what the hell had just happened.93 
Phone calls poured into the newly founded Yippie office, asking when they should leave 
for Chicago. Apparently, the Yippies were not the only protesters who were thinking 
about the convention.94  
The Yippies’ next task was to decide what sort of demonstration to hold. Hoffman 
and other organizers finally settled on a mixture of a rock festival, a protest workshop, 
and a large march—a Festival of Life. The next step was to get a permit. Here, the 





antiestablishment commitments. The difficulty in obtaining a permit was linked to several 
factors. First, the city was apprehensive about issuing permits because of the previous 
violence associated with protests in the past.95 Second, the city did not want to grant a 
permit too early, because this would attract even more demonstrators to the city. Third, 
the city officials were hesitant to allow the protesters to sleep in the park.96 
Regardless of the dissonance and difficulty, the Yippies, along with Mobe and the 
Coalition for an Open Convention (COC),97 persisted in their efforts to organize the 
protest. On March 26, protest leaders met with David Stahl, Deputy Mayor of Chicago, to 
present their permit application. Over the next four months, battles ensued regarding the 
nature of the permit. Hoffman referred to the permit as a “treaty” between the protesters 
and the city of Chicago: 
This matter of a permit is a cat-and-mouse game. The Chicago authorities do not 
wish to grant it too early, knowing this would increase the number of people that 
descend on the city. They can ill afford to wait too late, for that will inhibit 
planning on our part and create more chaos. It is not our wish to take on superior 
armed troops who outnumber us on unfamiliar enemy territory. It is not their wish 
to have a Democrat nominated amidst a major bloodbath. The treaty will work for 
both sides.98 
On August 22, the Yippies joined an already existing lawsuit enacted by Mobe to sue the 
city of Chicago “to require the issuance of a permit for Lincoln park.”99 The Yippies 
eventually withdrew from the suit because they realized its futility. According to Walker, 





became clear to the Yippies that no permit was going to be issued for the festival of 
life.”100 They began to plan despite the lack of a permit. 
As the convention opened, police and other federal officials converged on Lincoln 
Park. David Farber described the preparations that took place prior to the protests: “By 
the time the convention began, there were approximately one thousand federal agents in 
Chicago. By midweek, military intelligence estimated that one in six demonstrators was 
an undercover government agent.”101 The police planned to enforce the 11:00 p.m. 
curfew at the park. The Saturday activities went as planned: Various workshops were 
held, and at 11:00 p.m., the demonstrators were led out of the park.102  
Despite the obvious police presence and the lack of a permit, the protest leaders 
decided to hold the music festival anyway. David Dellinger and Eric Weinberger 
attempted to meet with Chicago Deputy Mayor David Stahl on Sunday morning to again 
attempt to acquire a permit, but the Deputy Mayor did not appear.103 The Sunday 
demonstration was not as successful as the one held the day before. When the 11:00 p.m. 
curfew came, many protesters refused to leave the park. As the police began to clear the 
park, the protesters resisted, yelling obscenities at the officers. According to Farber, a 
storm of violence ensued: 
Then, suddenly, the police moved forward, some screaming, “Get the fuck out of 
here.” A police captain tried to restrain his men, “Don’t leave the line. . . . Get 
back.” He raised his own club to one of his men who was threatening a 
photographer. But he had lost control. The crowd bolted, moving into Clark 
Street. A few police gave chase, clubbing people in the head and in the back. A 





forty policemen to “clear” Clark Street in order to keep traffic flowing. With this 
break in the line, the skirmish formation dissolved. The police began to 
methodically club people.104 
The next day, the protesters came back to the park. Hoffman, along with other 
leaders, walked through the crowds, encouraging members to leave the park by 11:00. 
The police were hearing rumors that the crowd was armed and planned to shoot police 
officers. These rumors, combined with the brewing hostility of the protesters, led to a 
tense and aggressive atmosphere. As had happened the previous night, violence erupted 
when the curfew was broken: Police attacked both protesters and journalists, clubbing 
without regard to age or sex. Although no demonstrators were shot or fatally beaten, 
hundreds were treated for serious wounds at local hospitals or by the medics brought to 
Chicago by the protesting groups. That night, seventy protesters were arrested.105   
The Democratic National Convention began that night. The Democrat’s nominee 
for president was then-Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey was known for 
endorsing the policies of the Johnson administration; he supported the war in Vietnam 
and Johnson’s civil rights legislation. He ran, however, on a significantly more moderate 
platform.106 His choice for Vice President was Edmund Muskie, the Democrat Senator 
from Maine, “a man whose views on policy at home and abroad almost exactly 
parallel[ed] Humphrey’s.”107 At the convention, both men explained their positions on 
both foreign and domestic policies. Regarding Vietnam, Humphrey argued for “a 
continued strong American war effort,” unlike Republicans, who publicly favored a 
decrease in American involvement.108 For the situation at home, Humphrey proposed no 





for the continuation of Johnson’s programs.109 Because the counterculture groups 
severely disliked Johnson’s policies, they transferred their frustrations to Humphrey’s 
candidacy. In his acceptance speech, Humphrey condemned the actions of the protesters 
outside of the convention: 
This moment is one of personal pride and gratification. Yet one cannot help but 
reflect the deep sadness that we feel over the troubles and the violence which have 
erupted regrettably and tragically in the streets of this great city, and for the 
personal injuries which have occurred. Surely we have learned the lesson that 
violence breeds more violence and that it cannot be condoned—whatever the 
source.110 
Humphrey did, however, condemn the behavior of the police officers as well, stating, 
“We do not want a police state but we need a state of law and order, and neither mob 
violence nor police brutality have any place in America.”111 
The next morning, the leaders of the protest, including Hoffman, held press 
conferences condemning the behavior of the police officers. The media also condemned 
such treatment, writing letters to Chicago Mayor Daley and demanding meetings with 
Chicago officials. Despite these meetings, violence again erupted between the police and 
the protesters after the protesters once again violated the 11:00 p.m. curfew. This time, 
though, the police had new weapons, including very potent tear gas. The riots persisted 
well into the night, and eventually Mayor Daley called in the National Guard to relieve 
police. After a long night of protest, Hoffman went to a restaurant for breakfast with 
some fellow protesters. Around 8:00 a.m., Hoffman was arrested for having the word 





he would not be involved in the Grant Park rally and convention march,”112 which were 
scheduled for that afternoon. That march did take place, and again, police met protesters 
with violence.   
As a result of the riots on the Chicago streets, eight policemen and eight 
demonstration leaders were arrested. The officers were arrested on charges that they were 
“depriving citizens of their civil rights by inflicting summary punishment.”113 Seven of 
the eight policemen were acquitted of the charges, and all charges were dropped for the 
other officer. This was not the case for the eight demonstration leaders, however. Abbie 
Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Bobby Seale, David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, John 
Froines, and Lee Weiner were charged with the intent to “travel in interstate commerce 
. . . to incite, organize, promote, encourage, participate in, and carry on a riot and to 
commit acts of violence in furtherance of a riot, and to aid and abet persons in inciting of 
a riot.”114 
The Chicago Eight Trial 
The Chicago Eight Trial began on September 24, 1969. The jury was made up of 
ten women and two men, all chosen by Judge Julius Hoffman in one day. On the first day 
of court, Judge Hoffman had four of the defense attorneys arrested for failing to show up 
to court on time, despite their having withdrawn from the case. Also on this day, Bobby 
Seale asked for a postponement in order to wait for his attorney to recover from surgery. 
This motion was denied.115  
Both the prosecution and defense laid down solid cases. The prosecution called 





reporters.116 They attempted to show that the eight defendants conspired to create rioting 
in the streets of Chicago. According to J. Anthony Lukas of the New York Times,  
Most of the Government’s evidence has focused on what the seven defendants 
said, not what they did. For the defendants are charged not so much with doing 
anything here in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, but 
crossing state lines with an “evil intent,” a “common state of mind,” “a mutual 
understanding” of what to do: namely, to incite a riot.117  
The defense attempted to call surprise witnesses, including Mayor Daley, but was 
continuously sanctioned by the judge.118 Other defense witnesses included poet Allen 
Ginsberg, writer Norman Mailer, activist Timothy Leary, civil rights activist Jesse 
Jackson, and singer Country Joe McDonald.119  
Throughout the trial, various antics and outbursts were cause for Judge Hoffman 
to hold the defendants and their lawyers in contempt. David Dellinger, in his book 
Contempt, allocated over 250 pages to outlining all of the various contempt charges. Over 
the course of the trial, Abbie Hoffman was charged with twenty-four counts of contempt. 
The following represent examples of these charges: 
Specification 1: On September 26, during the opening statement by the 
Government, defendant Hoffman rose and blew a kiss to the jurors. 
Specification 3: On October 28, at the close of the session, the defendant Hoffman 
refused to rise in the customary manner when directed to do so by the marshal. 
Specification 14: On January 9, the defendant Hoffman openly laughed at the 





Hoffman was ordered to spend eight months in prison for the counts of contempt, and 
David Dellinger, Jerry Rubin, and Rennie Davis were sentenced to just over two years for 
contempt charges. Thomas Hayden’s sentence for contempt totaled 1 year, 2 months, and 
13 days, and Lee Weiner and John Froines were sentenced to 2 months and 6 months, 
respectively. Bobby Seale received the longest sentence on contempt charges, totaling 
four years.121  
Notably, the trial changed in November of 1969 from the “Chicago Eight” to the 
“Chicago Seven” after Bobby Seale was severed from the trial and given four years in 
prison on his charges of contempt. Seale had attempted to act as his own attorney because 
Judge Hoffman would not postpone the trial to wait for Seale’s attorney to recover from 
surgery. After various outbursts from Seale, Judge Hoffman ordered the marshals to bind 
and gag the defendant. For six days, Bobby Seale was bound and gagged by the court. 
When Seale attempted to talk through the gag, it was reinforced with heavy tape. On 
November 4, 1969, Judge Hoffman ordered a mistrial for Seale and severed him from the 
case, so that he could face trial on his own at a future date, without the other seven 
defendants present.122  
The witnesses called by the defense were not as effective as the attorneys had 
hoped. On February 18, 1970, the jury acquitted two of the defendants (Froines and 
Weiner), but found five of the defendants—Hoffman, Dellinger, Davis, Rubin, and 
Hayden—guilty. They were each given the maximum five-year sentence and sent to jail 
without bail.123 The defendants appealed. On May 11, 1972, the contempt convictions of 
the seven defendants and their two defense attorneys were reversed. Six months later, the 





overturned. Seale, conversely, spent the entire span of the trial in prison, unlike the other 
defendants who were allowed to leave after court. Seale’s jail time was extended because 
of murder charges he faced in Connecticut at the end of his Chicago trial. After his trial in 
Chicago, he was sent to New Haven to face the murder charges. He was ultimately 
acquitted, and he was never retried for the conspiracy charges.124 
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Public Moral Argument and Carnival in the Courtroom 
Arguments about the morality of war are often presented by antiwar protesters in 
the form of narrative. Walter Fisher noted that public moral argument is “founded on 
ultimate questions—of life and death, of how persons should be defined and treated, of 
preferred patterns of living.”1 The previous chapters showed that arguments over war not 
only involve questions of life and death, but other “ultimate questions” as well, including 
issues of citizenship, colonization, slavery, justice, freedom, and similar “ultimate” 
principles. Extending Fisher’s views on the moral, Celeste Condit argued that public 
moral arguments rely upon the collective understanding of what constitutes “moral,” as 
created through stories.2  
The average person, Condit contended, must compete with those in power to 
define the moral. “Dominant elites” can seek to “hijack the moral potential [of public 
arguments] for partisan ends” because they are able to “control the means of 
communication.”3 In a social movement context, then, activists must strive to create 
strong narratives that can persuade the public about the moral nature of the cause.  
Linking narrative and persuasion, Lisa M. Gring-Pemble argued that public moral 
argument enacted through the narrative form becomes persuasive because it offers a story 
that is accessible to the public, allowing the audience to identify with either side of the 
argument.4 Thus, public moral argument depict problems of social and/or political 
consequence that encourage identification and engagement with the community.5  
One way that activists are able to organize and create a strong narrative, and 





“carnival.” Bakhtin asserted that carnival is based on its opposition to the dominant 
culture and its institutions as it becomes a form of social protest that centralizes the role 
of the people: “Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and 
everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people.”6 Building upon 
Bakhtin’s original conception of carnival, John Fiske explained that the carnivalesque “is 
a testament to the power of the ‘low’ to insist upon its rights to a place in the culture.”7 
Encompassing Hauser’s concept of “vernacular rhetoric,”8 carnival also relies upon a 
heavy emphasis on the element of humor. Carnival challenges the rules and control of 
dominant culture and “builds a world upside down.”9  
According to Juliet Dee, the defendants also faced three specific constraints in 
expressing their public moral argument within the trial: (1) “Normative Constraints” like 
the conventions of traditional storytelling and norms of persuasion; (2) “Political 
Constraints” in which the media utilized their agenda setting function to report, ignore, or 
celebrate the antiwar stance of the defendants; and (3) “Production Constraints” in which 
the media emphasized the deviant and exciting and “conferred celebrity status upon the 
defendants . . . at the expense of deliberative debate on Vietnam.”10  
In this chapter, I explore how the defendants created public moral arguments, 
utilizing the elements of the carnivalesque in a legal setting dependent on rules and 
decorum. Before examining this matter, however, I discuss  carnival as conceived by 
Bakhtin and developed by later scholars through the elements of ritual spectacle, comic 
verbal composition, and various genres of billingsgate, so it may serve as the lens through 
which the public moral arguments of the defendants can be understood. Utilizing this 





defendants in the Chicago Eight Trial engaged in carnivalesque actions in the courtroom. 
When viewed through the lens of carnival, the discourse of the Chicago defendants can 
be seen as a narrative of conflict that exposes the absurdity of the trial and the war in 
Vietnam. The chapter closes with an examination of the government’s response to these 
carnivalesque techniques employed by the defense.  
Carnival 
Ritual Spectacle, Comic Verbal Compositions, and Billingsgate 
 According to Bakhtin, the foundation of the carnival is laughter, without which 
this form has little meaning. First, Bakhtin writes, carnival laughter is “the laughter of the 
people.” Second, laughter is universal, meaning the “entire world is seen in its droll 
aspect.” Third, carnival laughter is “ambivalent,” both fun and mocking at the same 
time.11 This laughter is public, as hierarchies are denied in the carnival and “a special 
form of free and familiar contact reigned among people who were usually divided by the 
barriers of caste, property, profession, and age.”12 Laughter is the overarching theme of 
the carnival, and the each of the three categories within the carnival form (ritual 
spectacle, comic verbal compositions, and billingsgate) holds this common, universal, 
and ambivalent theme as its foundation. The defendants in the Chicago Eight Trial used 
all three elements of the carnival when crafting their public moral argument.  
 All three elements of the carnival—ritual spectacle, comic verbal compositions, 
and the genres of billingsgate—are intended to invert hierarchies and induce laughter 
according to Bakhtin. These strategies can and often do offer a political and/or social 
critique according to Paul “Pablo” Martin and Valerie Renegar, but these authors warn 





necessarily qualify it as being carnivalesque. The persons employing carnivalesque 
strategies must be somehow questioning the social structure and encouraging critical 
awareness,”13 while also creating laughter.  
Ritual spectacle. The first element of the carnival is ritual spectacle, which serves 
to place individuals on equal footing with each other, no matter what their social status, 
and occasionally even reverses the hierarchy or power. According to Bakhtin, in the 
medieval world, these spectacles were “carnival pageants” and “comic shows of the 
marketplace.”14 In contrast to official ceremonies, ritual spectacles were not plays to be 
watched, but realities to be experienced. In fact, ritual spectacles did not “acknowledge 
any distinction between actors and spectators.”15 The spectacle offered the people a 
“second life” outside of the “existing world order” in which they experienced 
“community, freedom, equality, and abundance.”16  
In modern times, the ritual spectacle may incorporate laughter to create political 
arguments against what M. Lane Bruner called the “humorless state.”17 The essence of 
the political message in the ritual spectacle is to invert hierarchy and symbolically protest 
the current system. Bruner argues that although these techniques can serve to reinforce 
political norms, these carnivalesque approaches can also “create a space for critique that 
would otherwise not be possible in ‘normal’ society.”18 Finally, Bruner observes the 
blending of the high and low cultures in a “real” (versus a “pretend”) way that in the 
everyday world could have serious consequences. The fictional can blend with the real, 
and the real with the fictional, during the ritual spectacle of the carnival.19  
The main purpose of the ritual spectacle is to invert hierarchical structure, thus 





of freedoms. Masquerades, role reversals, and closing formalities give those in the lower 
order a chance to resist this structure. Bruner offers the following explanations for each 
of these modes:  
Masks signify a breaking away from ordinary time and entrance into fictive or 
sacred time via anonymity and normal role loss; role reversals—or the turning of 
the world upside down—signify a divine instance of group fusion as people enter 
liminal spaces where normally highly disciplined social roles are temporarily 
exchanged or discarded; and closing formalities (e.g., orderly processions, ritual 
reinstatement of officials) occur at the end of the carnival period to signify a 
return to the normal world of humorless repression where . . . politically 
consequential fictions . . . become “real” again.20 
As we shall see the Chicago Eight created ritual spectacles throughout their trial, often 
combining two or more of these methods,. 
Comic verbal compositions. The second element of carnival, comic verbal 
compositions, centers on the importance of laughter. Laughter may serve as a sign of 
truth and freedom, says Bakhtin, as people respond to these compositions: “Laughter 
created no dogmas and could not become authoritarian; it did not convey fear but a 
feeling of strength.”21 According to Bakhtin, this comic practice of the carnival consists 
mostly of parodies, which include types of “mock rhetoric” such as “debates, comic 
dialogues, and euloges” and is “also reflected in the fabliaux and in the peculiar comic 
lyrics of vagrant scholars.”22 Priscilla Marie Meddaugh describes parody in the carnival: 
“Of particular significance to carnival laughter is ‘parodia sacra,’ or the parody of 





government, industry, and religion—provide fodder for carnival as cultural critic.”23 In 
addition, Robert Stam argues that the laughter of the carnival is embedded in the form of 
parody as “the privileged mode of artistic carnivalization.”24 
Billingsgate. Various genres of billingsgate comprise the third element of 
carnivalesque manifestation, including categories such as abusive language, profanities, 
and oaths.25 All three, according to Bakhtin, are relegated to the carnival of the “low” 
because they defy the norms of official speech. Bakhtin defined abusive language as 
“insulting words or expressions . . . that while humiliating and mortifying . . . [are] at the 
same time revived and renewed.”26 Abusive language is double-sided in the sense that it 
performs the tasks of both complimenting and criticizing.27 Similarly, profanity links the 
sacred and nonsacred through language. The use of profanity is, at its root, outside of the 
church, thus defying hierarchical authority. Oaths, at times forbidden by authorities 
and/or the church, can be seen as “a certain rejection of official philosophy, a verbal 
protest.”28  
All three elements of the carnival—ritual spectacle, comic verbal compositions, 
and the genres of billingsgate—are intended to invert hierarchies and induce laughter for 
the nonelites. According to Paul “Pablo” Martin and Valerie Renegar, these strategies can 
and often do offer a political and/or social critique; however, Martin and Renegar warn 
that “simply because a text employs a selection of carnivalesque tropes does not 
necessarily qualify it as being carnivalesque. The persons employing carnivalesque 
strategies must be somehow questioning the social structure and encouraging critical 
awareness.”29 The political message and comedic performance create a dialectical tension 





The Defendants and Carnival in the Courtroom 
The Chicago Eight defendants were—in the context of the courtroom, at least—
the “low” commenting on the “high.” The interactions between the judge, lawyers, and 
defendants showed both the lack of power the defendants officially had in the courtroom, 
as well as their attempts to destabilize the hierarchies and create a space of equality 
among the three roles. Despite the Chicago Eight defendants’ disparate economic 
backgrounds, mostly white racial makeup, and all male gender, the judge treated the 
defendants as criminals,31 thus defining their status in the courtroom as lower than that of 
the judge. Expressions of the carnival form, however, help erase the differences between 
the defendants’ backgrounds and unite them based on their commonality as defendants. 
Thus, the tactics of the defendants can be understood through the carnival lens as they 
constructed public moral arguments regarding the Vietnam War, the nature of the United 
States judicial system, racism, and “high” society. 
Although not all the defendants agreed on the best method to create public moral 
arguments while also winning their case,32 they all repeatedly chose to violate the rules of 
the court in various ways—some laughed openly at court rulings, wore inappropriate 
clothing, applauded statements made by the other defendants, and spoke out of turn when 
they felt they had something to say. The defendants were constantly fighting the restraints 
of scene, as evidenced by the numerous contempt charges they faced during the trial.33 In 
particular, the Yippies (Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin) sought to fight against the 
system.  
Such an approach mirrored their protest outlook and behavior outside the 





that sought to transform institutions to fit ideological concerns, Yippies sought to do 
away with institutions all together.”34 Hoffman claimed that the court was not a place of 
justice, and in fact, justice should be placed in the hands of the people. In response to his 
contempt charges, Hoffman argued,  
We don’t consider it [this court] the highest [court in the land]. We consider the 
people  the highest court in the land. We cannot respect an authority that we 
regard as illegitimate. We can only offer resistance to such illegitimate authority. 
We cannot respect a law that is tyranny and the courts are in a conspiracy of 
tyranny. And when the law is in tyranny, the only order is insurrection and 
disrespect, and that’s what we showed, and that’s what all honorable men of free 
will show.35 
The court was just one example of the institutions the defendants sought to destroy; thus, 
the scene became a dominant element in the rhetoric of the trial as they fought against its 
restrictions and rules and sought to create their own arguments about justice, subverting 
the scene into a carnival-like context. This subversion occurred in three ways: ritual 
spectacles, comic verbal compositions, and various genres of billingsgate.  
Constructing the Ritual Spectacle 
On October 28, 1969, all eight defendants began one of their first ritual 
spectacles; they refused to rise when Judge Hoffman called for a recess.36 When Bobby 
Seale made a motion to act as his own attorney, the other defendants began speaking out 
in support of his motion. After they were silenced and a recess was called, Judge 
Hoffman demanded that the defendants rise for the Court Marshal; the defendants refused 





constitutional rights. Why should I rise for him? He is not recognizing —.”37 Later that 
day, Attorney Leonard Weinglass explained his clients’ decision not to stand: 
MR. WEINGLASS: If the Court please, it is my understanding that there is no 
constitutional or legal obligation on the part of the defendants to rise so long as 
his failure to rise is not disruptive. 
THE COURT: You advise your clients not to rise, do you? 
MR. WEINGLASS: I have no obligation to advise my clients to rise. He is doing 
nothing disruptive in the courtroom. 
THE COURT: We will determine that later. 38 
Attorney William Kunstler again explained why the defendants did not stand: 
“They are protesting, your Honor, and I think that is protective of the First 
Amendment.”39 In this case, the refusal to participate in the sanctioned spectacle of the 
courtroom became a ritual spectacle for the defendants, protesting their unfair treatment. 
The defendants’ apparent disrespect for the judge was used to protest Judge Hoffman’s 
disrespect for them.  
On February 6, 1970, Defendants Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman began wearing 
judges’ robes to court. Further, when Rubin and Hoffman removed their robes, they 
tossed them to the ground and stomped on them, indicating that the robes were supposed 
to represent justice, but through the course of the trial, the robes had become a symbol of 
racism.40 By dressing as judges, Rubin and Hoffman symbolically reversed the role of the 
judge and the defendant, becoming the prosecutor of the trial and implying that the 
government and the court system should be on trial instead. By appearing in the uniform 





and who was in fact on trial. Thus, Rubin and Hoffman used clothing as a ritual 
spectacle, masquerading in the attire of the officials and reversing the roles of prosecutor 
and prosecuted. Janack wrote, “Consistent with its anti-institutional nature, carnival 
inverts the roles of spectator and participant, commoner and elite.”41  
Abbie Hoffman used his body to create comic spectacles in a variety of ways. 
When being sworn in before he testified, Hoffman raised his right hand and created a fist, 
creating the symbol for Black Power.42 On another occasion, Hoffman lifted his middle 
finger as he was being sworn in. In another show of physical protest, Hoffman lifted his 
shirt and danced around the courtroom. Additionally, Hoffman discussed his bodily urges 
during his testimony, inciting laughter from the audience and perpetuating the sense of 
spectacle. When Schultz asked Hoffman, “Did you ever state that a sense of integration 
possesses you and comes from pissing on the Pentagon?” Hoffman replied, “I said from 
combining political attitudes with biological necessity, there is a sense of integration, 
yes.” The exchange continued: 
MR. SCHULTZ: You had a good time at the Pentagon, didn’t you Mr. Hoffman?  
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. I’m having a good time now too. I feel that biological 
necessity now. Could I be excused for a slight recess?  
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we will take a brief recess.43  
Bakhtin argued that the use of urination and defecation fits within a historical 
tradition of debasing gestures. Because carnival gestures are ambivalent, urination can be 
a symbol of “destruction, a grave for the one who is debased,” or it can stand for 
fertility.44 Both meanings, however, create humor and laughter for the audience. Using 





created larger arguments against the court system and the political scene. The body is a 
central theme within the comic spectacles of the carnival; for example, Bakhtin noted, 
“The material bodily principle is contained not in the biological individual, not in the 
bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who are continually growing and renewed. 
This is why all that is bodily becomes grandiose, exaggerated, immeasurable.”45 Thus the 
body becomes a site at which individual protest becomes public argument in which the 
protest within the courtroom moves beyond the immediate scene and encourage 
community conversation and debate.46 
The Comics of the Courtroom 
During his defense testimony, Abbie Hoffman often used comic verbal 
composition to respond to questions asked by both the prosecution and defense, creating 
a public moral argument by providing fabrications or political diatribes instead of the 
expected details of the case. At the beginning of his testimony, defense attorney Leonard 
Weinglass asked Hoffman where he resided, to which he replied, “I live in Woodstock 
Nation.”47 When asked where that was, he stated, 
It is a nation of alienated young people. We carry it around with us as a state of 
mind in the same way as the Sioux Indians carried the Sioux nation around with 
them. It is a nation dedicated to cooperation versus competition, to the idea that 
people should have better means of exchange than property or money, that there 
should be some other basis for human interaction.48 
By telling a story about where he lived, Hoffman created a larger moral argument about 





In another line of introductory questioning, Hoffman was asked when he was 
born, to which he replied, “Psychologically, 1960.”49 In this short response, Hoffman was 
offering to the court and to the news audience an understanding of his life in terms of his 
cultural awakening. His answers mimicked the answers a typical defendant would or 
should give. Hoffman extended this discourse of mockery by offering a cultural claim 
about the education system in the United States. Asked by Mr. Weinglass, “Between the 
date of your birth, November 30, 1936, and May 1, 1960, what if anything occurred in 
your life?” Hoffman replied, “Nothing. I believe it is called education.”50 This statement 
subverted the expected factual answer into cultural criticism.  
Hoffman also created comic dialogues by playing on the names of those officials 
who had a hand in his prosecution. For instance, when asked to tell about his experience 
attempting to get a permit for the protest, he stated, 
We explained to the press that we were leaving in our permit application but 
withdrawing our Federal injunction to sue the city. We said it was a bit futile to 
end up before a judge, Judge Lynch, who was the ex-law partner of Mayor Daley, 
that the Federal judges were closely tied in with the Daley and Democratic 
political machine in Chicago and that we could have little recourse of grievance. 
Furthermore, that we suspected that the judge would order us not to go into 
Lincoln Park at all and that if we did, that we would be in violation of contempt of 
court, and that it was a setup, and Judge Lynch planned to lynch us in the same 
way that Stahl was stalling us.51 
In this example, Hoffman used the names of actual officials to make a joke about the 





composition that caricaturized the men in charge through a mockery of their names. 
Hoffman’s jokes about the irony of these names also served to blur the lines between 
fiction and reality; personification this opportune rarely happens in the real world. 
Abbie Hoffman and David Dillinger continued to challenge the formality of 
naming in the courtroom by referring to everyone by their first names whenever possible. 
Often calling Judge Julius Hoffman “Julie,” Hoffman argued that it was unnecessary to 
speak to a judge as if he were an authority.52 Further, Hoffman refused to refer to himself 
as “Mr. Hoffman,” despite the Court’s efforts to force him into this formal naming 
structure; he referred to himself as “Abbie” throughout the trial.53 Similarly, David 
Dellinger refused to refer to Judge Hoffman as “Judge” or “Your Honor,” noting, “I 
believe in equality, sir. I prefer to call people Mr. or by their first name.”54 By referring to 
the judge, prosecutors, witnesses, and defendants by their first names, these defendants 
worked to subvert the hierarchy of the court system in an attempt to create a level field. 
All the defendants laughed out loud repeatedly during the trial, occasionally even 
rising to their feet to emphasize their pleasure. David Dellinger explained succinctly, 
“We are not ashamed to laugh.”55 The defendants laughed at various points throughout 
the trial, for example, when another defendant made a joke, when they believed that a 
witness was lying, and when Judge Hoffman ruled against them. John Froines, for 
example, laughed freely at the testimony of William Frapolly, a Chicago police officer: 
MR. KUNSTLER: And Tom Hayden said that if there was rough going, that 
instead of the march there should be a vigil at the Amphitheatre?  
THE WITNESS: He said that fifty to a hundred thousand people would mass at 





MR. KUNSTLER: They’d leave the area by a snake dance? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, Sir. 
MR. KUNSTLER: Fifty to a hundred thousand people would snake dance through 
the streets of Chicago, is that what Mr. Hayden said? 
MR. FORAN: Objection, your Honor. And I also would like the record to note the 
character of the noises and giggling and laughing from the defense table. 
THE COURT: Yes. I’ve repeatedly asked that there be no loud laughing, and 
there was after that question. 
MR. FORAN: Your Honor, may the record show that the defendant Froines just 
made a comment saying, “We laughed—we laughed because it was a stupid 
answer.”56  
Although repeatedly warned that they would be cited for contempt if the laughter 
continued, the defendants defied the judge and repeatedly engaged in the kind of laughter 
characteristic to carnival.57  
Abusive Language and Billingsgate  
Throughout the trial, the defendants repeatedly used abusive language and 
profanity to argue against the formality of scene and the trial itself. For instance, Abbie 
Hoffman often referred to Judge Hoffman as a “Nazi,” “racist,” and “pig.” Suggesting 
that Judge Hoffman was Nazi-like, Hoffman stated, 
MR. HOFFMAN: Your idea of justice is the only obscenity in the room. . . .  
THE COURT: Mr. Marshal, will you ask the defendant Hoffman to —  
MR. HOFFMAN: This ain’t the Standard Club.  





MR. HOFFMAN: Oh, tell him to stick it up his bowling ball. How is your war 
stock doing, Julie [Judge Julius Hoffman]? You don’t have any power. They 
didn’t have any power in the Third Reich either.58  
Referring to Judge Hoffman as someone who “would have served Hitler,” 59 Hoffman 
argued that he was being prosecuted based on his beliefs and not his actions.  
Many of the defendants used abusive language to refer to Judge Hoffman. For 
example, during his objections to having the judge’s chosen legal counsel represent him, 
Bobby Seale pointed to the pictures on the walls of the court: “You have George 
Washington and Benjamin Franklin sitting in a picture behind you, and they was slave 
owners. That’s what they were. They owned slaves. You are acting in the same manner, 
denying me my Constitutional rights being able to cross examine this witness.”60 He 
made it clear that he considered Judge Hoffman a racist, yelling, “I still want to defend 
myself, and I know I have a right. I just want to let him know. That racist [Judge 
Hoffman], that fascist [Judge Hoffman].”61 David Dellinger called Judge Hoffman a 
“fascist,”62 and a “Nazi,”63 Abbie Hoffman noted the courtroom was more like a “neon 
oven,”64 and Rennie Davis referred to the judge as a “disgrace.”65  
The defendants used some form of “fuck” as their profanity of choice most of the 
time. Sometimes the phrase “mother fucker [sic]” was used to refer to the court marshals; 
for example, Jerry Rubin yelled, “Don’t hit me in my balls, mother fucker.”66 In his 
testimony, Hoffman used the word “fuck” to refer to sexual intercourse and noted that he 
wrote “FUCK” on his head to keep his picture from being taken and to condense his 
frustrations about the planned Chicago demonstrations: “I like that four letter word—I 





profanity, the defendants challenged the formality of the courtroom and the rules of 
language contained within. 
Reactions from the Court 
In order to maintain at least the semblance of power, Judge Hoffman, the 
prosecutors, and the government witnesses expressed strong responses to the carnival 
constructed by the defendants. James C. Scott claims,  
Every visible, outward use of power—each command, each act of deference, each 
list and ranking, each ceremonial order each public punishment, each use of an 
honorific or a term of derogation—is a symbolic gesture of domination that serves 
to manifest and reinforce a hierarchal order.68  
In line with this view, the government figures used various tactics to reinforce their own 
power, while the defendants attempted to undermine that power. Scott calls these kinds of 
acts “public transcripts,” which he defined as the “self-portrait of dominant elites as they 
would have themselves seen . . . [and that] is a decidedly lopsided discussion.”69 The 
most severe tactic was the binding and gagging of Bobby Seale, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
Although carnival is not always the most successful form of conveying a message 
of social displeasure, it has the possibility of prompting a dialogue of social and political 
change. As Walter Fisher wrote, “The presence of ‘experts’ in public moral arguments 
makes it difficult, if not impossible for the public of ‘untrained thinkers’ to win an 
argument or even judge them well—given, again, the rational world paradigm.”70 While 





continue to oppress the powerless by offering a short, sanctioned time and space for this 
form of protest,71 others, including Bakhtin, have noted the emancipatory potential of the 
carnivalesque form and its possibilities for questioning the established structures of a 
society.72 When the defendants lacked expertise, they attempted to use narrative and 
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Bobby Seale and the Containment of the Black Voice 
On October 29, 1969, Bobby Seale, National Chairman and cofounder of the 
Black Panther Party, was bound and gagged in the courtroom in response to his repeated 
interruptions as he demanded to act as his own attorney. Seale’s treatment within the trial 
was evidence of a larger ideological debate occurring in the United States over the role of 
the U.S. citizen within the context of the Cold War. Freedom of speech and judicial rights 
had been under attack during the era of the McCarthy hearings and had not fully 
recovered by 1969.1 Violence had been spreading throughout the country over issues of 
civil rights and the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The Chicago Eight Trial 
represented a culmination of these tensions, with judicial and political implications that 
would extend far beyond a simple guilty or innocent verdict. Seale’s public moral 
argument within the trial provided a particularly poignant view of the conflicting 
ideologies that were dividing the country. 
Bobby Seale’s experience in the Chicago Trial prompts an emotional view of the 
importance of oppositional discourse and images in the context of the Cold War. More 
specifically, the binding and gagging of Seale and the discourse leading up to these acts 
emerged as important rhetorical acts within the trial. In this chapter, I examine Bobby 
Seale’s public moral argument through the lens of guerrilla theater operating in the 
Chicago Conspiracy Trial. My objective is to analyze the ways in which Seale’s rhetoric 
of opposition and his testimony challenged the dominant Cold War ideologies that still 
existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The binding and gagging of Seale by the court 





and the civil rights movement; however, Seale’s reaction to his restraint also represents 
an emancipatory act within the trial. Ultimately, I hope to offer insight into the larger 
societal implications of Seale’s treatment within the trial and into the public moral 
argument that Seale was attempting to make, first by situating Seale and the Black 
Panthers within the Cold War context. 
Intersection of the Cold War and the Civil Rights Movement 
The Cold War ideology that germinated in the 1940s and 1950s continued to 
strengthen throughout the ensuing three decades as the United States government sought 
to censor suspicious actions and discourse perceived as communistic “in an effort to 
protect the ‘free world.’”2 During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the 
domestic response to the Cold War was to “root out any and all communists and their 
friends and allies and suppress communistic, socialistic, un-American ways of thinking 
and acting.”3 Speaking out against the war, governmental activities, or capitalism was 
considered un-American, and this behavior was quickly censored or condemned by the 
U.S. government or by other American citizens.  
This policy targeted the civil rights movement as well; its leaders were often 
treated as sympathetic to communist ideals—some were alleged to have ties with the 
Communist Party based on the content of their public discourse. As Suzanne Clark has 
observed, “Associating powerful rhetoric with ideological threat suggests a major tenet of 
Cold War poetics.”4 The political instability that the movement caused was seen by some 
as evidence of communist infiltration—as a way for communists to divide the American 
people, making it easier to spread the communist doctrine. Stephen J. Whitfield points 





political subversion.”5 Thus, the NAACP was the target of Southern hostilities, attacked 
for supposed communist infiltration and subsequently outlawed in some states.6 Some 
extremists used the communist label for the U.S. Supreme Court, because of its rulings 
banning racial segregation. Mary Dudziak comments,  
The primacy of anticommunism in postwar American politics and culture left a 
very narrow space for criticism of the status quo. By silencing certain voices and 
by promoting a particular vision of racial justices, the Cold War led to a 
narrowing of acceptable civil rights discourse.7 
The symbolism of containment proved to be an important concept in the Cold 
War and the battle over African American civil rights. The United States government 
espoused a policy of containment in reaction to the perceived communist threat. First 
championed by George Kennan in The Long Telegram of 1946,8 containment became a 
central policy and a key discursive symbol in the nation’s approach toward communist 
aggression. This linguistic framing of policy was felt domestically as well. Elaine Tyler 
May proposed in her book Homeward Bound that containment also applied to American 
families. She wrote,  
The family was the arena in which that adaptation was expected to occur; the 
home was the environment in which people could feel good about themselves. In 
this way, domestic containment and its therapeutic corollary undermined the 
potential for political activism and reinforced the chilling effects of 





As the U.S. government attempted to stifle the perceived aggressiveness of the Black 
Power movement, evidence of containment also became visible in the context of African 
American civil rights. 
For those groups adamantly concerned with the perception of the United States in 
the eyes of foreign powers, the civil rights movement could not have come at a worse 
time. The treatment of black men and women in the United States was widely covered in 
the foreign press, especially in African and Middle Eastern countries. According to Haig 
A. Bosmajian and Hamida Bosmajian, “Because the nation and the entire world had their 
attention focused on Montgomery and the actions of civil-rights leaders, this larger 
audience also had to be considered, for they too were watching and being persuaded.”10 
Pictures of riots and people being bitten by dogs, sprayed with fire hoses, and beaten by 
police were shown throughout the world, severely undermining the U.S. Cold War 
agenda abroad. To counter such negative images, great care was paid to creating images 
that would portray African Americans as having substantial rights in the United States.11 
These efforts were not completely effective, however. As Dudziak reports, “Soviet 
propaganda exploited U.S. racial problems, arguing that American professions of liberty 
and equality under democracy were a sham.”12 Civil rights thus became a tool for the 
Soviet Union to show the world that the United States was not the paragon of freedom 
that its leaders professed the country to be.  
The Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP) was perhaps the most difficult 
group to digest for even sympathetic whites who supported the civil rights movement as a 
whole, especially because some factions of the movement seemed to exhibit strong 





October 15, 1966, as a means of helping the poor black citizens of Oakland, California. 
They were tired of being represented in the civil rights movement by college-educated, 
middle-class African Americans, and sought to give power to those who had been 
disenfranchised even from their own movement. Their ten-point program included 
various demands for freedom and equal rights, such as the desire for “an end to the 
robbery by the capitalists of our Black Community,”13 for the “freedom for all Black men 
held in federal, state, county, and city prisons and jails,”14 and for “all Black people” to 
“be tried . . . by a jury of their peer group or people from their Black communities, as 
defined by the Constitution of the United States.”15 The group advocated a socialist 
doctrine, which stood in opposition to the existing U.S. capitalist system the group 
labeled “racist.” 
The gun was considered the “key to the rise of the Party,”16—a commitment that 
attracted considerable attention from American citizens, the U.S. government, and 
foreign countries. The Black Panthers became experts on firearms legislation, and used 
the weapons specifically for symbolic purposes. Sol Stern noted, “For the Panthers, their 
guns have had both real and symbolic meaning[,] . . . symbolic because of the important 
political effects they think that a few blacks, openly carrying guns, can have in the black 
community.”17 The guns captured the anger of the black community regarding their 
treatment by the government, by southern racists, and, perhaps most significantly, by the 
police. Many Americans worried that the guns were for offensive rather than defensive 
purposes, however, and reacted negatively to the group. Because the BPP was often 





of guns in the group. The U.S. government, also feeling threatened, attempted to combat 
the group by enacting new gun law legislation.18  
International powers took notice of the BPP as well; the group argued that their 
cause was not only domestic but also “part of an international struggle against 
imperialism.”19 As Stern noted, “To Newton and Seale the identification with world 
revolution is a serous business. They see the United States as the center of an imperialist 
system which suppresses the worldwide revolution of colored people.”20 
“Black Power” emerged as the dominant ideology of the Black Panther Party, 
demonstrating a commitment to the renewal of black culture. Richard B. Gregg, A. 
Jackson McCormack, and Douglas J. Pedersen wrote, “The rhetoric of black power is 
essentially a call for the black man to rediscover himself as a substantial human being. Its 
primary themes center around black pride, black cohesiveness, and the need for political 
and economic power.”21 These authors argued that “Black Power” was not intended to 
persuade white audiences; instead the phrase was aimed at African Americans to push 
them to become involved in their communities and to help create a more positive black 
identity. The BPP had no interest in assimilating into the dominant white culture; rather, 
they desired an empowerment of black culture. 
Government officials used various tactics to contain the voices of civil rights 
protesters, ranging from completely ignoring the violence being perpetrated against the 
African American community to wiretapping the phones of prominent movement leaders. 
Kenneth O’Reilly argued that the FBI, and particularly J. Edgar Hoover, strategically 
sought to charge all civil rights workers as communists, “a category Hoover defined 





The story of Hoover’s FBI and black civil rights is largely the story of a powerful 
police bureaucracy’s reluctance to enforce the law and its willingness to break 
it. . . . The bureau began the 1960s by passively observing the brutalization of 
civil rights workers and ended the decade by egging on the racists.23  
Emory J. Tolbert likewise noted Hoover’s desire to suppress the work of civil 
rights leaders. He claimed, 
Hoover . . . was a major actor in the federal suppression of the [Marcus] Garvey 
movement. He [Hoover] was also a tenacious opponent of Garvey who, without 
Garvey’s awareness, led a two year long effort to find grounds for prosecuting 
and/or deporting the Black nationalist leader.24  
In addition, in a controversial article, Jeff Gottlieb and Jeff Cohen artfully accused the 
FBI of executing Chicago Black Panther leader Fred Hampton, who was killed 
suspiciously in his bed during an FBI raid.25 
The attempts of local police and the government to control the BPP can be 
considered through the lens of containment as the police attempted to keep black men 
with guns off the streets and as the government attempted to stifle the voices of black 
militants. The government distorted various laws in order to contain “un-American” 
voices, as evidenced by the numerous court cases during the 1950s and early 1960s 
involving the motion picture community. Many civil rights leaders, including Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Huey P. Newton, and Stokely Carmichael were arrested in the 





Seale and the Chicago Eight Trial 
The events leading up to Seale’s arrest and his subsequent treatment by the 
Illinois Supreme Court are evidence of the anxieties of the U.S. government and many 
Americans regarding the civil rights movement and the Black Panther Party. This 
experience was not new to Seale, who had grown up amid the racism and segregationist 
culture of the 1940s and 1950s. However, this trial was different from Seale’s previous 
battles with an oppressive culture—the media attention given to the Chicago Eight 
afforded him a new outlet through which to express his frustrations. For Seale, the trial 
was another means for exposing the suppression of black voices and publicizing the 
inability of black men to receive fair treatment from the United States government. 
In the late 1960s, the Black Panthers became involved with other leftist groups, 
including SNCC and the Yippies. Through this involvement, Seale, now a notable figure 
in the civil rights movement, was asked to participate in the demonstrations at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Tom Hayden, a founder of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) and a leader of the National Mobilization to End the War in 
Vietnam, personally invited Seale to participate in the protests, and Seale willingly 
accepted.26   
Prior to his arrival at the convention, various confrontations with police had 
already occurred. Chicago officials had been trying to enforce an 11:00 p.m. curfew for 
the park in which the demonstrations were being held. With no place to sleep because 
delegates had taken all available hotel rooms, the demonstrators refused to leave. When 





rocks and verbal insults. The police retaliated by storming the park and the city streets, 
clubbing and beating demonstrators.27  
The violence primed the audience for the rhetoric of Bobby Seale. On August 27, 
1968, between two and three thousand people convened in the park to hear Seale speak, 
and “after its own baptism by clubbing, [the crowd] was ready for his fiery rhetoric.”28 
The speech had several objectives: to expose the violent nature of the government, to 
legitimize the use of weapons as a defense against the perverse capitalist power structure, 
and to encourage people to organize to occupy their own communities.29 An undercover 
police officer was a member of the crowd, and his account of Seale’s speech was in large 
part responsible for Seale’s later arrest. After only a few hours in Chicago, and a few 
more short, impromptu speeches,30 Seale flew back to California to take care of other 
Black Panther business. 
Seale saw his arrest in connection with the Convention demonstrations as racist. 
He had not been a part of the violence that occurred during that week, had never met any 
of the defendants before, and had only spoken with Tom Hayden once over the phone. 
His inclusion in the indictments was based on the speech that he gave at the 
demonstrations, despite the fact that he had been in Chicago for less than twenty-four 
hours and had not even booked his own flight in or out of Chicago. As Jason Epstein 
noted, “When the indictments were handed down in March, it was at first unclear to the 
other defendants why Seale, of all the radicals who had been involved in the Chicago 
demonstrations, was included. . . . [He] had nothing to do with planning the protests.”31 
Seale argued that his indictment was part of a larger conspiracy by the government to 





observed, “[W]hen Jerris Leonard, . . . head of the Civil Rights division of the Justice 
Department, was asked . . . the reason for Seale’s indictment, he replied, ‘The Panthers 
are a bunch of hoodlums. We’ve got to get them.’”32 Seale was singled out as a dominant 
voice of the civil rights movement and was thus included in the Chicago Eight Trial. The 
Justice Department desired to contain Seale by legal means, singling him out among 
numerous other leaders. Thus, even though Seale was not a part of the planning of the 
demonstrations and did not encourage the protesters to stay in the park after curfew when 
many of the leaders and demonstrators were arrested, he was indicted with the seven 
other defendants who played much larger roles in the protest. 
The Chicago Eight trial began on September 24, 1969. On September 26, the first 
official day of court, Bobby Seale asked for a postponement in order to wait for his 
attorney to recover from surgery. This motion was denied. Over the course of the trial, 
Seale was charged with sixteen counts of contempt for a variety of reasons, including 
calling the judge a “racist” and demanding to cross-examine government witnesses.33 
After repeated pleas from Seale to act as his own attorney, on October 29, 1969, Judge 
Hoffman ordered the defendant to be removed from the courtroom, and when he 
returned, he was bound to a chair with a cloth gag in his mouth. Each day from October 
29 through November 4, Seale was not allowed to enter the courtroom without the chains 
and gag. Finally, on November 5, 1969, Seale’s case ended in a mistrial as Judge Julius 
Hoffman severed him from the case and sentenced him to four years in prison on charges 
of contempt. Seale was charged independently of the others and forced to undergo a 





Seale’s Public Moral Argument through Guerrilla Theater 
Seale’s public moral argument in the Chicago Eight Trial had implications not 
only for African Americans, but for all Americans living within the Cold War context. 
Seale sought to expose the injustices that he and other Americans felt in the political 
climate of the Cold War. Two major themes emerged in Seale’s public moral argument: 
(1) the fight for the constitutional rights of all Americans during a time when these rights 
were being systematically taken away and (2) the exposure of racist practices both in the 
government and in the court system. These themes were similar to the goals expressed by 
the Black Panther Party, yet Seale provided a new context and media outlet for these 
goals to be espoused.  
Seale’s profanity and harsh words might not have been as laughter-producing as 
were his codefendants’, but the purposes of the language were similar: to reject the 
authority of the court and to create a public moral argument that questioned the status 
quo. To this end, Seale’s public moral argument came in the form of guerrilla theater. The 
difference between guerilla theater and ritual spectacle in the carnival is twofold: (1) 
laughter is not a goal or even a condition within guerilla theater; and (2) although actors 
and spectators become one in the carnival, they are kept separate in guerilla theater. 
Guerrilla (Spanish for “little war”) theater stems from the theories of Che Guevara, who 
stated, “The Guerrilla fighter . . . has the intention of destroying an unjust order and 
therefore an intention, more or less hidden, to replace the old with something new.”35 
According to R. G. Davis, who first conceptualized the concept of guerrilla theater, this 
form has three purposes: “To teach, direct toward change, [and] be an example of 





theater as a way to gain media attention through the spectacle of the act and to 
“intentionally trigger a violent reaction.”37 Seale used guerrilla theater in two distinct 
phases. The first was during his time as one of the eight defendants within the trial; the 
second was during his return to the courtroom as a witness for the defense. In the first 
phase, Seale used historical revision, “little” narratives, strategic juxtaposition, and body 
rhetoric to argue for legal and social change. In the phase of the trial when Seale was a 
witness, he used historical revision almost entirely.  
Seale as Defendant  
Prior to the opening statements, Seale asked for a postponement until his lawyer, 
Charles Garry, was available to act as his counsel; Judge Hoffman denied his request.38 In 
light of this denial, Seale chose to act as his own attorney: “I would like to speak on 
behalf of my own self and have my counsel handle my case in behalf of myself. How 
come I can’t speak in behalf of myself? I am my own legal counsel. I don’t want these 
lawyers to represent me.”39 Two weeks later, Seale again demanded his right to act as his 
own attorney:  
MR. SEALE: What about my Constitutional right to defend myself and have my 
lawyer? 
THE COURT: Your Constitutional rights— 
MR. SEALE: You are denying them. You have been denying them. Every other 
word you say is denied, denied, denied, denied, and you begin to oink in the faces 
of the masses of the people of this country. That is what you begin to represent, 





Seale blamed the court system for denying him his Constitutional rights, but turned the 
dialogue between himself and the judge into a public moral argument against the 
corruptness of the U.S. government’s treatment of African Americans since the republic’s 
genesis. Seale responded to the denial of his constitutional rights through spacial and 
historical references. Pointing to the pictures on the walls of the court, he stated,  
You have George Washington and Benjamin Franklin sitting in a picture behind 
you, and they was slave owners. That’s what they were. They owned slaves. You 
are acting in the same manner, denying me my Constitutional rights being able to 
cross examine this witness.41  
Anne Teresa Demo referred to this guerrilla tactic as “history by incongruity,” wherein 
the actor revises the dominant historical narrative to account for and radicalize the 
traditional story and expose the inequalities of the past.42 Seale questioned the 
appropriateness of the portraits on the wall, which would normally have remained 
unquestioned, creating a strategic juxtapoisition between himself and the other members 
of the court and “remoralizing” the social order.43 
Seale also sought to expose the illegal practices of government officials in 
connection with the Black Panther Party through what Julia M. Allen and Lester Faigley 
called “little” narratives.44 When the prosecution attempted to question an undercover 
police officer who allegedly followed Seale throughout his stay in Chicago, Seale 
attempted to ask the man questions in order to show how the government was acting 
illegally:  
MR. SEALE: Why did you follow me, could you please tell me, Mr. Witness— 





MR. SEALE: —at the airport? 
THE COURT: Mr. Seale, I ask you to sit down. 
MR. SEALE: Have you ever killed a Black Panther Party member? 
THE COURT: Mr. Seale, I will have to ask you to sit down, please. 
MR. SEALE: Have you ever been on any raids in the Black Panther Party’s 
offices or Black Panther Party members’ homes? 
THE COURT: Mr. Seale, this is the third time I am asking you to sit down as 
courteously as possible.45 
“Little” narratives are individual, specific stories that work by “raising issues of human 
rights and countering political wrongs.”46 In this instance, Seale attempted to overturn the 
allegations of the witness into accusations of his own, showing that he was the target of 
violence and intimidation, not the witness.  
Seale sought to expose racism in the courts by showing how his specific treatment 
was the result of racist structures. He argued,  
If a black man stands up and speaks, if a black man asks for his rights, if a black 
man demands his rights, if a black man requests and argues his rights, what do 
you do? You’re talking about punishing. If a black man gets up and speaks in 
behalf of the world . . .”47  
Using strategic juxtaposition of his own treatment to compare his experience to that of 
the other defendants, Seale argued that African Americans were being treated unfairly in 
the courtroom and in Cold War society. His intention was to expose the silencing 





Seale’s most dramatic act of guerrilla theater occurred between October 29 and 
November 4, 1969, when he was bound and gagged for disruptive behavior in the 
courtroom. Although Seale could have sat quietly, bound and gagged in the courtroom, 
instead he chose to struggle against the shackles and continue disrupting the trial. Thus, 
Seale took advantage of the opportunity to use his body to create a public moral 
argument. J. Anthony Lukas described the scene on day two of the binding: 
The Black Panther Leader . . . somehow managed to shout through and around the 
elaborate gag, which was first wound over his mouth yesterday. Time and again, 
his voice could be heard through the courtroom, maintaining his demand that he 
be allowed to defend himself. Once, he managed to slip free of the leather strap 
on his left arm. Several Federal marshals rushed to his side, and a wild scuffle 
ensued, during which Mr. Seale’s chair toppled backwards into the press section. 
Mr. Seale shouted that the policemen were kicking him in the groin.48 
By maintaining his place in the court even though he was bound and gagged, he was 
maintaining what Chaim Perleman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca called an argumentative 
“presence,” which served to concentrate the audience’s (in this case, the jury’s) attention 
and “occupy the foreground of the hearer’s consciousness.”49 
Seale’s body represented a visual example of the Cold War containment policy 
toward African Americans generally and toward the civil rights movement specifically, 
encompassing the attempts of African Americans to break out of those restrictions and 
oppressions. His body became a site of resistance to the rules of the courtroom, and by 
extension, to the silencing of African American voices. Thus, Seale’s body was a site of 





always seem rational, it does convey passion and commitment.50 Seale’s choice to remain 
in the courtroom bound and gagged and to shout through those restraints may seem 
irrational in terms of the immediate context of convincing the jury to acquit, but his 
actions expressed his dedication to enacting his constitutional rights.  
Seale as Witness 
Bobby Seale returned to Chicago on January 29, 1970, to testify on behalf of the 
now-Chicago Seven. His acts of guerrilla theater were notably less defiant on this date, 
perhaps because of the change of role from defendant to witness. Seale was not obligated 
to testify; he took the stand freely to speak on behalf of the defendants, despite still being 
under indictment for the charges.51 The majority of Seale’s testimony was an attempt at 
historical revision; he told his version of events in an effort to set the record straight. His 
testimony offered a counterdiscourse consisting of alternative theories to account for the 
defendants’ motives and behavior.52 
Early in his testimony, the defense played a tape of his speech from August 27, 
1968, at the Democratic National Convention. Seale allowed the tape of the speech to be 
played in its entirety for the jury, then responded to questions to clarify his meaning. In 
the speech, Seale retold the story of Huey P. Newton’s arrest in October 1967.  
He was charged with making a couple of pigs act in a desired manner. And from 
there, . . . the Peace and Freedom Party . . . and the Black Panther Party . . . 
formed this coalition based on the fact that the white people said they were 
concerned by the fact that their racist power structure in Oakland in California 
was going to try to railroad Huey P. Newton to the gas chamber and kill him.53  





MR. SCHULTZ: So when you said that “individuals should make pigs act in a 
desired manner,” you were referring to shooting policemen in defense if 
necessary, isn’t that right?  
THE WITNESS [SEALE]: Organizationally and functionally, if you look at the 
whole context of the sentence, what I mean is not what you are inferring. What I 
mean is this here— 
MR. SCHULTZ: I am asking you what you said, sir. I am asking you, did you not 
state that? 
THE WITNESS [SEALE]: But you also asked me what I mean, Mr. Schultz. 
MR. KUNSTLER: I thought he asked him what he meant too, your Honor. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Let me rephrase the question if I did.54 
This line of questioning continued with Seale repeatedly noting that any acts of violence 
would have only occurred in self defense.55 Seale corrected the prosecution, giving 
himself a voice in the (re)construction of the events in Chicago.  
Toward the end of Seale’s testimony, Prosecutor Schultz asked Seale about a 
previous incident in which Seale was convicted for possession of a gun in the vicinity of 
a jail. The question about this case appeared out of place in the context of the other 
questions, falling between questions about the Black Panther’s objectives and questions 
about Seale’s speech in Chicago. By bringing up previous convictions, the government 
attempted to show that Seale had a pattern of breaking the law, as well as to demonstrate 
that Seale was dangerous. In response, Seale used historical revision to counter the 
attacks on his character. He provided a counternarrative that revised the story constructed 





MR. SCHULTZ: Mr. Seale, are you the same Bobby G. Seale who was convicted 
on April 11, 1968, of being in possession of a shotgun in the vicinity of a jail? 
SEALE: Yes, I am the same person who was convicted later of being in 
possession of a shotgun as they charged me of being adjacent to a jail, but as I 
know by the law, you could have a shotgun as long as it wasn’t concealed and as 
long as you are in a public place, and I was actually in fact on a public sidewalk. 
Yes, I was convicted, and the thing was appealed. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Were you convicted of having a loaded shotgun? Were you 
convicted of having a loaded shotgun at a jail in California? 
SEALE: No, it was not in a jail. 
MR. SCHULTZ: At a jail, sir. 
SEALE: The law in the state of California says that I violated a law, what they 
call having a gun on ground adjacent to the jail made in 1880-something. That 
law they charged me with, and charged me with this law and they railroaded me 
through and convicted me and violated my constitutional rights because I have a 
right to have a gun on public property as long as it wasn’t concealed. 
MR. SCHULTZ: You had five shotgun shells in that gun, did you not? 
SEALE: Yes, in a magazine. 
MR. SCHULTZ: Now, Mr. Seale, on a Wednesday morning, you gave the second 
speech, right? 
SEALE: You are talking about the park? 





SEALE: I guess that was Wednesday morning, in the middle of the week 
somewhere. 
MR. SCHULTZ: You said to the people—that was Grant Park, right? 
SEALE: Yes, this is across, this is where the convention was going on? 
MR. SCHULTZ: Yes. 
SEALE: Yes. 
MR. SCHULTZ: And you said to the people, Mr. Seale, “If the pigs get in the 
way of our march, then tangle with the blue-helmeted mother-fuckers. Kill them 
and send them to the morgue slab,” and you were pointing to policemen at that 
time, isn’t that a fact? 
MR. KUNSTLER: I don’t recall anything on direct examination on that. 
SEALE: The first thing, it is impossible for me—wait a minute—it is impossible 
for me to have been pointing at any policeman at such-and-such a time because I 
was over here, and all the people was in front of me, and people was all over in 
the trees. I don’t know what you mean. I don’t know what you are talking about. I 
think you are taking a statement or a speech, or something, out of context. 
MR. KUNSTLER: This is completely out of the scope of the direct examination, 
your Honor. It is improper and it is wrong. 
THE COURT: No, the witness was brought here to testify about his activities 
during that period. I think the Government has the right to inquire. Treating your 
remarks as an objection which you have not made, I overrule the objection.56 
In this interaction, Seale offered a historical revision in which he retold the story of the 





was wrong. In the end, Bobby Seale refused to allow himself or his voice to be contained 
by the court. 
Conclusion 
Murray Edelman argued that court trials themselves can be viewed as spectacles, 
as they “help maintain and legitimate a social system that allocated benefits and penalties 
unequally, minimize unconventional expression of discontent, and help avert severe 
political challenges and rebellious action.”57 Restrictions of free speech and constitutional 
rights have often been part of the trials of defendants during the Cold War era, similar to 
events seen in wartime eras since the country’s founding. However, Seale’s role within 
the trial of the Chicago Eight exemplifies an extreme case of ideological and physical 
containment of such rights in an immediate and national context designed to expose “un-
American” activities.  
Neil Smelser argued that opposition is necessary for a movement to be successful, 
because the opposition serves to legitimize the movement’s cause. In this way, Seale was 
successful—he created severe oppositional discourse between himself and Judge 
Hoffman, culminating in the Judge’s decision to restrain Seale during the trial and 
ultimately to sever Seale’s case from the trial entirely. This opposition may have served 
to legitimize the claims not only of Seale but of the Black Panthers as well—in fact, the 
trial provided evidence of their claims that racism was a structural problem. Discussions 
ensued over Judge Hoffman’s right to enforce such a stiff punishment, his legal right to 
deny Seale’s desire to represent himself in court, and the constitutionality of such 
extreme measures to ensure an orderly trial. These discussions are discussed in further 





In the end, though, the attempts by various government agencies to counter the 
message of the civil rights movement helped lead to the containment and ultimate 
silencing of the Black Panther Party. As John Morton Blum noted,  
Police informers and police action also contributed to the decline of the Black 
Panthers, who were increasingly feared and rejected by the people in the ghettos. 
Huey Newton admitted the Panthers had lost their following. Eldridge Cleaver 
fled into exile to escape both a jail sentence and the hired guns of his Panther 
opponents. . . . [B]y 1970 the Panthers were becoming insignificant as agents of 
revolution.58  
As their leaders were jailed, killed, or exiled, civil rights agitators became increasingly 
disheartened about their ultimate ability to change society. Seale’s inclusion in the 
Chicago Eight trial is a representative example of the government’s efforts to contain the 
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Framing of the Trial and its Defendants 
The previous chapter focused on the internal workings of the Chicago Eight trial; 
in contrast, this chapter concentrates on the ways that defendants and media framed the 
story of the Chicago Eight for different segments of the American public and sometimes 
for a worldwide audience. The defendants attempted to create a frame that challenged the 
political system in general, and specifically, the Vietnam War. Newspapers created 
frames from various perspectives--often in opposition to the frames offered by the 
defendants. 
Framing theories offer a lens through which defendant messages and media 
messages can be analyzed. According to Robert M. Entman, framing “illuminates the 
precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or 
communication) of information from one location—such as a speech, utterance, news 
report, or novel—to that consciousness.”1 Frames help audiences make sense of the world 
and “function to organize experience and guide action.”2 The tension between frames—
between the meanings that the protesters wanted to express and the coverage of the trial 
by the dominant media outlets—is the focus of this chapter.  
Because of their dramatic story lines and vivid imagery, social movements often 
make excellent news stories. The relationship between social movements and news media 
is complicated, as news media may often have what scholars have referred to as a “status 
quo bias,” while the purpose of the social movement is to disrupt the status quo.3 These 
stories show the conflict between the movement and mass media, contrasting the beliefs 




M. Burns suggests, “Since journalists must draw on a variety of sources in constructing 
their narratives, framing often becomes a process of negotiation, especially when the 
subjects of news stories are aware of the importance of image-making.”4 The way that 
these stories were framed is especially important because the frames shaped ways that the 
audience created meaning from the social movement’s messages. In addition, just gaining 
the attention of the news media grants credibility to a movement, serving as “validation 
that it is having an impact, that what participants in the movement are doing matters.”5 
Defendants in the Chicago Eight Trial competed with the dominant media outlets 
to define and explain the major issues at stake in the trial. I shall analyze the defendants’ 
messages through the construct of the collective action frame. Snow and Benford defined 
collective action frames as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO).”6 
Within Snow and Benford's conception, collective action frames function to guide 
viewers’ understanding of particular topics, but do so “to mobilize potential adherents 
and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”7  
Conversely, I shall analyze the coverage of the trial from the dominant media 
outlets by examining the story frames (marginalizing, biased, mixed, and sympathetic) 
used to cover the defendants and the trial. According to McLeod and Detenber, media 
coverage of social movements often serves to “marginalize challenging groups, 
especially those that are viewed as radical in their beliefs and strategies.”8 I therefore ask 
whether coverage of the Chicago Eight Trial followed or strayed from this pattern.  
The first section of this chapter provides a brief description of framing insofar as 




description, two conceptions of framing will be distinguished and explained--namely 
collective action framing and story framing. The second section applies collective action 
framing to examine how the defendants in the Chicago Eight Trial constructed their 
public moral argument regarding the Vietnam war for  audiences outside of the 
immediate courtroom. In the third section of this chapter, I examine the dominant 
media’s framing of the trial, using the four story frames as a guide. Both the second and 
third sections of this chapter employ sources from newspapers (New York Times, 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times)9 as evidence of the framing 
process.  
Framing  
In what is perhaps the most often cited definition of framing, Robert M. Entman 
emphasizes its dynamic nature: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.10 
Entman elaborated by outlining the four functions of media frames: (1) to define 
problems, (2) to diagnose causes, (3) to make moral judgments, and (4) to suggest 
remedies.11 Framing is thus linked to the public moral argument through these functions 
as problems, solutions, and judgments are constructed through different frames. 
At times, journalists have exploited the elements of framing to add bias to a story. 




The routines of journalism, set within the economic and political interests of the 
news organizations, normally and regularly combine to select certain versions of 
reality over others. Day by day, normal organizational procedures define “the 
story,” identify the protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes 
toward them. Only episodically, in moments of political crisis and large-scale 
shifts in the overarching hegemonic ideology, do political and economic 
managers and owners intervene directly to regear or reinforce the prevailing 
journalistic routines. But most of the time the taken-for-granted code of 
“objectivity” and “balance” presses reporters to seek out scruffy-looking, 
chanting, “Viet Cong” flag-waving demonstrators and to counterpose them to 
reasonable-sounding, fact-brandishing authorities.12 
Journalistic conventions combine with economic and political interests to define what 
constitutes “news,” and thus frames are constructed that conform to and perpetuate those 
notions. Therefore framing by journalists might be totally unconscious, or adaptive 
framing designed to attract attention, or brazen ideological framing insisted upon by 
political and economic managers. Similarly, social movement agents may engage in 
framing for analogous reasons.  
Collective Action Frames 
Collective action frames are used by social movement leaders to challenge the 
status quo and create meaning for their audience. According to Benford, “Whatever else 
social movement actors do, they seek to  affect interpretations of reality among various 
audiences.”13 Social movement leaders utilize collective action frames to shape the 




potential advocates to join their cause. These frames have two sets of characteristic 
features: (1) “core framing tasks,” which involve three “action-oriented functions”: 
Diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing,14 and (2) “interactive 
framing tasks,” which represent the process through which social movement leaders 
choose to develop particular frames over others through discursive, strategic, and 
contested processes.15 Thus, collective action framing is an active process of constructing 
messages that encourage an audience to think and mobilize in the ways the movement 
desires. 
Collective action frames are inextricably linked to the actions of social 
movements, revealing and complicating the options that leaders and organizations have 
for framing their messages. Social movements must construct frames that resonate with 
their audiences in order to mobilize individuals to act. The audiences must ultimately find 
the frame compelling, particularly in terms of cultural compatibility, internal consistency, 
and relevance to the lives of the audience, if they are to be persuaded.16 These qualities 
must be found in the frames used by the protesters.  
Story Framing 
Journalists have the power to shape the coverage of political events through 
framing. Economics, social responsibility, public interest, community values, and other 
factors influence the way that media frame an issue.17 The media often promote a 
narrative framing structure (story framing) in which stories of good versus evil, police 
versus protesters, or protagonist versus antagonist emerge. According to McLeod and 
Hertog, four particular frames arise within these narratives: marginalizing, mixed, 




constructing stories of violence and property crimes.19 This frame may also be used to 
warn society about the moral decay and threat that protesters pose. The marginalizing 
frame is the most biased against protesters. Of the other types of story frames, the mixed 
frame also creates a narrative, but does so without bias toward one side or the other.20 
The sympathetic frame conveys the message of the protesters positively, allowing social 
movement leaders to express their stories and create connections with the audience by 
printing an interview transcript in its entirety or making connections between movement 
groups.21 Finally, the balanced frame works by offering a policy debate that features both 
sides of the argument through a debate-type format.22 According to McLeod and Hertog, 
all of these frames position the reader to focus upon the actions of the protestors, rather 
than the issues they represent.23  
Authors of news stories utilizing the marginalizing frame question the legitimacy 
of the movement, marginalize its members, and may even demonize the protest group. A 
major hurdle for many social movement organizations is to be seen as legitimate and 
worthy of attention. Journalists can remove that legitimacy by using denigrating 
quotation marks or belittling phrasing to refer to the movement’s activities.24 McLeod 
and Hertog described an example in which a journalist covering an anti-Vietnam War 
protest placed the words peace march in quotation marks, thus questioning the intentions 
of the protesters. These authors also noted that, although journalists often quote their 
official sources directly, protesters are less likely to be given the same voice. The protest 
leaders’ legitimacy is reduced when their messages are paraphrased by reporters instead 




Similarly, marginalization occurs when journalists suggest protesters are deviant 
and unlike the average citizen. This type of framing occurs when journalists underreport 
the level or number of protest activities, framing the issue or event as unrelated to the 
interests of mainstream society. Journalists are unlikely to deem a protest successful, 
often because social movements do not have concrete, pragmatic, attainable goals on 
which to be judged. Thus, journalists may marginalize the movement through this win-or-
lose gauge. Finally, journalists might move beyond downplaying the effects or size of a 
protest to actually demonizing the protesters. To this end, reporters might describe violent 
protests, link the protests to undesirable groups such as Communists or Nazis, or refer to 
the protesters as “extremists.”26 
However, sympathetic framing also occurs, particularly if the movement members 
are easily constructed as victims. For instance, journalists might frame protestors as 
unjustly persecuted, as similar to other like-minded groups or issues, or to show the 
aesthetic or emotional expression of a protest group.27 According to Pamela J. 
Shoemaker, if journalists perceive a group to be radical, they are more likely to cover the 
protestors negatively.28 It would follow, then, that sympathetic framing might be possible 
if a group is perceived less radical, or more closely linked to popular causes.29 In many 
cases, it is more likely to be “alternative media” that covers stories sympathetically, 
according to Hertog and McLeod.30 
In the rest of this chapter, I analyze the news coverage of the Chicago Eight trial 
using the lenses of the collective action frame and story framing. I examined major 
newspapers, including the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times 




coverage of the trial. Only materials dated between August 1, 1969 (when the media 
started covering the impending trial) and December 21, 1972 (one month after the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed all convictions of the defendants) were 
examined in order to isolate the framing of the trial during its duration and to avoid 
confusing this framing with issues of collective memory.31  
The Defendants’ Public Moral Argument and Collective Action Framing 
The Chicago Eight defendants wanted their public moral argument carried by all 
of the major media outlets to the world utilizing the sympathetic frame. However, social 
movement leaders have little control over the media. Sidney G. Tarrow suggested, 
“Against the inherent power of the media to shape perceptions, movements possess little 
cultural power.”32 In some ways, the defendants had more power to disseminate their 
antiwar messages in the courtroom than they did in the dominant media outlets. 
Newspapers quoted the defendants’ and lawyers’ testimony gathered during the trial and 
their messages from the press conferences, enabling the Chicago Eight to express 
messages of discontent, but not always giving them the power to shape how that message 
was framed. The most sympathetic newspaper coverage generally appeared in 1970 in the 
New York Times and particularly by J. Anthony Lukas, who quoted the defendants 
verbatim, followed the case daily, and noted the larger political consequences of the trial.  
Through the collective action frame, the defendants attempted to mobilize 
existing and potential social movement members to support the cause of the leaders.33 
This mobilization involves “core framing tasks,” which are useful to social movement 
leaders who must negotiate difficult problems between the social movement organization 




own members. In addition, these tasks are important for motivating the general public to 
acknowledge or understand the movement’s existence and ideology, and to get them to 
agree with the social movement leader’s solution. In this study, the diagnostic framing 
task, also known as the “injustice frame,” is most relevant. Within this framing task, the 
social movement organization or leader defines individuals or groups as victims.34 
According to Gamson and Benford and Snow, the injustice frame accuses an authority of 
wrongdoing, encouraging the public to view the problem as an injustice rather than as the 
norm. The defendants relied heavily on the diagnostic or injustice frame as they 
constructed their public moral argument using collective action framing.  
Lawyers and defendants in the Chicago Eight case utilized the diagnostic 
(injustice) frame to construct the trial itself as an act of political persecution in order to 
gain support for their cause. Jerry Rubin described an incident to the press in which the 
police followed three different men because they could not identify which one was 
actually Rubin. He described the incident as “hilarious[,] were it not for the fact that the 
government is trying to jail us for 10 years and use this trial to attack an entire generation 
of young people.”35 In this instance the defendants also used motivational framing by 
claiming to the press that the real jury in the case was “the young people of the world”; 
one journalist quoted a defendant who said, “This ain’t the ground I would have chosen 
to fight on now, but since we have to be here we will use the trial to carry on the 
revolution.”36 
The defendants also used the diagnostic frame to depict themselves as victims of 
the police and the American justice system as a whole. For example, David Dellinger 




the trial for the New York Times, quoted an outburst from Dellinger, “You’re being very 
prejudicial and unfair. . . . You’re depriving us of a fair trial. That’s why I call this a 
fascist court. We’re interested in the truth and you’re not and that’s what the conflict is 
here.”37 The defendants spent most of the morning of February 5, 1970, positioning 
themselves as victims, according to a New York Times article published the next day. The 
journalist reported that Jerry Rubin equated Judge Hoffman to Adolf Hitler; Abbie 
Hoffman asked the Judge about his “war stock”; and David Dellinger accused Judge 
Hoffman of punishing him because of an antiwar speech he delivered the week before 
and not because of his behavior during the trial.38 Thus, the Chicago defendants 
continued to frame themselves as victims of the U.S. justice system. 
On October 22, 1969, the defendants brought a birthday cake for Bobby Seale to 
the courtroom. The “turmoil” that ensued was covered by the New York Times. When the 
defendants brought the cake into the courtroom (despite being told repeatedly that cake 
was not allowed), the marshals wrestled the cake from their hands. The article quoted the 
defendants’ humorous retorts: Abbie Hoffman yelled, “That’s a cake-napping” and 
Rennie Davis stated, “Hey, Bobbie [sic] they arrested your cake,” to which Seale 
responded, “But they can’t arrest a revolution.” The defendants also made the most of the 
cake’s message, writing “Free Huey and Bobby” in the icing.39 Again, the defendants 
used the diagnostic frame in this example, making a larger public moral argument about 
their victimization in the courtroom by portraying the marshals as dramatic and abusive, 
and themselves as merely trying to celebrate a birthday. 
In October 1969, the defendants made another attempt to frame themselves as 




to make the defendants look violent and aggressive. The New York Times article by J. 
Anthony Lukas noted that two members of the jury had received threatening letters, both 
of which were signed, “The Black Panthers.” The defendants spoke to the press after the 
incident in court; the prosecutors declined comment. Lukas noted that the targeted jurors 
were most likely to sympathize with the defendants, with the article referring to them as 
“open-minded” and “the ones the prosecution would most want to remove.” Tom Hayden 
was quoted, saying, “Why would we want to threaten jurors like that? . . . It just doesn’t 
make sense.”40 By framing the story in the diagnostic form, the defendants implicated 
that they were not bullies who threatened jurors, but victims of prosecutorial misconduct 
(the subtitle of the article reads “Defendants Contend Letters Signed by ‘Black Panthers’ 
are Part of ‘Frame’”) and potentially gained sympathy from the reading public.  
Mainstream Media Frames 
Although at times the media used sympathetic, balanced, or mixed frames to tell 
the story of the Chicago Trial, marginalizing frames led the coverage of the trial from its 
beginning in September 1969 to the sentencing of the defendants in February 1970 (see 
Table 1). At times, the quotes from the trial within news stories described only the 
prosecution’s side to create the marginalizing narrative frame, without giving voice to the 
objections raised by the defense lawyers. For example, the author of an article published 
on October 27, 1969 in The Washington Post entitled “One of ‘Chicago 8’ Urged 
Firebombing, Trial Told” accused Froines and Weiner of suggesting that the protesters 
use firebombs, acid, and other chemicals to hurt the police and convention attendees. 
Although the reporter noted that Seale and Dellinger “interrupted” this testimony, the 





Table 1: Newspaper Coverage of the Chicago Eight Trial, Aug. 1969 to Dec. 197242 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
Marginalizing 80 119 7 4 209 
Sympathetic  40 95 14 21 170 
Balanced  26 34 3 5 68 
Mixed  23 47 5 4 79 
 
Often the media used official spokespersons to question the legitimacy of the 
protesters and the movement, rather than to support the defendants. Journalists tend to 
seek out official spokespersons, adopting their language and often their perspective on 
the protest activity. McLeod and Hertog offered three reasons for this reliance: “(1) to 
add prestige to the story; (2) to increase the efficiency of news production; and (3) to 
maintain the illusion of objectivity.”43 Officials include government workers, politicians, 
police officers, city council members, and even business owners. The trouble with only 
using official sources, these authors noted, is that the news frame then features only one 
side and supports only the status quo.44  
In an article published September 25, 1969 entitled “Daley Certain Crowd at 
Conspiracy Trial is There to Bait Cops” from the Chicago Tribune, Edward Schreiber 
quoted Mayor Richard Daley, who warned that the defendants were trying to incite 
additional violence in Chicago. Schreiber wrote, “Asked about threats ‘to create another 
August 1968 [violence outside of the DNC],’ Daley said: ‘There’s no doubt about it. 
Some people, not all of them, want a confrontation and have to have it with the 
police.’”45 When Daley was questioned about his own stake in the trial, he said he had no 




violence in Chicago, noting Daley had refused to give the protesters the needed permits.46 
However, Schreiber did not discuss those charges; in his article, only Daley’s side was 
presented.  
Instead of quoting the defendants or their objections, news stories often quoted 
the testimonies of the witnesses as official experts in the trial, offering only small details 
of the defendants’ rebuttals. In an article published on October 4, 1969 entitled “Tells 
Abbie’s Advice: Arm Against Cops,” Robert Enstad and Robert Davis extensively quoted 
the testimony of Mary Ellen Dahl and Robert Murray, undercover police officers who 
infiltrated the protest groups at the Democratic National Convention. Dahl was quoted 
throughout the story regarding Abbie Hoffman’s suggestions that the protesters at the 
Democratic National Convention should “gather up weapons, including golf balls 
studded with nails, to use against police.”47 In addition, the testimony of another 
undercover police officer, Richard L. Thompson, was quoted at length in the Chicago 
Tribune. Thompson recalled that Abbie Hoffman intended to take a deputy police 
superintendent hostage.48 
In a Chicago Tribune article dated November 12, 1969, the reporter used an 
official spokesperson of North Vietnam as a source. Although the content of the 
Vietnamese radio broadcast was supportive of the Chicago Eight, the fact that North 
Vietnam was the enemy of the United States in the Vietnam War framed the defendants 
as allies of the enemy. Entitled “Hanoi Demands End to Chicago Trial of 8,” the article 
referred to the defendants as “antiwar militants” and contrasted the violence of the war in 
Vietnam to the violence of the American government against its own people (the 




Vietnam created an unsympathetic view of the defendants for an American audience. In 
an earlier article from the same newspaper, the defendants and their attorneys were 
referred to as “Hanoi’s Helpers” and “latter-day Judases,” making the connection of the 
defendants to the Communist North Vietnamese obvious and contemptible.50  
Newspapers often framed stories using official spokespersons to praise the Judge 
and prosecution in the trial and to condemn the defendants. After Judge Hoffman 
sentenced the defendants, the Chicago Tribune ran a marginalizing story in which the 
author used official spokespersons to praise the Judge’s ruling in the trial. Entitled 
“Chicago 7 Trial Judge Given High Praise,” the article, published February 23, 1970, 
detailed the approval offered to Judge Hoffman. For example, Representative Roman 
Pucinski was quoted as saying, “No judge in modern history has taken as much abuse and 
filth as has Judge Hoffman from the seven defendants now properly ensconced in the 
Cook County jail.” The reporter quoted other Congressmen who called Judge Hoffman 
“courageous,” “patient,” and “a very able, learned, and fair man.” In a description of 
defense attorney William Kunstler, the reporter quoted Congressman Thomas Abernethy, 
who called the lawyer “one of the most ruthless lawyers ever admitted to the bar in this 
country.”51 No mentions of the various condemnations of Judge Hoffman nor the 
accolades of Mr. Kunstler occurred in the article. In a more extreme version, a reporter 
quoted Senator John Stennis, who argued that the Chicago defendants did not deserve a 
trial at all, stating that the trial “should have been stopped until they [defendants] were 
willing to proceed as human beings entitled to a trial. . . . They should have been kept in 




official sources marginalizes the defendants by casting them in a poor light and 
supporting existing institutions.  
Occasionally during the trial, certain reporters seemed to be on the side of the 
defendants, displaying the sympathetic frame to write stories, quoting the voices of the 
defendants themselves or those compassionate toward their cause. For example, in 
“Group to Ask End to Chicago Trial” in the New York Times, published October 18, 
1969, Seth S. King quoted a legal expert who called the entire trial a “miscarriage of 
justice.”53 In a later article published February 21, 1970, a New York Times reporter 
interviewed then-New York Mayor John Lindsay, who called the Chicago Eight Trial a 
“mockery of the judicial process,” continuing,  
When you try political activists under a conspiracy charge—long considered to be 
the most dubious kind of criminal charge, difficult to define or to limit—and 
when a trial becomes fundamentally an examination of political acts and beliefs, 
then guilt or innocence becomes almost irrelevant.54 
Media framing of the defendants in the above newspapers became more 
sympathetic, balanced, or mixed after trial concluded, when the contempt charges against 
the defendants came into question and lawyers and judges criticized the government and 
Judge Hoffman’s judicial overstepping. For example, in an article dated April 25, 1970, 
the author questions the constitutionality and legal standing of the conspiracy law used to 
indict the Chicago defendants.55 Another story in the New York Times published 
November 18, 1972, explains the ways that Judge Hoffman acted unconstitutionally in 




story framing showed the most sympathetic coverage in 1972, two years after the trial 
ended.  
Seale’s Body and Cold War Containment 
The major news outlets tended to cover Bobby Seale’s use of guerrilla theater in 
the courtroom separate from the rest of the defendants.57 Though the tactics used by Seale 
throughout the trial differed from his white counterparts, the tendency of the mainstream 
media to use the marginalizing frame when covering the trial remained the same, 
particularly because Seale exited the trial early on. Though this may seem surprising at 
first, the collective action frame is similar for all eight of the defendants. Under the 
umbrella of the collective action frame, the purposes are the same; it is the tactics that 
differ. Thus Seale’s purpose of expressing his role as victim and mobilizing his 
supporters remains consistent with the collective action frame. In particular, Seale’s 
resistance to his court-ordered restraints show how his efforts to frame his message 
differed from the other defendants.  
Seale’s tactics for the collective action frame become evident in his forcible 
resistance against his binding and gagging, described in detail in Chapter 4. By refusing 
to quietly accept his restraints, and to instead shout his arguments through the gag and 
physically fight the bindings, Seale attempted to shape the coverage of his role within the 
trial. J. Anthony Lukas, in his book published seven months after the end of the trial, 
wrote, 
But the [Seale’s] interjections were not random disruptions of the trial. By and 
large, he spoke only when it would have been proper for his attorney to speak in 




constitutional rights; and his language was often perfectly apt (Judge Hoffman: 
“You are making it very difficult for me, Mr. Seale”; Seale: “You are making it 
difficult for me, Judge Hoffman”). And whatever technical points the judge could 
find to buttress his position, the right to be represented by a lawyer you trust or 
alternately, to speak in your own behalf seemed to me so fundamental that I came 
to admire Seale’s dogged persistence in its behalf.58 
Seale’s outbursts and his binding and gagging was covered widely by the mainstream 
press, offering Seale a platform to attempt to construct his own message for the audience.  
 Despite Seale’s attempts at framing his own message, media coverage often 
blamed him for his plight. Coverage of Seale often featured an image of him being bound 
and gagged in the courtroom. Beginning October 30, 1969, the New York Times 
published a drawing of the scene.59 The drawing portrayed a side view of the defendant, 
showing both his hands and feet chained and strapped to a chair, his head tilted all the 
way back, a white cloth wrapped around his mouth and tied at the back of his head, and a 
painful expression on his face.60 The image communicated a sense of ideological 
containment, as discussed in the last chapter, symbolically silencing Black Power as a 
perceived violent, subversive, and anti-white force, simultaneously re-empowering 
whiteness. In addition, the drawing reinforced the existing Cold War ideology that the 
civil rights movement was un-American, suggesting that those who were subversive 
would be subject to legal and physical suppression.  
In order to combat Black Power and the Black Panthers who expressed this idea, 




media framing as a tactic.61 The images portrayed in the media of the BPP were 
disproportionately negative. Black Panther member Mumia Abu-Jamal wrote,  
There was scarcely a city with a functioning BPP chapter that did not experience 
trumped-up arrests, police raids, firefights, and, in some instances, the death or 
wounding of Party members. However, what made these raids and attacks 
acceptable to the public was the role of the American media. In a campaign of 
demonization and stigmatization, the FBI, working through its media 
“newsfriendlies,” would circulate rumor, slander, innuendo, and lies to further 
COINTELPRO objectives . . .62  
Such familiar images of repression served to lessen anxieties about Black Power for the 
white communities. Thus, in the reception context generated by pre-existing government 
framing of the Black Panthers, the drawing of Bobby Seale bound and gagged could 
function to re-empower whiteness, psychologically reassuring anxious community 
members.63 For the community of Americans who feared the Black Panther Party, the 
drawing could take on a comforting role, showing that the government was successfully 
containing the problem. As previously mentioned, the image of Seale could have been of 
any black man, and in this way, the image of one Black Panther could represent the entire 
organization. The image of Bobby Seale reaffirmed faith in the system and the 
government, in contrast to many photographs from the civil rights movement in which 
protesters and police clashed in violence.  
Some stories emphasized that the act of Seale displayed a legal, as opposed to 
vigilante or violent, means for silencing the African American message, thus 




In contrast with the images of police brutalizing protesters, in this case, a judge had 
perpetrated the act of binding and gagging Seale legally. As Herbert H. Hinman, Jr. wrote 
in a Letter to the Editor of the New York Times on November 12, 1969,  
In the final analysis, the survival of our individual rights is dependent on the 
continued existence of the system. While defending individual rights one must 
remain wary of the vice of extremism in the defense of liberty, the results of 
which may wreck the system so necessary for the preservation of our liberty.64  
For Hinman, the act represented a legal means for containing dissenting voices and 
preserving the “system.” By containing one member of the Black Panther Party, the 
government could “control” the Panthers and thereby protect American citizens.  
Much of the coverage constructed Seale as “getting what he deserved” for being a 
disruptive defendant. For example, in The Washington Post, William Chapman described 
the courtroom setting as “pandemonium,” and noted that the jurors “were reluctant to 
look at Seale.”65 J. Anthony Lukas even published a heading in the New York Times on 
November 8, 1969 referring to Seale as a “Major Threat.”66 In an editorial entitled 
“Shortcircuiting the Judicial Process,” the author defended Judge Hoffman’s actions: The 
judge “had abundant reasons to punish Seale for contempt of court.” 67  
 Other mainstream news media utilized the sympathetic frame, condemning the use of 
gagging in the courtroom. For example, an article published November 3, 1969 in the 
New York Times noted the various Constitutional rights that the restraints violated.68 
Another article in the New York Times referred to the binding and gagging of Seale as 
“unprecedented,”69 while a Chicago Tribune article notes the support of the other 




legal angle, arguing more about legitimacy than morality. Despite these occasional 
sympathetic frames, the most prevalent type of coverage adhered to the marginalizing 
frame, blaming Seale for his treatment in the courtroom.  
 
 
Table 2: Newspaper Coverage of the Bobby Seale in relation to the Chicago Eight Trial, 
Aug. 1, 1969 to Dec. 31, 197271 
 
 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 
Marginalizing 24 8 1 0 32 
Sympathetic 15 7 7 9 38 
Balanced 3 6 5 0 14 
Mixed 12 7 0 0 19 
 
The coverage of Bobby Seale provided two potentially contradictory messages. 
On the one hand, Seale’s image troubled some, fostering a sympathetic reading. 
Occasionally, an act of protest can reveal the flaws in the system so that some members 
of the mainstream press agencies are encouraged to frame the story in a sympathetic 
way.72 On the other hand, news coverage blamed Seale for his own plight and encouraged 
the audience to condemn Seale and his organization. As J. Anthony Lukas noted, “At one 
extreme, those who regard the Founding Fathers as sacred objects may feel a gag is 
precisely the right attire for Bobby Seale. At the other extreme, those committed to 
revolution will see the gag as merely another symbol of repression.”73  
In his book Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault argued that public execution 
and torture were linked to political culture, because these actions became public 




In the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the people, 
whose real and immediate presence was required for the performance. An 
execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would 
scarcely have had any meaning. The aim was to make an example, not only by 
making people aware that the slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by 
arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the 
guilty person.74   
Although Seale was not executed, the illustration of Seale may have been framed in a 
way that scared the public away from the actions of the civil rights movement for fear 
that they, too, would become vistims. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I showed that framing can be used by both protesters and 
mainstream media sources to construct public moral arguments in ways that can promote 
or challenge the legitimacy of the movement. The population receives their news from 
these sources, and the ultimate decision regarding how a story gets framed rests with the 
mainstream media sources. The way that media sources frame a protestor, issue, or 
movement on the spectrum of marginalizing to sympathetic has implications for the way 
society generally understands the demands of a social movement organization. Although 
the defendants attempted to construct and frame their side of the case in the mainstream 
media, their messages were often tempered or countered with those of the status quo 
created by the mainstream press. 
The results of this chapter raise the question, why did sympathetic coverage 




possibility for the sympathetic coverage is that the Chicago Eight seemed less radical as 
the trial ended and the Vietnam War waged on. Although some scholars argue that the 
protests had little impact on public opinion of the war in Vietnam, it is at least true that 
the duration of the war and the increasing death toll led to public disapproval of the 
war.75 By the end of 1969, for example, 69% of college students described themselves as 
doves.76 These public opinion numbers could potentially lead to more sympathetic 
coverage of protests of the war; as the status quo changes, so does the coverage of that 
status quo.77  
Second, it is possible that the increase in sympathetic coverage occurred because 
the Chicago Eight seemed tame in comparison with the new protest groups of the early 
1970s. In particular, the emergence of the Weather Underground (or Weathermen), 
whose emphasis was violence and destruction,78 and whose choice of weapon was the 
bomb, encouraged a more moderate reading of the Chicago Eight.79 Michael P. Boyle, 
Douglas M. McLeod, and Cory L. Armstrong note that a protest group’s tactics play a 
strong role in the type of coverage it receives.80 In addition, the more radical the protest, 
the more critical the news coverage, according to Shoemaker.81   
Finally, the increase in sympathetic coverage is possibly because the American 
people became desensitized to protests. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow refer to a 
“social movement society,” in which protest becomes “a perpetual element in modern 
life,” and protests “lose its power to inspire challengers and to impress antagonists and 
authorities.”82 It is possible that this phenomenon occurred to the public in the late 1960s 




Vietnam War became normalized, coverage of the Chicago Eight and their activism may 
have become less radical over time.  
This chapter has analyzed media coverage of the Chicago Eight Trial using the 
lenses of collective action framing and story framing from the beginning of the trial in 
1969 to the overturning of the convictions in 1972. Collective action framing was used by 
all defendants as an attempt to shape their message for the public and to mobilize their 
supporters. For the mainstream media, four types of media frames, marginalizing, 
sympathetic, biased, and mixed frames, were employed. Although the status quo was 
supported through the marginalizing frame during the trial, a relatively more sympathetic 
frame emerged after the trial, as the war lost popularity, even more radical groups 
emerged, and protests became somewhat mundane. Importantly, despite Seale’s differing 
tactics within the trial, his use of the collective action frame to construct himself as victim 
was similar to the other defendants. However, the coverage of Seale being bound and 
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According to Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, “A rhetorical theory suitable 
for our age must take into account the charge that civility and decorum serve as masks for 
the preservation of injustice, that they condemn the dispossessed to non-being, and that as 
transmitted in a technological society they become the instrumentalities of power for 
those who ‘have.’”1 In this dissertation, I examined the discourse, behavior, silencing, 
and media framing of the various agents involved throughout the Chicago Eight Trial. 
The defendants’ carnivalesque behavior combined with the Cold War seriousness of the 
judge and prosecution to create a perfect storm of protest, an important event in the 
contentious climate of the 1960s but also in the history of anti-war rhetoric. This trial 
served as an important object of study because of its timing at the intersection of the 
antiwar movement, the Cold War, and the height of protest movements in the United 
States. The courtroom as a venue for anti-war protest was unique to anti-war protest as 
well. Also significant were the high profile defendants and their comical protest tactics 
(particularly by Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin), the binding and gagging of Bobby 
Seale in the courtroom, and the wide coverage of the trial in the press. The argument 
constructed by the defendants and the various frames used by the mainstream press 
served as an interesting case study of the ways that public moral arguments are created, 
constructed, and disseminated. 
Protest does not occur in isolation. Often, social movements precede other 
movements; other times, movements are sparked from or come to fruition alongside 
existing movements. Chapter 1 of this dissertation provided the long history of antiwar 




unpopular war in U.S. history. Perhaps because of the larger audience that the protesters 
gained because of the advent of the television, Vietnam is often remembered as the only 
war that United States citizens opposed. A historical analysis showed, however, that 
antiwar protesters used whatever means necessary to distribute their pacifist, isolationist, 
federalist, or other arguments against war. This chapter joined many disparate works that 
focused on individual cases of antiwar demonstrations and leaders, combining them into 
a longer history so that the anti-Vietnam War protesters in general and the Chicago Eight 
defendants in particular could be understood as part of that longer history.  
Chapter 2 provided a detailed account of the antiwar movement against the 
Vietnam War. I discussed its similarities to previous protests and noted the numerous 
differences of this dissent. In this chapter, I explained the context in which the defendants 
were protesting, the various groups to which each defendant belonged, and the actions at 
the Democratic National Convention that led to their arrests. The Chicago Eight Trial 
cannot be understood apart from the larger context of the Vietnam War; this was a 
political trial in which the defendants were attempting to make arguments about the 
morality of the war itself through their actions and testimony within the trial. 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the Chicago Eight defendants’ actions instantiated 
Bakhtin’s concept of carnival as they enacted protest activities within the limits of the 
courtroom setting. The defendants in the Chicago Eight Trial used carnivalesque 
techniques to make fun of the elite and to question the dominance of the elite over the 
powerless. In addition, the defendants used carnivalesque techniques to create public 
moral arguments they hoped would expose the injustices of the U.S. justice system, and 




War, particularly U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Although carnival is created by 
and addressed to those who do not have power, the audience does not always appreciate 
the humor of the protesters, making carnival a precarious way to create public moral 
arguments, as the protesters risk alienating potential supporters. In this case, the use of 
carnival by the Chicago Eight provoked the audience to consider the absurd nature of the 
Vietnam War and the role of government in foreign affairs.    
Chapter 4 reflected a slight departure from the antiwar history and Democratic 
National Convention events, focusing on Bobby Seale’s role within the Chicago Eight 
Trial independently from the other defendants. Seale’s case was unique because he 
represented the intersection of the trial with the civil rights movement. Bobby Seale’s 
experience reflected the Cold War policy of containment that was being applied to the 
civil rights movement as well as to the Communist menace abroad. Seale’s case was also 
unique because he was bound and gagged in the courtroom to keep him from enacting his 
guerilla theater. Although the other defendants were confined to jail, Seale’s physical 
containment in the courtroom proffered messages regarding the authority of the court 
system, the racism present in much of the United States, and the fear of civil rights 
leaders in the Cold War climate.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I examined the ways that stories were framed about the 
Chicago Eight Trial using theories of journalistic framing. The defendants’ messages can 
be understood through the collective action frame as they attempted to gain adherents to 
their movement, and the media often presented narratives through the marginalizing 
frame, in which they diminished the protesters by disseminating one-sided stories told by 




was easier for media to support the status quo based on economic, social, and political 
reasons, stories about the Chicago Eight Trial often sided with the judge, prosecutors, 
mayor, and the police at the Democratic National Convention, at least towards the 
beginning of the trial. The defendants struggled to advocate for their innocence and for 
their antiwar cause, using their court testimonies, speaking engagements, and press 
conferences to disseminate their side of the story to the mainstream press. However, as 
time went on, more sympathetic coverage of the trial occurred, perhaps due to public 
disapproval of the continued war, apathy towards ongoing protest, or obfuscation by even 
more radical groups. 
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation has contributed to the literature on antiwar discourse, the 
Chicago Eight Trial, Bakhtin's conception of carnival, civil rights, and media framing. 
The history of antiwar discourse, along with the account of Vietnam War protest, can be 
used to interpret antiwar discourse and media response concerning later U.S. wars. 
Additionally, future research could extend the discussion of framing. In particular, this 
dissertation contributes to the literature regarding story framing in terms of the trial and 
antiwar rhetoric. Future studies could utilize these notions to interpret media coverage of 
wars beyond Vietnam, particularly the War on Terror, and of social movements like the 
Black Lives Matter Movement, for example.   
Another future research trajectory would be to examine the collective memory of 
the trial. Collective memory would extend beyond media coverage of the trial to study 
the ways the American public has remembered (or forgotten) the trial. Examining the 




provide an interesting capstone to the history provided in the Introduction and first 
chapter of this dissertation. This research could examine film versions of the trial,2 for 
example, and the implications that remembering or forgetting this trial has for future 
antiwar protest. 
 Finally, this dissertation complicates the notion of the protest paradigm in media 
framing research. Journalists have the power to shape the coverage of political events 
through framing. Though there is room for journalists to form this coverage in a variety 
of ways, researchers tend to agree that the media follows a consistent pattern when 
covering stories about dissent and protest, which they call the protest paradigm. In their 
study of the Golden Jubilee School Affair, Joseph Man Chan and Chi-Chuan Lee argue 
that the political leaning of the news outlet influenced the coverage of the protest, either 
supporting, depoliticizing, or moralizing the protests.3 Because the media coverage of this 
trial included a large number of sources outside of the marginalizing frame, this research 
seems to challenge the protest paradigm, rather than uphold it. More research on the 
protest paradigm in terms of trials, multiple individual voices (8 defendants rather than 
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Appendix A: List of News Stories on Chicago Eight/Seven 
Stories Listed by Year, Newspaper, and Category of Framing 
1969 
New York Times 
Marginalizing 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Judge Orders Arrest of 4 Defense Attorneys as Trial Begins for  
Leaders of ’68 Chicago Demonstrations,” Sept. 25 
Seth King, “‘Chicago 8’ Denied Moratorium Day: Judge Bars Adjournment to Join in  
War Protests,” Oct. 14 
John Kifner, “Two of ‘Chicago 8’ Are Denied Paris Trip to Discuss P.O.W.’s,” Oct. 24 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Rubin Surrenders After He Leaves Trial,” Nov. 12  
J. Anthony Lukas, “Police Agent Says 2 Chicago Defendants Plotted Firebombings,”  
Nov. 13 
J. Anthony Lukas, “‘Chicago 7’ Judge Denies Motion for Mistrial by Lawyer Who  
Charges Bias,” Nov. 19  
J. Anthony Lukas, “Chicago Judge is Weighing Plea on Subversive Unit,” Nov. 21 
Special to the New York Times, “Plea on Informers Denied in Chicago,” Nov. 24 
Special to the New York Times, “Hoffman Rejects Defense Witness: Denies Permission  
to Bring Witness to Chicago Trial,” Nov. 26  
J. Anthony Lukas, “Clash Described at Chicago Trial: Police Official Says He Was  
Attacked by Demonstrator,” Nov. 28  
J. Anthony Lukas, “Judge Bars Film at Chicago Trial: Reverses Earlier Decision in  




Seth S. King, “Defense Witness Barred from Trial by Chicago Judge,” Dec. 8  
J. Anthony Lukas, “‘Om,’ Ginsberg’s Hindu Chant, Fails to Charm a Judge in Chicago,”  
Dec. 12 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Chicago Witness Backs Violent Revolt,” Dec. 16 
J. Anthony Lukas, “U.S. Prosecution of Chicago Police Called a ‘Sham,” Dec. 19  
Sympathetic 
Seth S. King, “Group to Ask End to Chicago Trial: Lawyers Petition to Allege Political  
Persecution,” Oct. 17 
Special to the New York Times, “Chicago Defendants Plan Capital March,” Oct. 27 
John Kifner, “Witness Denies Seeing Chicago 7 Commit Violence,” Nov. 18  
J. Anthony Lukas, “Allen Ginsberg Meets a Judge and is Clearly Misunderstood,” Dec.  
11 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Defendant in Trial of Chicago 7 Calls the Judge ‘Very Unfair,’” Dec.  
15 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Trial in Chicago Told of Beating: Ohio Editor Said He Saw  
Policeman Strike Youth,” Dec. 17 
J. Anthony Lukas, “First ‘Chicago 7’ Defendant Testifies,” Dec. 23 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Hoffman Ailing, Trial Adjourned: 1 of Chicago 7 in Hospital - Said  
to Have Pneumonia,” Dec. 24 
Balanced 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Daley to Appear as Defendants’ Witness in Chicago,” Nov. 11 
John Kifner, “Order on Police Agents Modified in Chicago Trial,” Nov. 25 




Special to the New York Times, “City Aide Testifies in Chicago 7 Trial,” Dec. 4 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Government Rests Case in Chicago Conspiracy Trial,” Dec. 5 
Special to the New York Times, “Chicago Conspiracy Trial Adjourned Until Monday,”  
Dec. 26 
Mixed 
Seth S. King, “Chicago 8 Defense Denied Bid to End Jury’s Confinement,” Oct. 10 
“Chicago Defendants Send a Telegram to Seaver,” Oct. 16 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Party Disrupts Chicago 8 Court: Turmoil Starts after Judge Bars 
Cake for Defendant,” Oct. 23 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Seale Put in Chains at Chicago 8 Trial,” Oct. 30  
Herbert H. Hinman, Jr., “Verdict in Chicago,” Nov. 12 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Trial of Chicago 7 Goes Into Overtime,” Nov. 14 
Special to the New York Times, “Chicago Film Shown Despite Objections,” Nov. 20 
J. Anthony Lukas, “British Woman M.P. is Heard at Chicago Trial,” Dec. 9 
J. Anthony Lukas, “Yippies’ Leader Tells the Judge Just What His ‘Party’ Believes,”  
Dec. 29 





William Chapman, “Edgy Chicago Awaits Trial of ‘8,’” Sept. 24 
William Chapman, “Tempers Flare at Trial of ‘8,’” Sept. 25 
William Chapman, “Judge Jails 2 Lawyers in Chicago Trial of ‘8,’” Sept. 27 




Sept. 30  
William Chapman, “‘Chicago 8’ Jurors Threatened,” Oct. 1 
William Chapman, “Yippie Leader Urged Violence, Witness Says,” Oct. 3 
Nicholas Von Hoffman, “‘A Nation Infiltrated:’ Poster ‘Guilty or Not Guilty is  
Immaterial,’” Oct. 6 
“Court is Told of Groin-Kick Riot Training,” Oct. 7 
Agent Hoped to Unveil Yippie Plot,” Oct. 9 
“Judge, ‘Chicago 8’ Lawyer Clash on Courtroom Guards,” Oct. 16 
“2 Clash Over Flag at Trial of ‘8,’” Oct. 16 
“Witness Says One of ‘8’ Incited Lawbreaking,” Oct. 17 
“Birthday Cake Furor Roils Chicago Trial,” Oct. 22 
“‘Friend’ Testifies Against the ‘Eight,’” Oct. 23 
“Judge Bans Paris Trip by Riot Figures,” Oct. 24 
“One of ‘Chicago 8’ Urged Firebombing, Trial Told,” Oct. 27 
William Chapman, “Judge Rejects Mistrial Motion by Riot-Conspiracy Defendants,”  
Nov. 7 
“Shortcircuiting the Judicial Process,” Nov. 12 
Ronald Goldfarb, “On Courting Contempt: Akin to Despotism,” Nov. 16 
“‘Chicago 7’ Lose Mistrial Motion,” Nov. 18 
“Chicago 7 Counsel Lectured by Judge,” Nov. 19  
Tom Fitzpatrick, “Defense Aide Ball Shocks Hoffman,” Nov. 20 
William Chapman, “Plot Proved, Chicago Prosecution Says,” Nov. 25 
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